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Network policies are ''traffic regulations" for the networks which make up the Internet. 
These are necessary for managing the flow of data, for access control to the network, and for 
managing the network to achieve other types of quality of service goals. However, with the 
myriad of different policies and networks, all with varying needs, conflicts can arise between 
network policies. Detecting and correcting these conflicts can be quite difficult for human 
administrators. Thus, there is a need for a theoretically sound method for specifying policy and 
for automatically detecting policy conflicts. 
This dissertation presents a path-based policy language that is more comprehensive than 
earlier languages for describing network policy. The Path-based Policy Language (PPL) is a 
formal language for constructing models of Internet service and access control. This path-based 
language is extensible and allows for an unambiguous representation of network policies based 
on both the static and dynamic attributes of today's networks. To support this language, both a 
compiler and policy conflict tester were developed. These tools accept network policies specified 
in PPL, translate them into formal logic, and using a theorem prover to test for policy conflicts. 
PPL allows for the efficient representation of large networks with its abbreviated path format. 
This path format allows multiple paths to be represented with one statement. 
v 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ l 
II. RELATED WORK .............................................................................................................................. 9 
A. POLICY-BASED ROUTING PROTOCOLS ................................•.....................•......................................... 9 
1. Border Gateway Protocol ............................................................................................................. 9 
2. Inter-Domain Routing Protocol .................................................................................................. 1 0 
3. Inter-Domain Policy Routing (/DPR) ......................................................................................... 11 
B. NETWORK POLICY LANGUAGES ....................................................................................................... 12 
1. Clark's Policy Term .................................................................................................................... 12 
2. Policy Framework Definition Language (PFDL) ....................................................................... 15 
3. RPSL- Routing Policy Specification Language ...................... .................................................. 18 
C. TRAFFIC FLOW LANGUAGES .................•..................................................................•........................ 20 
1. PAX Pattern Description Language (PDL) ................................................................................ 20 
2. Simple Ruleset Language (SRL) ................................................................................................. 22 
3. Summary of Network Policy Languages ..................................................................................... 23 
D. LoGIC REPRESENTATION OF POLICIES ..•............................................•............................................. .25 
1. Analyzing Consistency ofSecurity Policies ................................................................................ 25 
2. On the Axiomatization of Security Policies: Some Tentative Observations About Logic 
Representation ..................................................................................................................................... 26 
3. Policy Hierarchies for Distributed Systems Management .......................................................... 27 
4. Conflicts in Policy-based Distributed Systems Management ..................................................... 27 
5. A Formal Process for Testing the Consistency of Composed Security Policies ......................... 29 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY ...................................................•............................................................. 29 
III. PATH-BASED POLICY LANGUAGE (PPL) ................................................................................. 31 
A. INTRODUCTION ...........•..................................................................................................................... 31 
B. GOALS ........................................................................................................................................... .31 
1. Path & Non-Path Based Traffic Flows ....................................................................................... 31 
2. Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 32 
3. Unambiguous Policies ................................................................................................................ 32 
4. Detect & Resolve Conflicts ......................................................................................................... 32 
5. Dynamic Policies ........................................................................................................................ 33 
C. POLICIES ........•............•...•.................•........•.••...............•................................................................... 33 
1. Support of Integrated Services ................................................................................................... 33 
2. Support of Di.fferentiated Services .............................................................................................. 37 
3. Support ofMPLS ........................................................................................................................ 38 
4. Support of Static Policies ........................................................................................................... 38 
D. MESSAGES ................................................................................................................................... .39 
E. PPL POLICY FORMAT ........................................................................................................................ 40 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ .42 
IV. POLICY CONFLICT DETECTION AND RESOLUTION ........................................................... 43 
A. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ .43 
B. DETECTING CONFLICTS .................................................................................................................... .46 
1. Basic Conjlicts ............................................................................................................................ 47 
2. Expanding Paths ......................................................................................................................... 48 
3. Conditional Overlaps ................................................................................................................. 49 
4. Find Overlapping Paths using Expanded Path and Conditional Elements ................................ 59 
vii 
5. Expanding Target Elements with Consideration of Action ltemsoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo59 
C. RESOLVING CONFLICTS ....................................................................... 00 ••••••••••••••• 00 ••••••••••••• 00 ........... 61 
D. PERFORMANCE ................................................ oo .............................. oo ....................... oo ................ 62 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY ............................................... 00 ................................................................ 63 
V. CASE STUDY ..................................................................................................................................... 65 
A. A I 0 NODE SIMULATED NETWORK .............................................. 00 .................................... 00 •• 65 
B. NETWORK MODELING AND USER DEFINED DATA .... oo ....... oo .. oo ........................................ oooo .............. 66 
C. NETWORK POLICIES ..................................................................................................................... 00 •• 69 
D. DETECTED CONFLICTS .................................................................................................................. 71 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY ................ oo ....................................................... oo ...................... oo .... oo .... oo .. 78 
VI. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................ 79 
A. CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS .. 00 ............ 00 ................. 00 .................................................................... 79 
B. CONTRIBUTIONS ............................................................................................................................... 79 
C. LIMITATIONS .................................................................................................................................... 80 
D. FUTURE DIRECTIONS ........................................................................................................................ 81 
APPENDIX A. PATH-BASED POLICY LANGUAGE (PPL) ................................................................ 85 
1. Keywords.oo.oo•····•oooo••oo·········oo .. oo ................. oooooo ..... oo·······oo•oooooo•oo•oo·oo·· .. oo•oooo .. oo .. oo .... ooooo•oo···oo ...... 85 
2. Define Statements .... oo.ooooooOOOOooooo•oo··•oooo .......... oooo.oo .... oo.ooooooo·oo·•oo•oo•oo•oo••oooooooo ... oo ....... ooooooo •• oo ••••••• 86 
3. Policy JD •• oo.oo•·····oooo•oo·• .. oo ........ oo.oooo ................... oo ......... oooo•oo•oo•oo···oo·ooooooo·oo .... oo.oo ..... oo •• oo.oooo•· ...... 86 
4. User /Doo •• oo ........... oo .. oooo•oo·····oooo.oo·oo····· .. oo·oo ...... ooooooooooooooooooooooooo.oo•oo•oo ... oo.ooooooooooo.oo •• oooo •• oo.oooooo ... 86 
5. Paths ..... oo .............. oo.oo ...... oo ..... oo .. ··oo·oo .... ·oo·····oooooooo•·····•ooooooooooooooo··oo·oo .. ooooooooooooo··········oooooooo ....... 86 
6. Target ......................................................................................................................................... 87 
7. Conditions ..... oo •••• oooooo•oo········ooooooo•oo··oo····oo·· ..... oo ..... oooo ••••• oo.oooooooo•OOoo•oo··········oo·oo·········oo·oo·•00 00 ..... 87 
8. Action ltemsoo.·oo····oo•oooo .. oo.oo··•oooo····oooooooooooooooooo··oo•oo····oooo .. oo.oo•oo•·oo··oo•oooo•·oo··oo··oo···oo·•oo•oo .. oo ......... 87 9. Legal Variables .. oo ••••• oo.oooooo•·•oooo····oooo····oooo··oo····ooooo·oo·oo·····oo··oooooo•oo····oo···oooooo·····oo·····oooo ••••••••• oo •• 87 
10. Dot Quad notation.oooo .. oo .. oo.ooooooo•oo·····oo···oo••oooooo ...... oo .. oo ... oo.oooo••oo•ooooooooooooooo .. oo ........ ooooooooooooooooooo.87 
11. Reserved Symbols. oo• 00 00 •••• oo. 00000 ••• 00 •• 00 000 000 ••••• 00 •• 00 00 00 00 ••••• 0000 00 0000 000.00 •• 000 00 oo· 00 00 •• oo• 000 •• 000.00 ••• 0000 00 ••••••• 88 
12. Comments .. oo,ooooooooo·oo•oo•oo ....... oooo••••oooo···•oooooooooooo•·oo·····oo•·oo•oo••ooooooooooooo•···oo•oooo•····oooooo•··ooooooo········88 
13. Formal Grammar ooooooooooooooooooooo •• ooooooooo•oo················oooo•··oooo•oo• .. ·oo····oo.oooooo·······oo··········oo·····•ooooooo.88 
APPENDIX B. POLICY RULE INPUT FILE OF CASE STUDY .......................................................... 93 
APPENDIX C. POLICY RULE OUTPUT FILE FOR CASE STUDY .................................................. 97 
APPENDIX D. PPL PARSER SOURCE CODE .................................................................................... 103 
APPENDIX E. PROLOG CONFLICT DETECTION CODE ............................................................... 123 
LIST OF REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................... 171 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................................................. 175 
viii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This research was supported in part by DARPA under the Next Generation Internet Program (Order# 




Millions of dollars are lost, a company folds, and thousands of employees are let go, 
throwing a community into economic chaos. These events could result from discontinued 
funding from Silicon Valley investors who became aware of continued reports of poor QoS, 
security problems, and the inability for clients to access the company's web sites. This ingenious 
company was the first to integrate voice, video, and data all on the same network based on a 
company's policies. The company's untimely demise was the result of conflicting network 
policies that were disseminated automatically throughout the network's policy servers causing 
erratic network performance. This scenario, although extreme, shows the importance of being 
able to represent the network policy goals of a company while simultaneously verifying that 
those goals do not conflict with each other. 
To understand how policy can play a role in managing a network, policy must be defined 
and applied to communication networks. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has 
proposed an Internet-draft of terminology for describing network policy [29] and provides many 
of the definitions used throughout this paper. 
A policy is formally defined "as an aggregation of policy rules. Each policy rule is 
comprised of a set of conditions and a corresponding set of actions. The conditions define when 
the policy rule is applicable. Once a policy rule is so activated, one or more actions contained by 
that policy rule may then be executed. These actions are associated with either meeting or not 
meeting the set of conditions specified in the policy rule" [29]. In other words, a policy specifies 
what action(s) must be taken when a set of associated conditions are met. 
A simple view of policy in regards to networks is that policy constrains communication. 
Specifically, network policy defines the relationship between clients using network resources and 
those network elements that provide those resources. A client in this case refers to users as well 
· as applications and services. 
Network policy allows administrators to manage network elements to provide service to 
a set of clients. If every system were permitted to communicate with all other systems without 
restriction, then there would be no need for network policies. Increasingly, networks that once 
only supported best-effort traffic are now integrating voice and data as well. Without a means for 
network managers to control the use of the network, mission-critical applications and general 
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network performance is going to suffer and there will be little hope of supporting future real-time 
applications. 
Network policies are grouped into three general areas: 
1. how the policy is used 
2. how the policy is triggered 
3. what level the policy is applied 
A usage policy describes what services will be used to maintain the current state of the 
network or to transition to a new state. Services which may be available in the network are 
differentiated service classes, virtual private networks, encryption capability, etc. A usage policy 
also describes how those services will be used. For example the ability to differentiate the 
handling of separate flows of traffic based on the service class they reside in, or which virtual 
channel they belong to, describes how a service is used. 
Policies can be triggered in two ways, either statically or dynamically. "Static policies 
apply a fixed set of actions in a pre-determined way according to a set of pre-defined parameters 
that determine how the policy is used"[29]. Examples of static policies are: 
• transit traffic in not permitted during normal working hours 
• Internet radio is only permitted after 4:00PM 
• for security reasons certain network addresses are denied access to network resources 
Dynamic policies are only enforced when needed, and are based on changing conditions 
of the network such as congestion, packet loss, or the loss of a network router. To support the 
dynamic and sometimes unexpected nature of the network, actions can be triggered when an 
event causes a policy condition to be met. Examples of dynamic polices are: 
• when the network gets congested, streaming video traffic is disallowed; 
• when gold class user is utilizing the network, lower best-effort traffic to only 25% of link 
capacity. 
The level of the policy can also be applied as a category. These policies are differentiated 
by their granularity, such as the application level, user level, class level, or service level. For 
example a mission critical application may be given priority over all other network traffic, or all 
users in the silver class (differentiated service) have priority over the bronze class but must 
succumb to the gold class. 
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In this thesis, a network policy language based on path is introduced. Path-based policy 
is defined to be a policy were all attributes associated with the policy, which include the service 
type of the traffic, conditions used to trigger the policy, and the actions executed when the policy 
is triggered, are all bound to a predefined path. Using path as the fundamental building block of a 
policy statement provides great control and flexibility. The ability to specify an explicit path, 
which represents each node from source to destination, enables us to create virtual channels 
where resources are reserved to support real time applications. These paths can either be 
specified by a user or by a network administrator. If a path had the restriction of always including 
each node in the path, then the number of unique paths needed to support a network could soon 
become over whelming. This is why a path may include wild card characters, and thus adds great 
flexibility to the way policies are specified. The use of a wild card character allows for path 
aggregation which greatly reduces the number of paths that have to be specified, and at the 
extreme one path statement can specify all possible paths under an administrator's control. 
Policy-based networking - the ability to control a networking environment by specifying 
and enforcing policies - is gaining increased interest among the network community. Policy-
based networking helps manage user and applications priority, quality of service and security 
rights, based on management policies. Because of an increasing industry trend to deploy business 
applications over the network and the convergence of voice, video and data applications on the 
same network, major network vendors such as Cisco, Nortel, and Lucent Technologies are 
developing products to support network management. These products allow network managers to 
create and implement policies that can prioritize the use of network resources by different 
network applications so that bandwidth will be guaranteed to the most business-critical 
applications during times of network congestion. For example, a company which offers IP 
telephony - which has strict timing requirements - must not permit a large data file transfer to 
interfere. Network management also provides the ability to restrict the use of network segments 
by denying access of unwanted and perhaps malicious traffic. The ability to create and enforce 
network policies adds intelligence to a network that was previously based only on best-effort 
packet traffic. Rather than adding more bandwidth, which is expensive and time consuming, to 
solve existing network congestion, companies can use network policies to allow for important 
applications and user groups to receive network priority over secondary network users. 
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Many aspects of policy-based networking are being addressed such as policy storage 
structures, policy servers, and protocols to deliver translated policies to enforcement points. One 
aspect of policy-based networking that does not seem to be receiving much attention is the 
verification of policies that are going to be applied to the network. Consistent enforcement of 
network policies, often specified by different people at different times, is impossible if those 
policies conflict with each other. Thus, a method is needed to detect and deal with conflicting 
policies before they are distributed throughout the network to the policy enforcement points. 
IETF Policy Framework Core Information Model 
With the emergence of service models such as Differentiated Services (DS) [25,37], 
Integrated Services (IS) [25,37], and Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) [36,37], the IETF 
has published a working draft for terminology to describe network policies and services [29]. 
This draft attempts to develop a scalable framework for policy administration and distribution of 
network policies across multiple devices and multiple vendors. A key to this framework is a 
common language to represent and provide a consistent implementation of policy. 
An underlying assumption of this draft is that policies are stored in a centralized 
repository. The policy repository is one of three important entities of the model. The other 
entities are the Policy Enforcement Points (PEP) and Policy Decision Point (PDP). 
The PEP is a component of a network node (e.g., a router, switch, or hub) where the 
policy decisions are actually enforced. When the PEP requires a policy decision about a new 
flow of traffic, or authentication for example, the PEP will send a request to a PDP. 
The PDP is the entity in the network where policy decisions are made. This PDP, which 
may reside on a remote server, will make policy decisions using information retrieved from 
policy repositories. 
Communication is needed to and from the policy repository as well as between the PDP 
and the PEP. In many proposals the policy repository is a directory and therefore the appropriate 
access protocol would be the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). Examples of a 
policy protocol, which is used to request and reply to policy decisions, could be the Common 
Open Policy Service protocol (COPS) [3] and the Simple Network Management Protocol 
(SNMP) [5]. 
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Figure 1 shows the components of a generic policy-based network management 
architecture. Although each ofthe components are displayed separately in the figure, they do not 















Repository Access Protocol 
(e.g.IDAP) 
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Policy Protocol 
(e.g. COPS or SNMP) 
Figure 1. Generic Policy Based Architecture. After [29] 
Since the PEPs can potentially be from multiple vendors, a common policy language is 
needed to support the dissemination of policy information to these devices. In the Policy 
Framework Core Information Model [32], policy is defined as an aggregation of policy rules. 
Each of these policy rules is composed of a set of conditions and a set of actions to perform if the 
conditions are met. The general form of these conditional statements is shown below. 
IF <condition 1> AND <condition 2> ... AND <condition N> 
THEN <action 1> ... AND <action N> 
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The policy representation includes a means to prioritize and order both the conditional 
statements as well as the policy actions. This is crucial when multiple policies exist and these 
policies conflict. A conflict occurs when the conditions of at least two policies are 
simultaneously satisfied, but the actions of at least one of the policies can not be simultaneously 
executed. For example, a router may have two access control rules where their conditions are 
simultaneously satisfied, but one contains that action deny, the other permit. For example: 
access-list 1 permit 131.1.30.0 0.0.0.255 
access-list 1 deny 131.1.0.0 0.0.255.255 
The first permits traffic with IP addresses beginning with 131.1.30 to pass. The second 
rule conflicts with the previous one by denying traffic with any IP address beginning with 131.1. 
The first rule in an access list that satisfies the conditional requirement is executed. This 
procedure resolves conflicts but puts the onus on the operator to enter the rules in the correct 
order. 
It was hypothesized that it is possible to detect conflicting network policies when those 
policies are specified using an unambiguous language. To support this hypothesize, a language 
was designed that can represent network policies in an abstract and unambiguous way. Using 
formal methods a compiler was implemented that can detect conflicts between multiple network 
policies. It was also hypothesized that it is possible to resolve some policy conflicts 
automatically. This resolution is done with a limited scope, but the concept can be expanded to 
support other conflict resolution schemes. 
It is envisioned that the Path-based Policy Language (PPL) compiler and conflict tester 
will be utilized in a network such as depicted in Figure 2. A secure user interface will be needed 
to control access to the PPL configuration file, which contains network connectivity information 
as well as the policies used to regulate the network. A cycle should develop as the network 
policies are created and modified until when composed together, they no longer generate 
conflicts. Once a conflict free set of policies has been specified, they will be distributed to a 
policy server where they can be used to regulate the network. It is expected that network devices 
will provide information about the current state of the network, such as delay, loss_rate, etc., and 
this information along with the specified policies will be used to response to requests made for 
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network resources. A protocol such as the Simple Network Management Protocol (SMTP) could 
be used to provide status about the current state of network, which then could be used in the 
decision making process of allocating resources. 
Existing protocols such as the Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP), could be used to 
make requests to the policy server in order to reserve network resources. The policy server would 
then apply network policies, as well as the current state of the network to the decision making 
process. New initiatives such as the Server and Agent based Active network Management 
(SAAM) [38] project, could also utilize this technology. SAAM makes efficient use of network 
resources in the support Integrated Services. The ability to extract the complex decision making 
process from overtaxed routers, and place it into a small number of dedicated servers, fits very 
well into the SAAM architecture. 






Figure 2. Network Configuration Utilizing PPL 
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The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II reviews work related to the representation of network policies, as well as the 
use of formal logic to detect conflicting security and management policies. These representations 
of network policy are based on different levels of abstraction. These levels are policy-based 
routing protocols, high level representations without low-level details, and languages based on 
the representation of patterns that can be used in the selection of network traffic. A lot of early 
work on the use of policies in networks occurred in the context of these network policy 
representations. The formal logic section reviews previous efforts of using formal logic to 
determine consistency between policies. 
Chapter III introduces the Path-based Policy Language (PPL). The goal was to represent 
network policies at an abstract level in order to support heterogeneous networks, while also 
providing the translation of those policies into formal logic. Having policies represented in logic 
will provide the ability for a compiler, which uses the Pro log (PROgramming in LOGic) 
language, to detect conflicting network policies. 
Chapter IV presents a formal process for testing the consistency of multiple network 
policies applied to the same network segment. 
Chapter V represents the formal process of detecting, and the possible resolution of 
conflicting network policies applied to multiple case studies. 
Chapter VI presents the conclusions, contributions, limitations, and future direction of 
network policy representation and conflict detection using PPL. 
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II. RELATED WORK 
A. POLICY-BASED ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
In this section three policy-based routing protocols are reviewed. These routing protocols 
provided a lot of early work on the use of policies in networks. All of these protocols enable 
policies to be enforced based on the elements of an explicit path through the network. 
1. Border Gateway Protocol 
Lougheed and Rekhter define an inter-autonomous routing protocol, Border Gateway 
Protocol (BGP) [13, 14, 15], where routers share reachability information by passing 
Autonomous System l(AS) information between neighbors. This exchange of routing 
information contains full AS paths that the traffic will transit to reach a distant network. Path 
information is not only useful in removing loops in the network, but also allows policy decisions 
to be made at the AS level. Policy enforcement is not part of the protocol itself but instead is 
manually configured at each BGP router. 
Policy decisions made by BGP [16, 9] are based on configuration information manually 
configured into each router by an AS administrator. The enforcement of policies is accomplished 
in two ways. The first is by specifying the procedure by the AS router itself to select the best 
paths, and the second is by controlling the redistribution of routing information to neighboring 
ASs. 
Policy decisions can be based on various preferences and constraints. Since the complete 
AS path is advertised to neighboring routers, particular paths can be rejected based on an AS that 
is contained in the path. The reasons a particular path are rejected vary. For example a particular 
AS whose control is under that of a major competitor may want to be avoided, causing one or 
more paths that include this AS to be eliminated from consideration. Performance information 
can also be used to eliminate paths from consideration. If an AS has access to metrics related to 
1 Autonomous System (AS), Administrative Region (AR) are a set of routers under a single 
technical administration, using one or more interior gateway protocols to route packets within the 
AS, and using an exterior gateway protocol to route packets to other ASs[n3]. 
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performance such as link speed, delay, or capacity, then these measurements can be used to rate 
multiple paths for selection. 
BGP allowing an AS to control redistribution of routing information is the means by 
which an AS can enforce policies on others. For example, if an AS does not want to be used for 
transit traffic, then it does so by not advertising routes to networks other than those directly 
connected to it. 
Fundamentally BGP is a distance vector protocol, but instead of maintaining just the cost 
to each destination, BGP keeps track of the exact path used. As mentioned earlier policies are not 
part of the BGP protocol itself and therefore each AS may have its own means for evaluating 
paths. Each router contains a module for examining paths to a given destination and scores them. 
This scoring mechanism, which may include local policy information, is then used to choose the 
best path to a destination. 
BGP routers can only advertise paths that itself uses. This prevents an AS from sending 
datagrams to a distant network using one path, but advertising an alternative path for others to 
use. This "hop-by-hop" routing paradigm which is generally used by the current Internet prevents 
the support of source routing. 
2. Inter-Domain Routing Protocol 
Kunzinger and Thomas describe the Inter-Domain Routing Protocol (IDRP) [10, 34], 
which is the International Standards Organization's (ISO) protocol for routing between 
Autonomous Systems. Just as in BGP, IDRP supports policy-based routing, but is not concerned 
with the implementation details of those policies. Policy-based routing can restrict access, and 
therefore enforce policy, by controlling the distribution of routing information to neighboring 
routers. This selective distribution of information can enable the AS to deny all transit traffic, or 
may deny access to only certain network paths. 
The IDRP router accepts router information from neighboring routers, which express 
their views of the network, and uses this gathered information to construct it's own view of the 
network. The IDRP router at this point can use local policy information to select or reject routes 
accordingly. The IDRP router advertises it's view of the network with internal gateway protocols 
such as Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) or Routing Information Protocol (RIP) so that all 
routers within the AS have a consistent view of the network. 
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Just as autonomous systems were used to refer to an entire set of IP networks, IDRP 
supports a concept call routing confederations. A routing confederation is a grouping of 
autonomous systems to make managing the Internet more manageable. As the Internet has grown, 
the number of autonomous systems has also grown making it's management less efficient. These 
routing confederations are quite flexible in that they can be subsets of each other, and can even 
overlap each other. 
IDRP uses path vector routing to propagate routing information. Path vector routing, like 
BGP, explicitly lists the entire path to each destination. This concept can alleviate network loops 
as well as enforce policy constraints based on the autonomous systems or confederations that 
comprise the path. 
Another feature supported in IDRP is the ability to reduce the number of path vectors by 
using route aggregation. Route aggregation lets an IDRP routers combine multiple IP address 
prefixes, destinations, to create a single advertisement for them all. This feature greatly reduces 
the number of individual destinations a router must support as well as reducing the amount of 
data that has to be sent during the advertising phase. 
3. Inter-Domain Policy Routing (IDPR) 
Steenstrup presents a set of protocols [28] and an architecture in [27] for Inter-Domain 
Policy Routing (IDPR). IDPR is a routing protocol that provides policy routing among 
Administrative Domains (ADs)2. The primary objective ofiDPR is to provide traffic with routes 
that satisfy the users' service requirements while respecting the service providers' service 
restrictions [26]. Source policies represent the users' requirements and can consist of parameters, 
such as throughput, acceptable delay, cost of session, domains to avoid, etc. Service providers 
specify transit policies which specify offered services and the conditions of their use. 
During route generation and selection, routes are filtered out which are not consistent 
with both the source and transit policies. Route generation is inherently complex and the most 
computationally intensive part of IDPR. The general policy route generation problem involves a 
2 Administrative domain (AD) refers to any collection of contiguous networks, gateways, links, 
and hosts governed by a single administrative authority who selects the intra-domain routing 
procedures and addressing schemes, specifies service restrictions for transit traffic, and defines 
service requirements for locally generated traffic. 
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combination of service constraints. For example, finding a route that generates minimum-delay 
and least-cost. Trying to calculate such a route is an NP-complete problem. 
To transport data along a selected route, a hop-by-hop or source specific method can be 
used. With hop-by-hop forwarding, each router makes an independent forwarding decision based 
on its forwarding information database. If all the routers have consistent information then the 
result is the same as source specific. With source specific, the source domain dictates the data 
message forwarding decisions to the routing entities in each intermediate domain, which then 
forward data messages according to the source specification. 
To reduce the size of the link-state database, IDRP supports the ability to group ADs into 
super domains. The existence of super domains imposes a domain hierarchy within the network. 
With a hierarchical approach only domain level information is needed to construct routes. This 
greatly reduces the information needed to be maintained by a route server. The size of the 
database will now depend on the number of domains and the policies associated with each. 
A variant of Clark's policy term, Section B.l, was chosen to represent policies in [28]. 
This variant allows for policies to be associated with a set of network elements that represents a 
path. A policy based on path is a great asset to policy-based r~uting protocols. 
B. NETWORK POLICY LANGUAGES 
In this section all the major policy languages are discussed. These languages are used to 
represent varying types of network policies such as routing, access, and QoS. 
1. ·Clark's Policy Term 
Seeing the importance of using network resources differently and more efficiently, Clark 
proposed a template to represent network policies [7]. This template, called a Policy Term, was 
designed to enable a wide range of network policies to be represented. The work is based on the 
fundamental assumption that Internet resources are grouped into Administrative Regions (ARs). 
ARs resources included such items as networks, links, routers, and gateways. The format of a 
Policy Term is shown in Figure 3. 
The first two "elements" of the Policy Term represent the source and destination points 
respectively. Each of these two points consist of three parts which provide for a wide range of 
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granularity while specifying the end points. To show the granularity available with this schema, 
here are some examples of source and destination points that could be represented with the 
diagram in Figure 4. These source and destination points use the special characters "*" and"-". 
The"*" represents the wild-card 
((Hs,ARs,ARent), (Hd,ARd,ARexit), UCI, Cg) 
where: 
Hs is the source host address 
ARs is the source AR 
ARent is the entry AR (previous hop) 
Hd is the destination host address 
ARd is the destination AR 
ARexit is the exit (last hop) 
UCI is the User Class Id (e.g. Gold, Silver Bronze service levels) 
Cg are any global conditions 
Figure 3. Policy Term. After [7] 
match and the"-" is used to make sure the AR entry or AR exit fields match the source 
AR or destination AR respectively. These examples could be applied to AR 2. 
(*, *, *) (*,*,*) 
No restrictions, allow all traffic flows to traverse without restriction. 
(*, 36, -) (*, 12,*) 
Allow all hosts directly attached to AR 36 to pass if their destination goes through AR 12 
(e.g., host 131.120.1.13 may communicate with 216.34.20.1) 
(131.120.1.13, 36, -) (216.32.74.53, 2,-) 
The host with IP address 131.120.1.13 in AR 36 may communicate with the host with IP 
address 216.32.74.53 in the AR 2. 
As the reader can see, the end points can be as explicit as specifying a host or generic 
enough to allow all Internet traffic. Although the use of these first two elements provides for a 
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flexible way to permit traffic flow, it can become cumbersome at times. If, for example, the 
reader wanted to allow only traffic from universities to flow across an AR, it could be 
accomplished by creating many policy terms, one for each university. This list of policy terms 
could become quite large, so the third "element" of the policy term, UCI, can be used to make the 
implementation of this policy more manageable. A policy term that would only allow university 
traffic to flow across an AR could be represented like this: 
((*,*,*),(*,*,*),University,*) 
The end points are such that if the UCI element was not used, then all traffic would flow 
across the AR. Using the UCI as a filter, only traffic marked with a University tag would 
be permitted to pass. 
The last element field of the policy term, Cg, is used for global conditions. Examples of 
information that might be held in this field are, "unauthenticated UCI", "no-per-packet charge", 
and "limited ton% of available bandwidth". 
((*,*,*),(*,*,*),University, {unauthenticated UCI}) 
This would allow only traffic marked as University to flow through the AR. There is no 
need to verify that the packet traffic was really from a university host. 
IP = 216.34.20.1 
IP = 216.32.74.53 
IP = 131.120.1.13 
IP = 216.32.74.50 
Figure 4. Sample Network Diagram 
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Although this was a good start for an abstract network policy representation, which is 
needed for heterogeneous environments, it has limitations. The first limitation is that there is no 
ability to represent explicit paths formed by a sequence of ARs as part of the term. Only single 
ARs and the wild card character "*" are allowed. Without this capability, support of Integrated 
Services requires several network policies distributed throughout the network to be combined for 
verification of a path. Consequently, there is no ability to exclude a set of ARs from a term to 
which a general policy is applied. Lastly, it may be desirable to represent a policy that is 
directional, so that a connection can be opened in one direction that has different conditions than 
the reverse flow. As defined in the language policy terms are bi-directional. 
2. Policy Framework Definition Language (PFDL) 
Strassner and Schliemier define the language PFDL [31] that provides a mapping of 
network service requirements from a business specification to a vendor- and device- independent 
format. The benefits of such a language is that network policy can exist in a heterogeneous 
environment of devices that support policy enforcement. 
With the development of standards to provide QoS, like integrated services with RSVP3 
and differentiated services, the IETF working group on Policy Management has proposed this 
language. The belief is that without a means for representing, administrating, and distributing 
consistent policy information, these QoS standards that classify and give preferential treatment to 
certain types of traffic flows will not see wide-scale deployment. 
In this first release of the draft, the grammar was only available in Backus-Naur Form 
(BNF) and no explicit examples were presented. Attributes the authors believe should be 
supported by the language are discussed. As with many of these efforts to represent policy, the 
authors believe that having a language that will support multiple network devices and vendors is 
the key to successful policy deployment. 
The design of PFDL is based on the Common Information Model (CIM) [32] being 
designed by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF). This model defines a hierarchy of 
. 
object classes that can be used to represent policy information. 
3 Resource Reservation Protocol defines how applications can place reservations, and how they 
can relinquish those resources once their need ends. 
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The class and relationship hierarchy of the CIM model are used to help define the 
structure of the PFDL grammar, see Figure 5. The basic premise is that a policy is an 
aggregation4 of policy rules. A policy rule defines a sequence of actions to be initiated when a 
corresponding set of conditions is satisfied. Five classes defined to support the CIM are the 
ComplexPolicy class, SimplePolicy class, PolicyRule class, PolicyCondition class, and the 
PolicyAction class. Their relationship to each other is shown in Figure 5. A PolicyRule contains a 
set of PolicyConditions and a set of PolicyActions. When the set of PolicyConditions are meet, 
the set of PolicyActions will be executed. 
A PolicyConditionStatement is composed of a category and value pair. These two 
components are specific to a particular knowledge domain, whether the domain be QoS, security, 
or any other domain. Providing conditions and actions for a given knowledge domain 
accommodates the interoperability requirement for the language. It will provide the means for 
multiple vendors to supply components to a general policy architecture. 
A PolicyAction is a class in the PFDL model that consists of an action or a list of actions 
that will be executed when the conditions associated with a policy are evaluated to true. These 
actions can either be executed in a specific order, or any order which is the default. Along with 
the ordering of policy actions, the ability exists for the conditional execution of one or more 
actions based on the results of previous actions. The reader can see from Figure 5. that the 
hierarchy of the Policy Actions class is similar to the PolicyConditions class. 
With possibly hundreds, perhaps thousands of policies to be supported in a network, the 
ability to detect conflicting policies is crucial. The authors ofPFDL are aware of the need to both 
detect as well as support facilities to resolve conflicts. This proposal groups policy conflicts into 
two different categories, intra-policy and inter-policy conflicts. 
Intra-policy conflicts are caused when the conditions of at least two policies are 
simultaneous satisfied, but the execution of the actions of these policies cannot be executed at 
the same time. Inter-policy conflicts are described as two or more policies that, when applied to 
the network, result in conflicting configuration commands to be specified for one or more 
network devices. In this case, the conflict exists when the policy is applied to a specific network 
or device(s). An example given in the proposal is when two policies are executed such that the 
4 An aggregation is a string form of an association. An aggregation is usually used to represent a 
"whole-part" relationship. 
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number of queues in one network device is such that it does not match the number of queues 
allocated in a second device supporting the same traffic flow. 
Once conflicting policies are detected, they may be resolved in several different ways. 
The most obvious would be to modify the conditions or actions of the policies to remove the 
conflict. If this cannot be accomplished and the conflicting policies must exist in the system, 
there are three different ways to resolve them: 
l..n 
Policy Rules 
Policy Action Value 
Figure 5. PFDL Hierarchy. After [32] 
1. Resolve the conflict by only executing the first policy in the conflicting set. 
2. Use a priority scheme where only the highest priority policy in a conflicting situation will be 
executed. 
3. Use some type ofmetadata to determine which rule should be applied. The difference 
between this and straight priority is that priority is inherently linear, whereas metadata 
enables non-linear solutions, such as branching, to be used. 
17 
PFDL does not support path-based policies. A Path-based capability aids in initiatives 
such as Integrated Services [25, 37] and SAAM (Server and Agent based Active network 
Management) [38]. PFDL is a nice high-level framework, but lots of details need to be filled in. 
3. RPSL - Routing Policy Specification Language 
One of the activities of the Routing Policy System working group of the IETF is to 
develop a language for describing routing policy constraints. Alaettinolgu, Meyer et. al. provide a 
reference for the language [1] and a guide on how to use the language [19]. RPSL is a 
replacement for RIPE-81, the first language deployed in the Internet for specifying routing 
policies, and is the current Internet policy specification language. Specifying policies in RPSL 
allows a network operator to specify routing policies in the Internet Routing Registry (IRR), so 
that policies and announcements can be checked for consistency. The IRR stores the object-
oriented policies of authorized organizations so that they can be queried by others using the 
whois5 service. Each object which contributes to a policy stores pieces of information regarding 
the policy. Each object used to represent the policies contains attributes referred to as keys, that 
can either be mandatory or optional. RPSL is designed so that router configurations can be 
generated from the policies described with the language. 
Figure 6 is an example from [19] that represents a common but perhaps simple policy. 
The aut-num represents the Autonomous System number, in this case AS2 represents 
autonomous system 2. The as-name and descr attributes are the Autonomous System's name and 
description, respectively. The most important attributes of this aut-num are the import and export 
policies. The import clause specifies the import policies, while the export clause specifies export 
policies. 
5 WHO IS is used to look up records in a Who is database. Each record has a "handle", a unique 
identifier assigned to it by the Network Information Center (NIC). Each whois record will also 




as-name:CA T -NET 
descr: Catatonic State University 
import: from AS I accept ANY 
import: from AS3 accept <AAS3+$> 
export: to AS3 announce ANY 






Figure 6. RPSL Diagram and Policy Example. From [19] 
In this example, the import policy of "from AS 1 accept ANY" indicates that AS2 will 
accept any announcements that AS 1 sends. The second import policy states that AS2 only 
accepts announcements from AS3 which originated in A~3 and have paths composed of only 
AS3's. 
The export policy of "to AS3 announce ANY" indicates that any route that AS2 has in its 
routing table will be passed on to AS3. The second export will allow the announcements of all 
routes from AS2 or routes learned from AS3 to be sent to AS 1. 
The admin-c (administrative), tech-c (technical), mnt-by (maintained by), and changed 
(last changed by), are attributes that contain contact information. The values assigned to these 
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attributes are handles that uniquely identity the person responsible for the attribute. The sour. 
entry indicates that this object belongs to the RIPE6 registry. 
RPSL represents routing policies well, but was not intended for supporting polici( · 
regarding QoS or general access control mechanisms. 
C. TRAFFIC FLOW LANGUAGES 
This section discusses languages that are used in the selection of network traffic in the 
conditional section of a policy. At a lower level than the languages in Section 2, these languages 
can be used for pattern matching in network devices. 
1. PAX Pattern Description Language (PDL) 
Nossik, Welfeld, and Richardson describe PAX [23], a special purpose language used for 
defining pattern matching criteria in policy-based networking devices. PAX was intended 
primarily for data communications networks, but is also generic enough to be used for any kind 
of pattern recognition. 
The language itself was designed to be much like that of the C programming language. 
Viewing the code of a PAX program, the reader will see features similar to C such as comments, 
preprocessing directives, source file inclusion, conditional compilation, import and export 
statements, and the use of defines and macros. 
The basic concept in PAX is the pattern, with simple patterns being combined to form 
more complex patterns. The use of field concatenation, field combination, and the ability to name 
patterns leads to a flexible and powerful language for describing patterns in data communication. 
Examples from [23] will provide the reader with a quick idea of the syntax and features 
of the language. Two built-in fields used in the following examples are BIT and UINT and are 
used to create the simplest of patterns. 
6 The RIPE Network Coordination Centre acts as the Regional Internet Registry (RIR) for 
Europe and surrounding areas 
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BIT 16 - matches any 16 bits in the input 
UINT 4 - matches any 4 bits and value of those bits are converted to an unsigned 
numeric field 
Figure 7 illustrates a pattern to match IP version 4 headers of TCPIIP non-fragmented 
packets without IP options. This figure shows how simple patterns can be concatenated together 
to form more complex patterns. This pattern matches the input only when the 4 bit "version" 
element is equal to decimal 4, the next element "ihl" equals the decimal value 5, and the 
subsequent simple patterns are all successfully matched. 
{ 
} 
version UINT 4 = = 4; 
ihl UINT 4 = = 5; 
typeOfService UINT 8; 
totalLength UINT 16; 
identification UINT 16; 
flagReserved BIT 1 = = 0; 
flagDontFragment BIT 1; 
flagMoreFragments BIT 1 = = 0; 
fragmentOffset UINT 13 = = 0; 
timeToLive UINT 8; 
protocol BIT 8 = = 6; 
headerChecksum BIT 16; 
sourceAddress BIT 32; 
destinationAddress BIT 32; 
I* IP version 4 packet *I 
I* length = 5 : no options *I 
I* last fragments only *I 
I* first fragments only *I 
I* Next protocol TCP *I 
Figure 7. PAX Pattern to Match 1Pv4 Header. From [23] 
Figure 8 represents two more features of the PAX language. The first being the ability to 
name the pattern for inclusion in other more complex patterns, in the case the name being 
IEEE_ 802 _ 2 _ LLC. The second feature illustrated here is the use of a conditional field. 
Conditional fields are used to describe patterns with varying layouts depending on previous 
fields. In this case when the Control1 field is equal to Ob 11, the next 6 bits are used to create a 
field called ShortControl. When the value ofControll is not equal to Ob11, then the next 14 bits 
are used to create a field called LongControl. 
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PATTERN IEEE_802_2_LLC { 
} 
DSAP BIT 8 <> OxFF; /*Destination SAP not broadcast*/ 
SSAP BIT 8 <> OxFF; I* Source SAP not broadcast*/ 
Control! BIT 2; 
LongControl BIT 14 WHEN Controll <> Obll; 
ShortControl BIT 6 WHEN Control I = = Ob 11; 
Figure 8. PAX Pattern with Conditional Field. From [23] 
2. Simple Ruleset Language (SRL) 
Brownlee describes the Simple Ruleset Language (SRL) [4], as a procedural language for 
creating rulesets for Realtime Traffic Flow Measurement (RTFM). These rulesets, which specify 
the flows to be measured and how much information should be collected for each, are 
downloaded to RTFM meters. The RTFM meters use a pattern matching engine to match the 
downloaded rulesets against attributes extracted from traffic flows to select which flows to 
monitor. The attributes applied to the traffic flows are specific to network traffic and map to such 
things as source and destination addresses, port numbers, etc. SRL is not restricted to just traffic 
metering, but can be useful in any application that involves selecting traffic flows from a stream 
of packets. 
There are two goals of SRL rulesets, which are to identify network packets that are a part 
of the flow of interest, and then to take some action as a result of the match. The identification of 
packets is done using IF statements. Actions that are available include the ability to save flow 
identification attributes, and to keep statistical data about the attributes that are saved. 
Figure 9 is an example that counts only TCPIIP packets were the destination port is telnet 
while saving the source and destination address pair for each packet. 
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define lpv4 = 1; 
define telnet = 23; 
defme tcp = 6; 
# Address Family number from RFC 1700 
#Well-known Port numbers from RFC 1700 
# Protocol numbers from RCF 1700 
if SourcePeerType = Ipv4 save; 
else ignore; # Not an Ipv4 packet 
if (SourceTransType = tcp && DestTransAddress = telnet) 
save, store FlowKind := 'T'; 
save SourcePeerAddress /32; 
save DestPeerAddress /32; 
count 
Figure 9. SRL Ruleset to Identify and Count Telnet Packets. After [4] 
3. Summary of Network Policy Languages 
Table 1 summarizes the languages from Sections 3 and 4 that are used to represent 
network policies or support mechanisms for enforcing policies. Policy-based routing protocols 
from Section 2 are also represented in the table. The columns of this table represent criteria 
believed to be useful in comparing the various languages. The "Support Automated Conflict 
Detection" column refers to the ability to recognize different types of policy conflict as well as 
the ability to provide a flexible means to resolve conflicts. The column labeled "Suitable for 
Integrated Services" takes into account the ability to efficiently support Integrated Services. An 
entry with a "Medium" value signifies that the language can represent a path through the 
network, but that multiple polices have to be combined to do so. If a column had received a 
"High" value, then the policy language can represent a path in a direct and intuitive manner, and 
a policy can be applied directly to that path. The benefits of a "High" value are that policies that 
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must be associated with all the nodes along a path can be represented with just one statement. 
This greatly reduces the number of policies statements that a domain must maintain. The 
"Suitable for Access Control" column refers to the ability to permit or deny access based on 
policy. The capacity to establish a path through a network and restrict access to that path, is of 
great importance from a security point of view. The column labeled "Target Architecture" refers 
to the storage location of the polices. A "Distributed" value means that policies are stored 
throughout the network, perhaps on individual devices. A centralized value refers to one, or just a 
few locations where all the policies are located. Having a "Centralized" location is beneficial 
when trying to detect conflicting policies. The last column, "Ease of Representing Network 
Policies", takes into account the ability of a user to intuitively represent a policy with the 
language. Targeting the Path-based Policy Language (PPL) to the group of individuals 
responsible for representing policies defined with natural language and entering them into a 
central repository, the author believes the more abstract and closer to natural language, the easier 
they will be understood. Although these individuals may be versed in formal logic representation, 
it is believed the majority will be more comfortable with an abstract rule-based language. The 
more abstract the language and closer to a natural languag~ the higher the value in the column. 
The greater number of details that have to be specified, the lower the value assigned 
Language Support Suitable for Suitable for Target Ease of 
Automated Integrated Access Architecture Representing 
Conflict Services Control Network 
Detection Policies 
Policy Term Low Medium High Distributed High 
PFDL Medium Medium High Centralized High 
RPSL Low Low High Centralized Medium 
PAX Low Low High Distributed Low 
SRL Low Low High Distributed Low 
Policy-based --- High High Distributed -
Routing 
Table 1. Summary of Languages that Represent or Support Network Policies 
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Although the languages represented in table 1 contain many features, none of these 
languages individually contain all the features provided with PPL. Two major features not 
adequately addressed by any of these languages are the ability to specify a complete path through 
a network, and the automatic detection of conflicting policies. The policy-based routing 
protocols, which are summarized in Section 2, are not concerned with the language used to 
represent network policies, but instead concentrate on supporting policy-based routing. As a 
result, columns that have no relevance to these protocols are filled with a"--". 
D. LOGIC REPRESENTATION OF POLICIES 
This section discusses research using formal logic to represent and detect conflicting 
policies. The policies represented in this section are more general and involve the use of natural 
languages, which tend to be ambiguous, to represent policies ranging from management to 
security. 
There has been a great deal of research on the topic of formal representation of policies. 
Much of this research has been in the area of representing security policies, and the more general 
problem of translating ambiguous natural language policies into some type of formal 
representation. Creating an unambiguous language to represent network policies avoids the 
problems associated with natural languages. PPL focuses on the grammar needed to represent a 
wide range of network policies while still being manageable enough to provide a process for 
automatic conversion into a logical representation. Once the policies are in a logical 
representation, the utilization of methods already developed from research in this area are used to 
provide a means for checking the consistency of multiple policies. 
1. Analyzing Consistency of Security Policies 
In Analyzing Consistency of Security Policies[6], the development of a methodology for 
reasoning about properties of security policies is discussed. The authors view a security policy as 
a specific case of regulation, where a regulation defines what actions an agent is permitted, 
obliged or forbidden to perform. With this methodology a system is made up of agents which can 
perform some actions on some objects. The main focus in this paper is the ability to perform 
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consistency checks (e.g., check for conflicting situations) on the system, and to have the ability to 
query a regulation to know which norms apply in a given situation. 
To create an unambiguous representation of security polices, the authors use formal 
logic. According to Chovly and Cuppens the advantage of a representation based on formal logic 
is the ability to precisely define the axioms 7 to reason about a regulation. With policies defined 
by axioms, tools can now be developed to check the system regulation for consistency. 
Rather than associating norms (i.e., permissions, obligations, and prohibitions) with 
individuals, roles are created with these attributes and then individuals are associated with these 
roles. The individual inherits the norms associated with a role when the individual is playing that 
role. A conflict can only exist when an individual is playing different roles at the same time, 
because of an assumption in their research that norms within a role are conflict free. 
To resolve conflicts when an individual is playing multiple roles, an ordering is applied 
when roles are merged. The order represents a priority between them and the order is assumed to 
be total. 
Tools written in Prolog were developed which checked the consistency of the security 
policies as well as an algorithm for solving conflicts when an individual is playing different roles 
at the same time. These tools designed to generate consequences of a given set of clauses which 
belong to a given language and which satisfy a given condition. 
2. On the Axiomatization of Security Policies: Some Tentative 
Observations About Logic Representation 
In [20], Michael et. al. add an intermediate step to ~e traditional approach of translating 
natural language security policies into their axiom representation. Once the policies are in axiom 
representation, automated reasoning systems are used for the detection of conflicts. Errors in the 
translation into axiom form can lead to unidentified conflicts, and incorrect proofs when indeed 
there is a conflict. 
An object-oriented approach is introduced to model the security policies using extended 
entity-relationship (EER) diagrams. The final axioms of the security polices are then derived 
from the diagrams rather than directly from the natural language representation. The premise was 
7 A proposition deemed to be self-evident and assumed without proof 
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that overall logic rule formulation is simplified in a model-based approach by capturing many of 
the rules in the structural model. 
A case study comparing the two different approaches, model-based and no pre-
structuring, produced results that appear to support a premise that fewer structuring errors are 
made with the model-based approach. A limitation of the model-based approach is that potential 
queries which might reveal conflicting security polices may be prevented. 
3. Policy Hierarchies for Distributed Systems Management 
In [22], a policy hierarchy is formed by refining general high-level policies into a number 
of more specific management policies. This derivation can be performed by refining the goals, 
partitioning the targets that the policies affect, or delegating the responsibility to another 
manager. The main motivation for understanding hierarchical relationships between policies is to 
determine what is required for the satisfaction of policies. If a high-level policy is defined or 
changed, it should be possible to decide what lower-level policies must be created or changed. 
The ultimate goal in [22] is to be able to specify high-level policies and automatically generate 
the lower-level ones. 
The goal of policy hierarchy analysis is to determine whether: 
• The collected lower-level objectives will completely achieve the higher-level 
objective which they purport to refine. 
• There is conflict between the objectives. 
• There is a imperatival policy, with a subject, for each objective. An imperatival 
policy gives an agent the imperative to carry out an action. In most cases this implies 
obligation. 
• There is an authority policy which empowers the subject to achieve the objective. An 
authority policy provides an agent with the legitimate power to perform an action. 
4. Conflicts in Policy-based Distributed Systems Management 
In [17], policies are used as a means to specify the management behavior of a system, 
without coding the behavior into the manager agents. Lupu and Sloman focus on techniques and 
tool support for off-line policy conflict detection and resolution. Two types of policies, 
authorization and obligation, are addressed in this research. Authorization policy specifies what 
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activities a manger is permitted or forbidden to perform on a set of target objects. Obligation 
policies specify what activities a manager must or must not do to a set of target objects and 
essentially defines the duties of a manager. 
Conflicts can arise in a set of policies, but it is not always desirable to eliminate the 
conflicts by rewriting the policies or changing the membership of the domains to which policies 
apply. As automated managers cannot enforce conflicting policies, Lupu and Sloman suggest a 
precedence relationship must be established between the polices in order to resolve the conflicts. 
Four types of policy's priority are addressed: 
• Negative policies always have priority : negative policies take precedence over 
positive ones. 
• The assignment of explicit priorities : policy 1 has priority over policy 2 which has 
priority over policy 3 ... etc. 
• Distance between a policy and the managed objects : priority is given to the policy 
applying to the closer class in an inheritance hierarchy. For example, a computer 
science (CS) department is a subclass of a university. If a student is in the CS 
department, policies of the CS department will override those of the university when 
a conflict exists. 
• Specificity related to domain nesting : a particular case of distance between policies, 
this principle is that a more specific policy (i.e., a policy applying to a sub-domain) 
refers to fewer objects so overrides more general policies applying to an ancestor 
domain. 
Lupu and Sloman developed a prototype conflict detection tool that currently detects 
overlaps between policies and optionally applies domain nesting precedence. The function of the 
detection tool which is analogous to compile-time type checking for a programming language in 
that it reduces run-time errors and detects specification errors. 
A notation is used to represent policies that is precise and can be analyzed for conflicts 
using automated tools, but it is not based on a well-known logic. In this system an administrator 
creates and modifies policies using a policy editor. Checks are made for conflicts, and if 
necessary policies are modified to remove the conflicts. 
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5. A Formal Process for Testing the Consistency of Composed Security 
Policies 
In [21 ], Michael presents a formal process for testing the logical consistency of 
composed security policies. The introduction of a strUctural model is made to represent 
relationships between security policies, and axiomatizes the policies so that relationships 
constructed in the model are preserved and made explicit in a logic model. This logic model is 
then used for deductive proofs of policy consistency. Michael states that problems arise in 
col!ectly defining, evaluating, and mapping policies onto procedures and that a structural model 
reduces these types of gaps. 
OTTER, an automated first-order resolution-style theorem prover is used to detect 
logical contradictions between the axioms in the logic model. 
E. CHAPTERS~Y 
In this chapter, several policy languages were reviewed, as well as techniques used in 
policy conflict detection and resolution. 
The policy languages fell into two major categories: the abstract network policy 
languages and bit-level traffic flow languages. Each of these languages were designed to address 
particular areas of network policy. Among these areas are: 
• Differentiated Services 
• Integrated Services 
• Quality of Service 
• Traffic Identification 
The techniques reviewed for policy conflict detection are not focused on network policy, and 
address the difficult problem of translating ambiguous natural language policies into a formal 
representation. It is clear that there is a need for network policy conflict detection, evident in the 
fact that many of the network policy languages surveyed have features to resolve conflicts once 
they are detected. What is lacking is an automatic method for checking individual network 
policies that are composed together to satisfy an overall goal. 
The Path-based Policy Language (PPL) introduced in this thesis encompasses as many of the 
features addressed in the previous languages as possible, as well as providing a means for testing 
policies for consistency. Table 2 states the major goals in developing a network policy language, 
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which is more suited toward what network policy implementers are accustomed to: a rule-based 
representation more closely associated with a computer programming language. Taking a path-
based approach will enable us to establish policies that will be based on path, like Integrated 
Services, as well as non-path based policies which are more suited toward Differentiated 
Services. The use of a wild card character enables us to describe policies based on the concepts 
of Differentiated Services or best-effort traffic. 
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III. PATH-BASED POLICY LANGUAGE (PPL) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will introduce the Path-based Policy Language (PPL ). This new language, is 
intended to solve and/or alleviate many of the deficiencies of the languages which were 
discussed in the previous chapter. PPL has the ability to represent network policies 
unambiguously, providing support to heterogeneous networks for which the networks are 
controlled using explicit policies. Policies required by both path and non-path based traffic flows 
are supported with PPL as well the ability to support conflict detection and resolution with the 
use of formal logic. 
B. GOALS 
PPL is designed to support policies that can be applied to Differentiated Service, 
Integrated Service as well as Multiprotocol Label Switching models proposed by the IETF. Table 
2 states the goals that PPL had strove to attain. 
PPLGoals 
1 create a path-based representation of policies flexible enough to support both path and 
non-path based traffic flows. 
2 represent network policies in an unambiguous way 
3 be abstract enough to cross device and manufacturer boundaries 
4 detect and resolve conflicts between polices 
5 support the dynamic aspect of networks 
Table 2. Summary of the goals of PPL 
1. Path & Non-Path Based Traffic Flows 
To support models such as Integrated Services (path based) as well as Differentiated 
Services (which may not be path-based) PPL must be flexible. Providing an absolute path 
consisting of the links the traffic must take will provide greater control over traffic flows and 
provide easier support to integrated services. A less specific policy may only need to provide 
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source and destination nodes in its configuration, or perhaps just the specification that all traffic 
of lets say file transfers, must be forwarded through a specific node acting as a firewall in an 
edge router. 
At the same time PPL will have to support non-path based policies such those associated 
with best effort service and possibly differentiated services. These types of flows classify and 
forward packets through the network based on the classification the packet receives. This enables 
preferential treatment to be given to particular service classes of data on a per node basis. 
2. ~bstract 
Our language is abstract enough to support multiple vendors and devices. Providing a 
language that is too specific will demand constant updates to the language, as well as to software 
on the vendor's devices. The way these policies are enforced with a vendor's equipment is not as 
important as the fact that they can be enforced. Each specific device should be able to implement 
the policy rule without specifying the exact details. 
3. Unambiguous Policies 
Our path-based language represents network policies in an unambiguous way. This 
feature allows us to detect policies that are in conflict as well as create a stable network 
environment. A policy that can be interpreted multiple ways will prevent a clear understanding of 
the network configuration and can potentially hide conflicting policies from the network 
manager. 
4. Detect & Resolve Conflicts 
Several languages summarized in the previous chapter provide features that support the 
ability to resolve policy conflicts, but fall short in providing a mechanism to detect such 
conflicts. PPL provides the ability to detect and resolve conflicts between policies using the 
translation of policy rules into formal logic. The compiler which works hand and hand with the 
Prolog programming language interpreter, evaluates the network policies and returns information 
about which policies are in conflict. 
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5. Dynamic Policies 
The state of a network is rarely constant and therefore a policjr language should be able 
to represent network policies based on dynamic factors as well as constant ones. PPL not only 
supports static policies such as attributes based on traffic class or network address, but also 
policies based on dynamic factors such as packet delay and packet loss rate. 
To support a dynamic network, PPL provides the ability to react to dynamic conditions 
of the network. For example, rather than just denying or permitting network traffic on a link that 
is suffering network delay, perhaps it would be better to compromise and lower the priority of a 
traffic class while the delay is occurring. Once the problem in the network delay is resolved, a 
second policy might support the upgrading of the priority of that same traffic class. This is all 
possible by allowing the policy maker to specify which messages, detailing the current state of 
the network, to collect and react to. 
C. POLICIES 
1. Support of Integrated Services 
Integrated services provide QoS assurances on a per-flow basis. This per-flow concept 
allows for the allocation and reservation of enough resources along a path to support a QoS 
request for a flow of packets. Integrated services using a signaling protocol such as RSVP can 
request resources along a path in a dynamic nature. If a path can not support the QoS demands of 
a request, then the particular path will be rejected. 
This ability to reserve and control the amount of resources allocated along a path through 
the network, or more importantly not to over allocate resources on the path, provides a great 
advantage when trying to support QoS. 
The importance of this per-flow concept is why PPL was based on the concept of path. 
The third element in a policy rule represents the path(s) effected by the policy. This path attribute 
has many flexible and powerful features. 
• Multiple paths: Assigning the same policy to multiple paths in the network is easily 
accomplished with PPL. This is carried out with a comma separated list as the third 
argument. The policy below demonstrates this feature by assigning the same policy 
which denies access to a block ofiP network addresses to multiple paths. 
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Policyl net_manager {pathl, path2}{*}{host1P = 161.1.*.*}{DENY} 
• Wildcard character support: The path argument in a PPL policy also supports the 
wildcard character. This is extremely useful when you have a policy that should be 
applied to all the paths in your network. One example would be to assign a maximum 
hopcount value to packets in your network. The policy below shows such a policy. 
Policy2 net_manager {*} {*} {hopcount> 19}{DENY} 
• Path: PPL supports the defining of paths and assigning attributes to these paths such 
as bandwidth capacity and dynamic messages supported. Once a path is defined, it's 
name can be used in the path argument of a PPL policy as shown in the following 
example. 
define path example_path {Node_l, Node_2, Node_3}; 
Policy3 Net_manager {example_path} {*} {*}{permit}; 
• Link: A link is defined in PPL by identifying the two nodes of the network that 
create the link. Since a link is a simple path of just two nodes, it can also be used in 
the path argument of a PPL policy, as the following example demonstrates. 
define link example_link <Node_l, Node_2>; 
Policy3 Net_manager {example_link} {*} {*}{permit}; 
• Node: Typically a single node would not be considered a path or link, but to support 
scalability, PPL provides the ability to assign a policy to a node. This concept is 
better demonstrated using Figure 1. At level 2 the network is not concerned with the 
details of the Naval Postgraduate School or the DARPA networks from level 1. All 
that is of concern are the policies that are supported in those lower level networks. 
This allow policies to be assigned to nodes representing networks to support QoS 
efforts at a higher more abstract level. 
For clarity, there is a difference between a path defined as { <* ,NPS, *>} and the path {NPS}. The first represents all possible paths that include the node NPS at some 
point. The second represents just the node NPS, which again might represent an 
entire sub-net at a different level in the network hierarchy. The following is an 
example of a policy rule that is expressed over a node. 
define path example_ node Node_l; 
Policy3 Net_manager {example_ node} {*} {*}{permit}; 
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Integrated services are not only based on a path through the network, but certain 
conditions must also be provided along the path to be acceptable. To accommodate this feature 
PPL provides a conditions argument in a policy statement which maps to the fifth element of the 
policy rule. All the conditions listed in a policy rule must be met before the actions associated 
with the policy are executed. The following examples show how the conditions argument can be 
used. 
Policy6 net_manager {path!} {traffic_class ={video} }{time>= 0800, time <=1600} 
{DENY}; 
Policy? net_ manager {path! }{traffic_class ={video}} 
{jitterO < 3 msec, delayQ < 2 msec}{PERMIT}; 
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Policy6 represents a policy that denies the use of a path to video traffic between the 
hours of 8:00am and 4:00pm, normal working hours. 
Policy7 represents a policy that permits video traffic over a path as long as the jitter() 
and delay() on the path are acceptable. In this example jitter() and delay() are messages that 
provide dynamic feedback on the current conditions of the path. 
Action _items is the last element of a PPL policy rule. Typically this parameter will either 
DENY or PERMIT packets of a traffic flow depending on the type of traffic contained in that 
flow, or as a reaction to dynamic feedback from network devices. For example, policy 8 below 
will DENY packets originating from the IP network 141.1. *. * on the link between NPS and 
DARPA. 
Policy8 net_ manager {NPS_DARPA}{*} {hostiP = 141.1.* .*} {DENY}; 
Policy 9 below will also DENY traffic, but this time as a result of network delay. 
Although the policy is reacting to the dynamic nature of the network and may even eliminate the 
current network delay, it is reacting in a very rigid manner. Rather than denying all video traffic, 
perhaps a better solution would be to lower the priority of the other traffic types. 
Policy9 net_ manager {NSP _DARPA} {traffic_class ={video} }{delay()> 20 ms} {DENY}; 
This action _items element can be also used to dynamically compromise on a network 
flow's requirements if so desired. For example, instead of totally denying a traffic flow 
containing video data, perhaps a better solution would be to lower the priority of the video 
traffic. In this way non-video traffic could be provided better service while the video traffic is 
still allowed to flow, but at a degraded rate. This feature provides the ability for a network flow 
to throttle back for the general good of the network. The following policy represents such a 
requirement. 
PolicylOnet_manager {DARA_SPAWAR} {traffic_class= {video}} 
{loss_rate() > 20%} {priority:= 20}; 
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2. Support of Differentiated Services 
In differentiated services, packets are marked differently to create seve
ral packet classes. 
Packets in different classes receive different services[3 7]. This concept allows fo
r preferential 
treatment of organizations who are willing to pay more for a par
ticular service class. This 
classification of traffic may be a single service class, for an individual
 company for example, or 
may contain several classes which differing requirements. A telephony a
pplication will require a 
class of traffic that can provide low-delay and low-jitter whereas an email service does
 not 
require such timely delivery. 
Differentiated services is essentially a relative-priority scheme where 
individual packets 
are classified and marked for forwarding. The handling of packets b
ased on its classification 
marking can provide several classes of traffic in a network. 
To support policies based on differentiated services, a PPL policy rule
 contains a target 
field represented by the fourth element in the policy statement. To utili
ze this field, a traffic class 
has to be created prior to its use in a policy. Some examples of def
ined classes of traffic are 
given below. 
define class traffic_class {data, video, voice}; 
define class traffic _priority {high, med, low}; 
define class user {faculty, student, staff}; 
In these defined classes, traffic _class, traffic _priority, and user, predefined values are 
assigned to each class. For example if a path supported t;raffic_class, then acceptable class
es on 
that path would be data, voice, and video. A policy may be defined to su
pport multiple classes of 
traffic on a path. When such a situation is desired a list of classes i
s presented in the policy 
statement. When more than one class is given in a statement the effect
ed path will support any of 
the provided classes. For example, consider the following policy. 
Policyl net_manager {*} {traffic_class ={data}, {traffic _priority= {high, med, low
}} 
{*} {PERMIT}; 
The fourth element representing the classes of traffic permitted, indica
te that data traffic 
is permitted, as well as either high, med, or low priority traffic. When m
ultiple classes of traffic 
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are presented in a policy statement as a comma separated list, the classes are logically OR'd 
together. 
3. Support of MPLS 
Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS)[36,37] is a forwarding scheme that provides 
fast packet classification as well as the ability to support efficient tunneling. At the edge router of 
a MPLS-capable domain the network protocol packets are classified and routed based on the 
information of their network headers as well as routing information stored at the label-switching 
routers. To make the forwarding efficient, an MPLS header is inserted between the link layer and 
network layer of every packet traversing the MPLS domain. The MPLS header contains a 20-bit 
label, a 3-bit Class of Service field, a 1-bit label stack indicator, and an 8-bit Time to Live field. 
The MPLS header allows label-switched routers within a domain, to examine only the label in 
forwarding the packet. When the packet leaves the MPLS domain, the inserted header is 
removed. These features make MPLS very useful for traffic engineering. 
One of the most useful features of MPLS is the ability to specify an explicit route 
through the MPLS domain, in essence set up a path. Since PPL establishes a path through a 
network based on a policy describing the network, it naturally supports MPLS as well. The target 
and conditions fields of a PPL policy rule can be used to do the classification of the packet, and 
the path associated with the policy can be used to establish routing information in the label-
switched routers. 
4. Support of Static Policies 
Policies based on static information can be easily represented with PPL. These policies 
are based on information contained in the network packets themselves and do not rely on the 
dynamic aspects of the network such as delay, jitter, and loss rate. Static policies are essential 
and can be used to establish classes of traffic as seen in differentiated services, or in establishing 
a path through the network as is seen with integrated services and MPLS. Examples of policies 
based on static information are given below. 
Policy! net_ manager {linkl} {hostiP = 206.3.4.*} {DENY}; 
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This policy will deny packets from a particular network address (206.3.4.*) to pass 
through linkl. 
define path video_path {<nodel,node2,node3>}; 
Policy2 stone {video _path} {traffic_ type= {video, voice}} {*} {PERMIT}; 
Policy2 establishes a path through a network that permits both video and voice traffic. If 
no other policies are associated with the nodes that make up this link, then video and voice are 
the only types of traffic that are permitted. This result is because PPL implements a default 
action of 'deny' unless explicitly 'permitted'. 
D. MESSAGES 
Dynamic policies require feedback from network devices to keep apprised of the current 
state of the network. To support dynamic policies in PPL, the concept of messages was 
introduced. A message is used to transcend the issues associated with platform-dependent 
network technology, allowing us to specify functionality rather than deal with implementation 
details. A message represents an information update about some measurable attribute of a 
network. For example a message identified as delayO might provide the time required to travel 
from point A to point B in a network in milliseconds. To maintain abstract, PPL, is not concerned 
with the definition of the message, just that the message will be supported on the path, and used 
consistently. Below is an example of a policy that supports dynamic feedback with the use of a 
message. Before the policy can use the message, it has to be associated previously with the path. 
The define path_param statement associates the delayO message with the path NPSJNTERNET, 
as well as defining the bandwidth associated with the link. The policy statement itself uses the 
delayO message as an argument in the conditions element of the policy to deny access to video 
traffic when the delayO is too great. 
define path_param NPS_INTERNET {BW := 500 MBPS, delayO}; 
Policy3 net_manager {NPS_INTERNET}{traffic_class ={voice}} 
{delayO > 20 ms} {DENY}; 
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During the policy testing phase of the PPL compiler, a policy utilizing the feedback of a 
message will also be tested for conflicts. This test involves the verification that all links required 
to compose the path(s) associated with a policy, also support the message. 
E. PPL POLICY FORMAT 
The format of PPL is summarized in Figure 11. A policy rule consists of six elements. 
The formal definition of the grammar is defined in appendix A. 
PolicyiD useriD {paths} {target} {conditions} {action_items} 
policy!D- unique policy identification token 
user!D - user ID of policy creator 
paths -network paths the policy affects 
target -target class of network traffic (items are OR'ed) 
conditions -any global conditions (items are AND'ed) 
action_items -for setting parameters (e.g., policy priority), explicit deny or permit, etc. 
Figure 11. Summary ofPPL format 
We illustrate the capabilities of PPL through the use of several examples below. 
Example 1 shows the ability to specify an explicit path for a traffic flow. Examples 2, 3, 4, 6, and 
7 use the wild card character'*' to specify partial paths for traffic flows. In example 6, the use of 
'*' places no restrictions on the path the traffic may take. 
In example 4 a policy is represented that will make a compromise when certain network 
conditions are met. This compromise feature provides the ability to throttle back network flows 
for the general good of the network. 
Example 1: Policy 1 net_ manager {<1,2,5>} {class= {faculty}} {*} {priority:= 1}; 
This is a rule which states that the path starting at node 1, traversing to node 2, and 
ending at node 5 will provide high priority for faculty users. 
Example 2: Policy2 stone {<*,2,*>, <*,4,*>} {*}time>= 1600, time<= 0800} {deny}; 
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This rule states that all traffic will be allowed to traverse through nodes 2 and 4 during 
non-working hours. Unless granted by another policy, traffic will not be able to traverse 
through nodes 2 and 4 during working hours. 
Example 3: Policy3 net_manager {<*,5,*> {*} {hostiP = 131.1.*.*} {permit}; 
All hosts with a network address starting with 13 1.1 will be permitted to traverse node 5. 
Having the ability to restrict groups of network addresses as well as individual network 
addresses is also a part of PPL. 
Example 4: Policy4 xie{<1,*,2,*,5>} 
{traffic_class ={video, voice}}{ used_bwO <= allotted_bwQ, 
allotted_bwO = 50MBPS, Ioss_rate 0 > 40%} {allotted_bw := 40MBPS}; 
This policy shows the ability for compromise. Voice and Video traffic are provided with 
an allotted bandwidth of 50 Mb/s, but when the network loss rate is greater than 40%, a 
compromise will be made to lower the allotted bandwidth to 40 Mb/s. 
Example 5: Policy5 net_manager {*} {traffic_ class= {data}} {*} {priority :=10}; 
All data traffic will be assigned a priority level of 10. Assume that there are three classes 
of traffic for this example, voice, video, and data. This allows for providing higher or 
lower priority to certain classes of traffic. In this case the priority might affect the order 
of packets being dropped from queues at network devices during times of congestion. 
Example 6: Policy6 Betty {<1,*,5>} {traffic_ class= {accounting}, 
day!= Friday} {*}{priority:= 5}; 
On all paths from node 1 to node 5, accounting class traffic will be lowered to priority 5 
unless it is a Friday. In this policy the action_items field is used with temporal 
information to influence the priority of a class of traffic. It might make sense to have this 
feature when departments of a company need more network resources to accomplish 
their jobs. 
Example 7: Policy7 net_manager {<1,*,5>} {traffic_ class= {student}, 
useriD =Gary} {*}{deny}; 
On all paths from node 1 to node 5, deny access to network traffic from user Gary who is 
in the student traffic class. This policy shows that PPL can provide control at a very 
small granularity level. In this case the policy affects only a single user in a particular 
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class of network traffic. It could have easily been modified to provide certain time~ 
the days when it was in effect as well. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the format and features of the Path-based Policy Language (PPL) were 
introduced. The six element policy rule supports the combined features of previous network 
policy languages as well as well as the following new features: 
• Path-based representation 
• Support of both static and dynamic policies 
• Support of future traffic classes 
• "Message" support for existing and new network measurements 
• Ability to scale well in large networks 
• Policy conflict detection 
Several policy examples were presented to show the power and flexibility ofPPL, and to 
demonstrate the usefulness of such a language by expressing realistic network policies. 
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IV. POLICY CONFLICT DETECTION AND RESOLUTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One major contribution PPL makes is the ability to detect and resolve policy conflicts. 
Having conflicting policies without the means to detect and resolve them is probably worse than 
having no policies at all. An obvious example involves security access policies. Having policies 
defined to restrict access to network resources can build a false sense of security, when a rogue 
policy conflicts with existing policies to provide access to those same restricted resources. 
Believing that the restrictive policies are working may prevent network administrators or security 
personal from verifying the protection, which can have very serious consequences. 
As was reported in chapter II, formal logic has been used in previous efforts such as with 
security policies and general management policies to detect conflicts between composed policies. 
One of the major problems with these previous efforts has been the ability to translate the natural 
language policies into their formal logic equivalent representation. Efforts were made during the 
creation of PPL to represent network policies without the inherent ambiguity of a natural 
language. 
Once the language (PPL) was created, it was then possible to develop a compiler that 
would parse the network policies and verify their correctness according to the grammar specified 
in appendix A. If all the policies were both syntactically and semantically correct, then a formal 
logic representation of those policies was created. 
Figure 12 shows the overall process flow starting at the acceptance of a PPL 
configuration file, which contains network construction information and network policies, to the 
fmal output file which contains a list of policies which created conflicts. Once the PPL compiler 
verifies the syntax and semantics of the input configuration file, an output file consisting of 
logical facts is generated from the configuration file. This logic file is the starting point of a three 
stage process that manipulates and refines the data that eventually results in the final conflict file. 
Although the three stages could have been accomplished in just one stage, multiple stages 
provided an incremental means to verify correctness during development. 
To create the compiler for PPL, tools designed to aid in the construction of compilers 
were used. Flex, a tool for creating a scanner for a language, was used to scan and return the 
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tokens required during the parsing phase of the compiler. Bison, a tool for writing a parser for a 
language, was used to create the parser that verified the correctness of PPL network policy rules. 
Correctness in this sense, refers to policy rules that are both syntactically and semantically 



















Figure 12. Overall Process Flow 
Policy Connicts 
Once the correctness of the PPL policy statements were verified, an output file with 
Pro log statements that represented the physical description of the network, such as network links, 
capacity, etc. was created. In Prolog these type of statements are called facts and are used to 
prove the validity of questions presented to the language interpreter. The actual PPL policy rules 
were then converted and represented in Prolog and appended to the output file as facts and rules. 
A rule in Prolog declares things that are true depending on a given condition. Prolog 
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(programming in logic), is a programming language based on first-order predicate logic. The 
advantage of using Prolog is that what constitutes a conflict can be represented, and then 
questions can be proposed to the interpreter as to whether a conflict existed. Using mechanisms 
such as pattern matching, tree-based data structuring, and automatic backtracking, the Prolog 
program can return a truth value representing an answer to a question, in the case of PPL's 
conflict tester, "Are there conflicts between any network policies?". 
When policy conflicts are detected, a PPL build-in support mechanism will be used in an 
attempt to resolved the conflict. The support mechanism utilizes the creators of each policy to 
check for a possible precedence relationship. Both resolved and unresolved conflicts are 
presented to the operator for their review. 
The development and test platform used to build the supporting compiler and policy 
conflict tester, was a Media On Pentium II computer running the Microsoft Windows 98 
operating system. Although the underlying operating system was Windows 98, the actually 
development environment was the BASH programming shell provided by Cygwin. Cygwin tools 
are ports of the popular GNU development tools and utilities for Windows 95, 98, and NT. They 
function by using the Cygwin library which provides a UNIX-like API on top of the Win32 API. 
The Prolog compiler used was SWI-Prolog, developed at the University of Amsterdam, and is 
targeted primarily at research and education. The details of the hardware and software used are 
listed below. 
Hardware Description 
• CPU: 300 MHz Pentium II-MMX 
• RAM: 64MB SDRAM 
Software Description 
• Operating System: Microsoft Windows 98 
• Shell: GNU BASH version 2.01.1(2)-release (i386-pc-cygwin32) 
• C Compiler: Cygnus gee version 2.7-B19 
• Flex: GNU flex version 1.25 
• Bison: Cygnus bison version 2.5-B19 
• File Utilities: GNU fileutils 3.16 
• Pro log: SWI-Prolog (Version 2.8.2) 
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- -------- - ---- -------- -
- ------------------------
----------------. 
The source code for the PPL parser, written in Bison with imbedded "C", is listed in 
appendix D. Appendix E contains the Prolog source code for the three stages of conflict 
detection and resolution. 
B. DETECTING CONFLICTS 
There are multiple elements to a PPL policy rule and consequently there are multiple 
types of conflicts that can exist. The key to all conflicts is the path or paths associated with a 
policy rule. PPL is based on path, and this path is used as the first step in identifying a conflict. 
Without the overlap of at least one path segment between policies, there will be no conflict. 
In PPL a conflict is defined as follows: 
Given a set of policies P, a conflict exists if for any 2 policies r, s E P, all of the 
following hold: 
1. Physical paths of r and s overlap on at least one path segment; 
2. Time and network conditions specified in the conditions elements of r and s overlap; 
3. There is a target a which is permitted in r, but denied ins (or conversely). 
Based on the definition above, the following general steps are implemented and used in 
the conflict detection process of the PPL policy tester. 
1. Find all policies that contain overlapping paths (physical). 
2. Prune the results from step 1 to only contain those paths that also have overlapping conditions 
(timing, network conditions, etc.) 
3. Use the target & action_item elements to determine if a conflict exists 
Each path associated with a policy rule specifies the nodes and links the traffic will 
follow, but the conditions of the policy rule can restrict that flow of traffic to a particular day of 
the week, hour ofthe day, etc. This combination of path and conditions can allow voice traffic on 
the same path that a second policy has denied without conflict, as long as the day and time do not 
overlap. 
When there are indeed overlapping paths in a network, the target and action _items will 
determine if there is truly a conflict. The target specifies the class of traffic that is allowed on the 
specified path, and the action item, among other things will either permit or deny that traffic. 
This ability to either permit or deny traffic is what leads to the fundamental conflict between 
policy rules. 
46 
The remaining sections of this chapter expand on the steps used to detect conflicts with 
PPL defined network elements and policies. 
1. Basic Conflicts 
Even before policy rules are processed for conflicting targets, conditions, and actions, a 
conflict can exist. When nodes, links, and paths are being defined for use in the policy rules, 
attributes about those elements are specified. These attributes consist of bandwidth capacity and 
the messages that will be supported on the path. Bandwidth conflicts are handled by the PPL 
compiler in the following fashion It is obvious in Figure 13, that when the links Link_l and 
Link _2 are defined with a bandwidth of 100 Mbps each, that there is no way Path _1 can produce 
can be defined with a 500 Mbps connection, therefore a conflict exists. This is the most basic 
conflict based on path and is easily identified. 
defme link Unk_1 <Node_1, Node_2>; 
defme link Link_2 <Node_2, Node_3>; 
define path Path_1 {Link_1, Unk_2}; 
defme link_param Link_1 {BW := 100 :MBPS}; 
define link_param Link_2 {BW := 100 :MBPS}; 
define path _param Path _1 · {BW := 500 :MBPS}; 
Figure 13. Bandwidth Conflict 
Message conflicts are based on the same premise as bandwidth conflicts. When a policy 
rule utilizes a message in the conditional element, the paths associated with this policy must 
provide the required message feedback. The message conflict detection phase, verifies that every 
link needed to construct the effected paths, provides the proper message support. 
47 
2. Expanding Paths 
Paths can be specified explicitly listing each node and link along the path from source to 
destination. When this happens, the path is associated with the Policy/D and stored as a fact in 
prolog. Facts about the network representation and policy rules are used to answer questions 
about policy conflicts in later stages of the compiler. 
The use of the wildcard character '*' has many benefits in the representation of a path as 
discussed in earlier. These compressed representations of paths must be expanded to check for 
overlapping paths. Figure 14 represents a limited view of a network. When a user wants to 
represent all paths from node 1 to node 4, rather than listing two separate paths, <1, 2, 4> and 
<1, 3, 4>, the user may instead represent both paths with the single path <1,*,4>. This 
compacted representation helps save space in policy databases. The savings are even greater 
when there are more than two paths from node 1 to node 4. During the process of conflict 
detection, the path <1,*,4> will indeed be expanded temporarily to search for overlapping path 
segments. 
Figure 14. Network View 
The path element of the policy rule supports the listing of several paths independently, 
as well multiple paths with wildcard characters. Examples include { <1, 2, 4>, <* ,3>} and { <*, 2, 
*>, <1, 3, 4>}. In all these path representations, each path has to be expanded and associated 
with the policy/D of the rule. These expanded paths are used in conjunction with other policy 
rule elements such as, the conditional element, target class, and action items, to identify conflicts 
between PPL policies. 
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3. Conditional Overlaps 
The conditional element of a policy rule provides a way to further isolate a path 
associated with that rule. It is possible that two policies apply to the same path segment in a 
network and that the actions of those policies will cause a conflicting situation. The conditional 
element of the policy rule can further specify attributes such as time of day, day of the week, a 
particular user, etc. The conditional element may allow two seemingly conflicting policies based 
solely on their paths, to co-exist without conflict. When several attributes are listed in the 
conditional field, the result will be the concatenation of each. For example, when both time of 
day and particular user are specified in the conditional element, both have to be true to validate 
the policy. In other words all the attributes in the conditional element are AND'd together. The 
process of expanding conditional elements is discussed below. The discussion also includes how 
the comparison of conditional elements from different policy rules may lead to overlapping 
conditions. An overlapping condition exists if the attributes of a conditional element provide 
some intersection in their values. For example, if a conditional element for a policy specifies that 
it will only be enforced on week days, and a second policy specifies it will only apply be 
enforced on Tuesdays, then an overlap occurs on Tuesday. This information about overlapping 
conditions along with the expanded path information is used in future steps of the conflict 
detection process, which include the target and action items of the policy rule. 
Time is represented with a 24 hour clock in PPL and is used in the conditional section of 
a policy rule to constrain when the rule will be applied. Like all conditional elements used in 
PPL, an overlap of time between two policies indicates that there is a potential for .a conflict to 
exist. Only two conditional operators are used when representing a time constraint, >= and <=. 
These two symbols are sufficient to represent the most common planed usage of time, which is 
specifying ranges of time the policy covers, such as between 0400 hours and 0800 hours. The use 
of<= and>= can also be used to simulate other comparison operators such as=, !=,<,and>. For 
example, if a policy was only to be enforced at one instance in time such as 0400, this can be 
specified with the two conditions,>= 0359:59 & <= 0400:01. PPL does not limit the number of 
occurrences of time in the conditional section of the policy rule and therefore several time ranges 
can be applied to the same policy. Table 3 represents the logical outcome used by the PPL 
compiler to determine if a time overlap exists. When more than one time is specified in a policy 
statement, each of those specific time entries will be compared against all the time entries in the 
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second policy. For example, one scenario represented in the table below is: Policy A applies 
between the hours of 0400 and 2359, and Policy B applies to the hours between 0300 and 0700. 
The result of combining these two constraints is that there is indeed an overlap in time, 
specifically between 0400 and 0700. There is no need to have an exact overlap in time, as long as 
there is a partial overlap in time the potential exists for a conflict. Also note that Policy A does 
not explicitly identify 23 59 as the ending time of the condition, but whenever there is no upper or 
lower limited identified, a default value of 0000 or 2359 is implied. Specifying only the time >= 
0400, therefore implies an upper limit of the 24th hour of the day. 
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>= 0400 <=0700 
- Overlap 





- No Overlap 
>= 0700 <=0400 
- No Overlap 






>= 0400 >=0300 <=0700 Overlap 
<=0400 >=0300 <=0700 Overlap 
>=0400 <=0300 >=0700 No Overlap 









- * * Overlap 
- - - Overlap 
Table 3. Conditional Time Overlap 
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Also displayed in the table are entries that indicate that when the time values are exactly the 
same, represented with an X, there is by default overlap because the equivalence that occurs with 
the >= and <= operations. As with all the conditional elements, when no time is explicitly 
declared, it implies that the policy will be active 24 hours a day and therefore will overlap with 
any other policy rule. An '-' entry in the table below indicates that no time was explicitly 
indicated, and the use of the'*' symbol represents any time may be applied. 
The built-in user attribute can also be used in the conditional section of a policy rule to 
place constraints on a rule. The user attribute allows another way to segregate network traffic. 
The user represents an identifier that uniquely identifies a particular user on the network. For 
example, the policy below indicates that data traffic will be denied if the user associated with the 
traffic is equal to gnstone. 
Policy_user net_ manager{*} {traffic_class ={data}} {user= gnstone} {deny} 
When two policies are being compared where at least one of those policy rules contains 
the user attribute, there is a chance of an overlap of coverage between those policies and 
continued conditional comparisons are warranted to verify consistency. Table 4 represents the 
results of the evaluation of user attributes. The only operators allowed with the user attribute are 
the comparison operators= and!=. Since no ranges or ordering are allowed with users, the use 
of the operators <, >, and all variations of those operators· are meaningless. When no user is 
specified in the conditional element of a policy rule, the default action is to allow all users. When 
only one of those policies contains the user attribute, then again there exists an overlap. This is a 
result of the fact that no user restriction on a rule implies all users are specified. In Table 4 two 
comparison results are also marked with an asterisk. The asterisk is used to identify that fact that 
more than two users are assumed to exist on the network. For example, if one policy specified 
user!= gnstone and a second policy specified user!= Iundy, then the comparison will identify an 
overlap. Assuming there are other users besides gnstone and Iundy, this is the proper action. If 
this is not the case and only those two users exist in the network, then the policies are 
meaningless because neither will ever be enforced because the condition will never be satisfied. 
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=gnstone != Iundy Overlap 
=gnstone != gnstone Conflict 
=gnstone - lundy No Overlap 
=gnstone = gnstone Overlap 
!= gnstone != Iundy Overlap* 
!= gnstone != gnstone Overlap 
!= gnstone Overlap* 
- gnstone Overlap 
Overlap 
Table 4. Conditional User ID Overlap 
The address attribute used in PPL is based on the format of the Internet Protocol (IP) 
used today in the Internet. Other address formats could also be added in the future, including IP 
version 6. During the comparison of the address attributes, two separate evaluations are 
performed. The first is whether an overlap exists between the addresses represented, and the 
second is whether the use of the operators '<=' and '>=' applied with the first decision result in 
an overlap. 
An IP address is usually written, and is represented in PPL with dotted decimal notation. 
In this format, four decimal values ranging from 0 to 255 ·are concatenated together using a '.' as 
a separator. An IP address contains both a network part and a host part with some number of bits 
used to identify the network, and the remaining number of bits used to identify the host. This 
subdivision of bits will vary depending on the class of the address, but there is no real need to 
totally understand how the addressing works to proceed. The idea is that different granularities 
can be used to isolate network traffic. It was documented earlier how an explicit individual can 
be isolated using the user attribute. The address attribute allows for the enforcement of policies 
at the individual machine level, or specifying a group of devices for enforcement. A typical IP 
address will look like 131.120.10.104. To implement a range ofiP addresses, PPL implemented a 
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simple pattern matching scheme using the '*' character. For example, 131.120.10.* would 
indicate the inclusion of all hosts with IP addresses between 131.120.10.0 and 131.120.10.255. 
When comparing two addresses in PPL for overlap, there has to be an exact match to the 
end of the address, or until the first'*' is reached. For example 131.120.*.* would include all 
machines specified by the address 131.120.10. *,and therefore an overlap would exist. 
The first evaluation of address overlap was the pattern matching scheme just discussed. 
The second evaluation for overlap of address space is based on Table 5. This evaluation takes 
into account the operators that can be used in specifying address ranges, namely== and !=. In 
this table, addresses are represented by either an X or Y. When the letters match between the two 
columns representing Address A and Address B, this indicates the addresses themselves include 
at least one host in common. With the example stated earlier, one policy rule specified 
131.120.*.* and the second rule specified 131.120.10.*, would result in an overlap of all 
addresses beginning with 131.120.10.*. Since the addresses have a range in common the same 
letter would appear in both columns. Ifthe two addresses being compared were rather 131.*.*.* 
and 141. *. *. *, then according to PPL there would be no overlap in address space and a lookup 
into the table would only consider those columns with both an X andY. 
h'',, ··:,):::;"\';;~';: 
=X Overlap 
=X =Y No Overlap 
=X !=X Conflict 
=X !=Y Overlap 
!=X !=X Overlap 




Table 5. Conditional Address Overlap 
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In general, the results of comparisons in Table 5 are similar to other conditional 
attributes discussed in this chapter. The result can be any of three values, conflict, overlap, or no 
overlap. Because multiple addresses can be specified, each address grouping has to be compared. 
If any of the comparisons result in a conflict, then there is no hope of overlap and no need for 
continued overlap checking. When a no overlap is returned, this only indicates that although 
there is no overlap between two particular address groupings, there is still a potential for overlap 
with other addresses specified in the conditional section of the rule. In this case, if no overlap 
status is returned, then the result is no pverlap and there is no chance for a conflict between the 
two policy rules. When an overlap status is returned and no conflict is returned, the potential for 
policy conflict does exist, and further evaluation is necessary. When an address specification is 
not included in a policy rule, the default assumption is all addresses are effected by the policy 
rule, and therefore an overlap exists. No address specification is represented in the table by the '-
' character. 
To provide support for future expansion, PPL allows user defined types to be included in 
the conditional section of a policy rule. This type feature allows for further granularity of policy 
specification. In the following tables a type of day will be used and defined as: 
define type day {Sun, Moo, Tue, Wed, Thu, Fri, Sat}; 
Day is defined to be a set containing seven elements which represent the days of the 
week. An order is implied with these elements, so the use of operators '<=" and '>=' as well as 
'=' and '!=' are allowed. When multiple days are to be associated with a policy, then each will 
be specified as needed. For example, if a user wanted to limit traffic to Wednesday and Thursday 
only, the following condition list could be given: {day == Wed, day == Thu}. If a policy was 
only needed during the normal work week then the following condition list could be used: {day 
!=Sat, day!= Sun}. 
Table 6 represents the expansion that takes place during the conflict checking phase of 
the compilation. This expansion is strait forward, if a day is associated with the equality operator 
then that day is added to the expanded list. When a non equality operator is used, then that day is 
taken away from the expanded list. If multiple days are denied in the conditional section of the 
policy rule, then an intersection of the possible days is made with each day denied, see third row 
of Table 6. The results of the expansion will always be a list of elements were the '=' symbol is 
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assumed to apply. For example, when the policy specifies {day<= Wed}, the result will be {day 
==Sun, day == Mon, day == Tue, day == Wed}. 
day= Sat. Sat. 
day!= Sat. Sun, Mon, Tue, Wed, Thu, Fri 
day != Sat, day != Sun Mon, Tue, Wed, Thu, Fri 
day<=Wed Sun, Mon, Tue, Wed, 
Table 6. Conditional Expansion of Type 
Table 7 represents the logic used in the determination of overlap in an expansion of a 
user defined type statement. As mentioned earlier the only operator that needs to be considered 
after a type expansion is the '=' operator. As a result, the only time an overlap condition will 
exist for a user defined type, is when the values specified contain at least comparison were the 
values are equal. 
X y No Overlap 
X X Overlap 
Any Value Overlap 
Overlap 
Table 7. Conditional Type Overlap 
Priority can be assigned to network traffic as well in PPL policy rules. The use of 
priority can give preferential treatment to certain types of traffic. For example, voice 
transmission over the network could be given preferential treatment over normal data traffic 
because of the QoS demands needed to support voice transmission. Table 8 shows the logic used 
to compare two priority values for an overlapping condition. The operators '<=' and '>=' are the 
only allowed in specifying a priority conditional attribute. Priority values are numeric and 
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therefore can be ordered for comparison with these operators. An exact priority can be iss1. ec 
with the combination of both an '<=' and '>=' operators. For example, when network traffic is 
allowed only with a priority of 10, this can be represented with the following conditioned 
statement: {priority >=10, priority <=10}. Conjunction is used with all conditional statements 
therefore all the statements have to evaluate to true for an overlap. In Table 1 an '*' symbol in 
the operator column allows either'<=' or'>=' symbols to be used. A '*' symbol in the priority 
value, field implies any numeric value can be used. To represent the same numeric value an 'X' 
symbol is used in the priority value field. Because of the equality in both priority operators, 
whenever the value of the priorities being compared are equal, there is an overlap. The numbers 
1 and 2 are used to represent that fact that one value is greater than another. In reality these 
values can be any numbers that preserve this feature. When an '-' symbol is used in the table 
below it represents the fact that no priority attribute was explicitly represented in a policy rule. 
The assumption is that when no priorities are stated, then all priorities are allowed. 
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>= * >= * Overlap 
<= * <= * Overlap 
* X * X Overlap 
>= 1 <= 2 Overlap 
>= 2 <= 1 No Overlap 
<= 2 >= 1 Overlap 
<= 1 >= 2 No Overlap 
- - * * Overlap 
* * - - Overlap 
- - - -
Overlap 
Table 8. Conditional Priority Overlap 
To prevent data packets from looping for infinity through a network, a hop count can be 
associated with a packet which represents the packet's maximum lifetime. PPL enables a 
hopcount attribute to be used in the conditional section of a policy rule to support the limiting of 
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a packets lifetime. This hop count is decremented each time the packet passe
s through a router. 
When the hop count reaches zero, the packet is dropped from the network. U
sing the operators 
'<=' and '>=',two policy rules can be checked for overlapping condition
s. Table 9 represents the 
logical relationship used by the PPL compiler to determine if an overl
apping condition exists, 
and therefore the possibility for conflict. In the table, an '*'symbol repres
ents any numeric value 
when placed in the hopcount value field, and either of the hop count conditio
nal operators when 
placed in the operator field. An '-' symbol represents that fact that no hopc
ount attribute was 
specified for policy rule and therefore will support all values. The num
bers 1 and 2 are again 
used represent that the caparison is being made between two values wher
e one is possible greater 
than the other. An 'X' symbol is used to represent the fact that two hopcou
nts are exactly the 
same. 





<= * .Overlap 
* 
X * X Overlap 
>= 1 <= 2 
Overlap 
>= 2 <= 1 N
o Overlap 
<= 2 >= 1 Overl
ap 







Table 9. Conditional Hopcount Overlap 
Bandwidth is the term used in PPL to represent the data rate of traffic i
n units/sec. The 
units can very from gigabits, megabits, kilobits, and bits. During the c
ompilation all units are 
converted to megabits, to provide a common base for comparison.
 Bandwidth is used to 
determine conflicts in two possible ways. During the establishment of li
nks in a PPL policy file, 
each link is specified with a supporting bandwidth. When no bandwi
dth is specified, a zero 
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bandwidth is assumed. The first check of conflicting bandwidths is during the establishment of 
paths through the network. Each network link along a longer path must be able to support the 
total bandwidth requirement of that longer path. 
The second use of bandwidth for detecting conflicts is in the determination of overlap in 
the conditional section of the policy rule. During the earlier conflict detection process the 
operator '=' is exclusively used to represent the bandwidth parameters. In the conditional 
section the operators '<=' and '>="are used for comparison. These bandwidth requirements are 
used to check for minimal bandwidth performance levels. An example of two bandwidth 
statements being compared can be seen in the following two PPL policy rules. 
Policy_bandwidth_l net_manager {*} {traffic_class ={data}} {bandwidth>= 20 MBPS} {deny} 
Policy_bandwidth_2 net_manager {*} {traffic_class ={data}} {bandwidth>= 40 MBPS} {permit} 
In this case each policy is specifying data network traffic bandwidth requirements that 
are above 20 and 40 Mbps respectively. The bandwidth comparison made during the conditional 
phase of the compiler would determine that there is an overlapping bandwidth requirement, 
namely when the bandwidth requirement is above 40 Mbps. This overlapping condition will lead 
to the detection of conflicting policy rules where one rule denies traffic above 40 Mbps and the 
other permits it. Table I 0 represents the logic used in the PPL compiler to determine if an 
overlap of bandwidth requirements exist. As with the other tables in this chapter the '*' symbol 
represents any valid value for that column, and the '-' symbol represents that fact that no 
bandwidth attribute was specified in the conditional element of the policy rule. The 'X' symbol 
is used to relate the fact that both values are equal and the numbers I and 2 are used to indicate 
that one value is greater than the other. 
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>= * >= * Overlap 
<= * <= * Overlap 
X X Overlap 
>= 1 <= 2 Overlap 
>= 2 <= 1 No Overlap 
<= 2 >= 1 Overlap 
<= 1 >= 2 No Overlap 
* * Overlap 
* * Overlap 
Overlap 
Table 10. Conditional Bandwidth Overlap 
4. Find Overlapping Paths using Expanded Path and Conditional 
Elements 
The process of finding overlapping paths is straight forward yet tedious. After the 
expansion of any path containing wildcard characters, each path is compared against one another 
other for an overlapping path segment. That overlapping path segment could be either one node 
or one link between the two paths. When a common path segment is found, the· conditional 
elements of each policy are compared using Table 3 though Table 10 to determine if the 
overlapping path segments can co-exist because of further granularity; see Section 3 for details. 
If the paths are not from the same policy rule, using the policy!D to determine this, then two 
policy rules have a potential for conflict and are marked for the verification of conflict using the 
target and action items elements, details are described below. 
5. Expanding Target Elements with Consideration of Action Items 
To help detect conflicting policies, the target element does not support implicit permits. 
An action element value of 'permit' allows the situation described by the combination of targets, 
conditions, and paths, to exist. The use of implicit policies can lead to ambiguity in expressing 
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network policies. If there are to be implicit actions, then the action should be on the side of 
denial rather than permission. PPL supports implicit denies, but not implicit permits. As a result, 
when a user wants traffic to be permitted on a path, they must explicitly state this fact, or permit 
all traffic with the '*' symbol as the only target attribute. For example, a class called 
"traffic_ class" is defined below. 
define class traffic_class {data, video, voice}; 
This class is a set that contains three values: data, video, and voice. Table 11 shows the 
logical results enforced by the PPL compiler with the combination of target information and 
action items using the defined traffic_ class. 
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traffic_class ={voice} permit explicit permit: voice 
implicit deny: data, video 
traffic_class ={voice} deny explicit deny: voice 
implicit deny: data, video 
traffic_class !={voice} permit explicit permit: data, video 
implicit deny: voice 
traffic class != {voice} deny double negative: There is no explicit permit. 
explicit deny: data, video 
implicit deny: voice 
* permit Explicit permit on all classes of defined traffic, all 
elements of the set 
* deny Explicit deny of all targets 
explicit deny: data, video, voice 
Table 11. Target and Action Combination 
The results of the combination of target elements and actions are associated with the 
policy ID from the policy rule. When overlapping paths are detected between two policy rules, 
the results of the expansion of the target elements are used to determine if a conflict exists. 
The action item can contain more than just the two values, permit and deny. The other 
action items are to control the dynamic aspects of the network. The keywords priority and 
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hopcount can be used to change values associated with the keywords when the network reaches 
the state which is described by the combination of path, target, and conditions. For example, if 
the loss rate of voice data reaches a certain level, the priority of this voice traffic may be 
increased in an attempt to provide better QoS to users using voice over the Internet. When the 
keywords hopcount or priority are used in the action items element, the implicit action is 
'permit'. When the action item value is 'deny', then no other action item elements can exist in 
the list. The compiler will catch this type of conflict, both permit and deny within the same 
policy rule, and flag it as a syntax error. The following policy rule explicitly denies the data 
traffic_ class on the NPS path. 
policy5 net_ manager {NPS} {traffic_ class= {data}{*} {DENY}; 
It is possible to have multiple permit actions, such as changing the priority of the traffic 
described by the policy rule as well as changing the hopcount associated with the policy rule. 
C. RESOLVING CONFLICTS 
The PPL compiler supports the automatic resolution of conflicting policies with the use 
of policy !D. The policy ID, is the element of the policy rule that identifies the creator of the rule. 
The policy ID field maps to an integer value, which permits the comparison of two policy ID 's to 
determine if one is greater than the other. When two policy rules have the same creator, or when 
each of the creators has the same priority level, automatic conflict resolution may not be 
possible. By default the conflict tester will not resolve conflicts between policies created by the 
same user or precedence level. As will be covered later in this chapter, a class of traffic not 
explicitly permitted, is implicitly denied in PPL. There may exist a situation when a single user 
creates several policy rules to create an overall network policy. Rather than explicitly listing all 
classes of effected traffic in each incremental policy rule, a compiler option may be used to 
alleviate this inconvenience. This option informs the policy tester to ignore conflicts that exist 
because of implicit denies between policy rules created by the same user. For example, take the 
following two policies: 
Policy! net_ manager {Pathl} {class= {faculty}}{*}{permit}; 
Policy2 net_manager {Pathl} {class= {student}}{*} {deny}; 
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With the default option of the compiler, these two policy rules would produce a conflict, 
since faculty traffic is permitted by Policy] on Pathl, but implicitly denied by Policy2. Using the 
"-no_implicit_deny" option during compilation, this conflict will be ignored since it was 
produced as a result of an implicit deny between two policies created by the same user. 
When a conflict does exist between two policy rules, and the ID values are not equal, 
then the higher value of the two ID's will have priority and in a sense deactivate the lower 
priority policy rule. The PPL compiler will advise the user which policy rules were resolved and 
how. The policy ID will allow a user to implement their own local policy rules, but when in 
conflict with a higher ID, the network administrator for example, the local policy rule will be 
overridden. 
In its current state, the PPL compiler accepts a configuration file that is created with an 
ordinary text editor. There is no control over its creation or the information entered into it. A 
mechanism must be created that prevents unauthorized access to this file, or the 
misrepresentation of network policy creators. One means to accomplish this would be to 
establish an interface that prevents direct access to the configuration file. This interface would 
allow policies to be created by password protected accounts, were only the current user's 
identifier would be associated with a policy rule. Accounts to the interface would be established 
that assign a priority level to each user. The priority levels are not required to be unique, but 
when multiple users are assigned the same priority level, there is a potential for an unresolved 
conflict to exist. 
Although the current PPL compiler only supports policy ID for conflict resolution, in 
theory there is no reason that further means cannot be implemented in the future. 
D. PERFORMANCE 
Performance was not emphasized during the implementation of the compiler and policy 
tester. More important was the ability to correctly detect conflicts between network policies. The 
detection of network policy conflicts is envisioned as an offline process that is executed before 
the policies are actually implemented in the network. Basing network size on a typical 
autonomous system of 40 nodes, network simulations were run. The results of three simulated 
networks are provided in Table 12 providing time estimates to process and test for conflicting 
policies. The three networks varied the number of nodes comprising each network at 10, 30, and 
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40. Analysis of the results confirmed that performance is directly related to the number of 
network paths that need to be generated for wildcard matching. The flexibility of the path 
representation provided by PPL, is also a performance bottleneck. 
PPL provides the use of wildcards in representing network paths to support aggregation. 
When a policy must be applied to all possible paths from node 1 to node 20 for example, it can 
be represented by <Node!, *, Node20>. Rather than listing all the paths explicitly, which in 
some cases may be hundreds, this representation allows one statement to represent them all. Path 
aggregation allows for smaller policy databases, as well as requiring less bandwidth to transmit 
path information to network enforcement points. The down side, is that the policy tester will 
generate all possible paths through the network as part of the path expansion process. 
To improve time performance, a flag can be used to inform the compiler that all policies 
represented in the data file explicitly list each node, and that no path expansion is required. Table 
12 displays the time required and the number of paths generated both with, and without the 
compilation flag. The network consisting of 10 nodes includes paths the contain wildcard 




!i " 10':, -'-···· 11 377 0:15 
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''30 10 1449 6:09 0:09 37 
' ' 
20 2271 18:35 0:09 126 
Table 12. Simulation Results 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
A major contribution made by PPL is the ability to test for conflicting network policies 
before they are disseminated throughout the network. This chapter discusses the formal logic 
representation of the network policies, and the incremental steps taken to detect conflicts using 
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the Prolog Interpreter. Tables are presented throughout this chapter to state the logical 
consequence of comparison operations between policy rules. The chapter is concluded with a 
discussion of the method used for resolving conflicts by using the identifier of the policy's 
creator. 
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V. CASE STl.JDY 
As a proof of concept, a case is presented in which network policies, represented in PPL, 
are tested using formal methods to determine the consistency of those policies. To demonstrate 
this procedure, network policies are presented which apply to the network represented by Figure 
15. 
A. A 10 NODE SIMULATED NETWORK 
Suppose that ten organizations, which are represented in Figure 15, are connected 
together as represented by this diagram. These organizations wish to apply policies to control 
NPS NA.SA 
CERT 
SPA WAR NSF 
U.N 
Figure 15. Case Study Network Diagram 
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the performance and access to their network. Using the Path-based Policy Language (PPL), 
network's connectivity is defined using nodes and links and entered into a configuration f 
This configuration file also contains user defined classes of traffic, data types, paramete 
applied to the nodes and links, as well as the network policies and the paths they apply to. Thl 
full configuration file can be found in appendix B. In the next few sections the elements of the 
configuration file will be discussed and explained. Although small, perhaps '14 the number of 
nodes associated with a typical Autonomous System, this network will allow us to demonstrate 
the features of PPL and the ability for conflict detection between policies. The benefit of a 
smaller network diagram, is the ability of not overwhelming the reader with too much 
complexity. 
B. NETWORK MODELING AND USER DEFINED DATA 
The first step in modeling a network is to define the nodes available for creating the links 
and paths for which network policies will be applied. This is done with simple define statement 
identifying a name with a node in a network. The nodes in this network reflect real world 
organizations, but the connectivity of this organizations in the real world is not implied. The 
nodes can be defined with one or more statements as a comma separated list of names. The 
following statements define the I 0 nodes that comprise the network. 
define node NPS, DARPA, SPA WAR, NSF, IETF, NASA; 
define node FDA, NATO, UN, CERT; 
The connectivity of the network is represented by defining the links between nodes. 
Although the link define statements imply a direction associated with the link, the PPL compiler 
and conflict detection process ignore direction apply bi-directional communication. The 
following list of define statements represent the eleven links that create the network. The ability 
to list several links with the same define statement is a time and space saver that again can be 
used with the definition of links. 
define linkNPS_DARPA <NPS, DARPA>, NPS_NASA <NPS, NASA>; 
define linkDARPA_IETF <DARPA, IETF>, DARPA_NSF <DARPA, NSF>; 
define linkDARPA_SPAWAR <DARPA, SPA WAR>; 
define link DARPA_ CERT <DARPA, CERT>; 
define link NASA_IETF <NASA, IETF>; 
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define linkiETF_FDA <IETF, FDA>; 
define link SPA WAR _NSF <SPA WAR, NSF>; 
define link SPA W AR_NATO <SPAW AR, NATO>; 
define link NSF _NATO <NSF, NATO>; 
define link UN_NATO <UN, NATO>; 
All paths must be defined before they can be referenced by a PPL policy r
ule. This 
definition of paths, allows for attributes to be associated with those paths.
 These attributes 
include the bandwidth requirement for the path, and the messages required to
 support policies 
based on dynamic features of the network such as delay, jitter, and data loss. A path can be 
represented by an explicit listing of nodes required to construct the path, or ma
y also include the 
wild card character '*' which expands to match all possible paths. The 
following define 
statements were used in the configuration file to define the paths and the attr
ibutes associated 
with the paths, links and nodes that comprise the network. 
define path NPS_CERT {<NPS, *, CERT>}; 
define path NPS_NSF {<NPS, DARPA, NSF>}; 
define path NASA_SPAWAR {<NASA,IETF,DARPA,SPAWAR>}; 
define path UN_NPS {<UN,*,NPS>}; 
define path ALL{*}; 
define link_param NPS_DARPA {BW := 100MBPS, delayQ, loss_rateO}; 
define path _param NPS _ CERT {BW := 100 MBPS, jitterO}; 
define path_param NPS_NSF {BW := 100 MBPS, jitterQ}; 
The path statements defined vary from the very specific, listing every node and
 the order 
which it will appear, to the path defined as ALL, which represents all poss
ible paths in the 
network. The ALL path, is useful when you want to apply a single policy over t
he entire network. 
The path labeled NPS _ CERT represented as <NPS, *, CERT>, is used to identi
fied all valid 
paths in the network that have a source ofNPS and a destination ofCERT. Th
e use of the term 
valid path, implies the path are loop-free. 
Parameters are associated with the links and paths using the appropria
te define 
statement, either link _param, or path _par am. The parameters associated wi
th the link 
NPS_DARPA are that a bandwidth of 100 Mbps is supported, as well the messages 
delayO, and 
loss _rateO. As mentioned earlier, these messages support dynamic policies where pe
riodic input 
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about the state of the network is required. These messages are simple identified, not defined in 
any rigid sense. The idea is that the policy has no need to know what information is passed in 
these messages or the format of that information. This allows network policies to utilize user 
defined messages, which required no changes to the formal PPL grammar. Although there must 
be an agreement between the policy server and other devices on exactly what information is to be 
carried by the message and the format. 
Other than the policies themselves, the remaining information that is entered into the 
configuration file are the user defined elements which will be used to construct the network 
policies. Every policy has a creator, so all the valid users who may create policies must be listed 
with their associated priority. The priority is used during the conflict resolution phase to negate a 
policy when created by a user with a lower priority. The highest priority is 1, and in this case 
only the network manager is assigned this value. The valid users and their priorities for this 
network scenario are listed below. 
define policy_maker Net_Manager(l), Xie(3), Lundy(3), Stone(4); 
Traffic types that are used throughout the network policies are listed below. The user 
may add, delete, or modify these classes to support their own needs. In this case defined six 
classes of traffic. Each traffic class contains all the valid values that may be used when referring 
to this class. 
define class traffic_type {research, university}; 
define class traffic_class {data, video, voice}; 
define class traffic_security {Private, Public}; 
define class traffic _priority {High, Med, Low}; 
define class user {faculty, student, staff, accounting}; 
define class node_traffic {NPS, DARPA, SPA WAR, NSF, IETF, NASA, FDA, 
NATO, UN, CERT}; 
The user may also define types as well. Types are similar to the user defined classes in 
that they are assigned a label and are associated with a list of valid values. Classes are used in the 
target element of a policy rule, and types are used in the conditional element of a policy. There is 
an ordering associated with the values of a type, so the comparison operators '<=', '>=', '=', 
and '!=' may all be used. A type defined and used in the network policies is listed below. This 
type is used to represent the seven days of the week. 
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define type day {Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday, 
Sunday}; 
C. NETWORK POLICIES 
The policies which are applied to the network represented by Figure 15, are also entered 
into the configuration file and described below. 
Policy1 was created by the network manager and applies to the path 
NPS-+DARPA-+NSF. This policy permits research traffic to and from the nodes NPS and NSF. 
A further restriction is placed on this traffic to only allow it between the hours of 0800 and 
1200, Monday through Friday. 
Policyl Net_Manager {NPS_NSF} 
{traffic_ type= {research}, node_traffic = {NPS, NSF}} 
{day!= Saturday, day!= Sunday, time>= 0800, time<= 1200} 
{permit}; 
Policy2 was created by the user Stone and applies to the path 
NASA -+IETF -+DARPA -+SPA WAR. The user Stone has a priority level of 4, which is the lowest 
of all defined users. This policy denies traffic from the NSF to flow along this path. 
Policy2 Stone {NASA_SPAWAR} {node_traffic= {NSF}}{*} {deny}; 
Policy3 was created by the user Lundy and applies to all paths between the nodes NPS 
and CERT. The wildcard character was used in the definition of this path and when expanded 
represents two paths through the network. The first is NP S -+DARPA -+CERT, and the second is 
NPS-+NASA-+IETF-+DARPA-+CERT. Although there are other possible paths between NPS 
and CERT, these two are the only ones that are free of loops. Loops in a network are not 
desirable, and are not considered valid during the expansion process. This policy permits all 
traffic without restriction to flow over this path. 
Policy3 Lundy {NPS_CERT} {*}{*}{permit}; 
Policy4 was created by the network manager and applies to link between the nodes 
NASA and IETF. This policy permits all traffic without restriction to flow on this link. 
Policy4 Net_ Manager {NASA_IETF} {*}{*}{permit}; 
Policy5 was created by the network manager and applies to link between the nodes NPS 
and DARPA. This policy denies university traffic from passing over this link after 1100. 
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Policy5 Net_Manager {NPS_DARPA} 
{traffic_type = {university}} 
{time>= 1100} 
{deny}; 
Policy6 was created by the network manager and applies to the same link as Policy5, the 
link between the nodes NPS and DARPA. This policy denies university traffic from passing over 
this link after 13 00 each day. 
Policy6 Net_ Manager {NPS_DARPA} 
{traffic_type ={university}} 
{time >= 1300} 
{deny}; 
Policy? applies to the node NSF. As mentioned earlier, the ability to specify policies that 
apply to nodes, provides the ability to scale well in larger networks. In this case NSF represents a 
sub-network that denies all traffic with a host address starting with 131. 
Policy7 Net_ Manager {NSF}{*} {hostiP = 131.*.*.*} {deny}; 
Policy8 applies to multiple paths as did Policy3, in this case when the path is expanded 
as a result of the wildcard used in it's declaration, eight paths are effected. These eight unique 
paths permit all traffic which match the host addresses of 153.20.8 or 131.40. *.*to flow through 
the paths. 
Policy8 Xie {UN_NPS} {*} {hostiP = 153.20.8.*, hostiP = 131.40.*.*} {permit}; 
Policy9 applies to the link connecting the nodes NPS and DARPA. Before the hour of 
0800, video traffic is permitted on the link and is assigned apriority of3. 
Policy9 Net_ Manager {NPS_DARPA} {traffic_ class= {video}} 
{time <=0759:59} {priority := 3}; 
PolicylO also applies to the link connecting the nodes NPS and DARPA. This policy 
denies video traffic between hours of 0800 and 1600 everday. 
Policy10 Net_Manager {NPS_DARPA} {traffic_class ={video}} 
{time >=0800, time <=1600} {deny}; 
Policyll again applies to the link connecting the nodes NPS and DARPA. This policy 
permits video traffic after the hour 1600, but lowers the priority to 5. 
Policyll Net_Manager {NPS_DARPA} {traffic_class ={video}} 
{time >=1601} {priority:= 5}; 
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D. DETECTED CONFLICTS 
Once the information required to model the network and represent the network policies is 
entered into the configuration file, the next step is to compile the file. This compilation phase 
parses the configuration data, including the network policies, to validate its representation is 
correct. The output of the compilation is automatically fed into a theorem prover based on formal 
logic. In this case the theorem prover is a program written in Prolog that defines a conflict, and 
along with the data extracted from the configuration file, is used to verify policy consistency. 
The results of the compilation and theorem proving phase are described below. There were a 
total of 7 conflicts that could not be resolved, and 22 conflicts which were resolved. The creator 
of the policy was used as a means of precedence to nullify policies of lower priority users, and 
therefore resolve certain conflicts. The complete results of the conflict detection process are 
listed in appendix C. The number of conflicts both resolved and not resolved can be a little 
misleading. The fact that one policy may be applied to multiple paths at the same time requires 
each path to be verified individually. For example, suppose that there are two policies defined for 
a network, policy! and policy2. Policy! applies to two paths through the network, but policy2 
only effects one link of network. During the conflict detection phase, one of the paths associated 
with policy I was determined to conflict with the single link of policy2, but the second path of 
policy I did not conflict with the link of policy2. For completeness, every path effected by the 
conflict is listed separately. This allows the user to identify which path of the network is 
effected. But when both paths of policy! are in conflict with the single link of policy2, two 
conflicts are listed. This may be a little misleading, in that the conflict between policy! and 
policy 2 is listed twice, once for each path. This is exactly what happened in this case study. 
There were 7 conflicts listed which could not be resolved, but there were actually only 5 
conflicts between policy rule pairings. The 22 non-resolved conflicts were reduced to only 8 
unique policy rule pairings. The 13 policy conflicts are represented in Table 13. Each of these 13 
conflicts are addressed individually below. 
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Policy 10 Policy 1 
2 Policy 5 Policy 11 
3 Policy 5 Policy 1 
4 Policy 6 Policy 11 
5 Policy 7 Policy 1 
Policy 10 Policy 8 
7 Policy 10 Policy 3 
8 Policy 4 Policy 2 
9 Policy 5 Policy 8 
10 Policy 5 Policy 3 
11 Policy 6 Policy 8 
12 Policy 6 Policy 3 
13 Policy 7 Policy 8 
Table 13. Policy Conflicts 
Conflict 1: Policy 10 specifies that video traffic is denied between the hours of 0800 and 
1600 on the link between NPS and DARPA. Policy 1 applies to a path between NPS and NSF, 
specifically NPS-;DARPA-;NSF. Both these policies share the link NPS-;DARPA, but Policy 1 
permits video traffic between 0800 and 1200 on all days except Saturday and Sunday. The 
conflict process starts with the fact that two policies both permit and deny the same traffic class 
on a common link. To verify the conflict, the conditional elements were compared for overlap. 
The fact that the conditions of Policy 10 did not mention which days applied to the policy, 
implied that all days were covered. The result was an overlap of the days Monday, Tuesday, 
Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. The remaining conditional element of these two policies was 
the time specified. When compared, there was also an overlap of the hours between 0800 and 
1200. This information confirmed that a conflict existed, but the creators of these two policies 
may be used to resolve the conflict by nullifying the policy created by the lower priority user. In 
this case both policies were created by the network manager, and thus can not be resolved. 
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Conflict 2: Policy 11 and Policy 5 both apply to the same link, NPS _DARPA. Policy 11 
assigns a priority to video traffic after 1600 each day. When an action such as assigning a 
priority is used, there is a default action of permit also implied. Policy 5 makes no reference to 
video traffic and therefore a denial of this traffic is implied. Unless a traffic class is explicitly 
permitted in a policy rule, the default action is to deny it. Policy 11 permits video traffic after 
1600 each day and Policy 5 denies video traffic after 1100 each day. The hours conditions from 
these two policies form an overlap anytime after 1600. This causes a policy conflict, and since 
each policy was created by the network manager, no resolution is possible with the default 
options. Using the "-no_ implicit_ deny" option discussed in section C titled "Resolving 
Conflicts", this conflict would be avoided because it was caused by an implicit deny. 
The fact that Policy 5 explicitly denies university traffic has no effect on the conflicting 
situation, since the university traffic is not addressed in Policy 11, it is implicitly denied. 
Conflict3: The third conflict identified was between Policy 5 and Policy 1. Policy 1 
applies to the path NPS-+DARPA-+NSF, and Policy 5 applies to the link NPS-+DARPA. These 
two paths overlap on the NPS to DARPA link. Policy 1 permitted research class traffic as well as 
NPS and NSF traffic on this path during non-working hours. Policy 5 explicitly denies university 
class traffic after the hour of 1100, and since no mention of research, NSP or NSF is made in the 
target element of the policy rule, they are implicitly denied. These two policies conflict in the 
fact that research, NPS, and NSF is permitted in Policy 1, and denied in Policy 5. The 
conditional element of the policy rules overlap between the hours of 1100 and 1200, Monday 
through Friday. This conflict can not be resolved using default options again, since both were 
created by the network manager. As mentioned in Conflict 2, the "-no_implicit_deny" option 
would also have resolved this conflict. 
Conflict 4: Policy 6 and Policy 11 are both applied to the NPS-+DARPA link of the 
network. Policy 11 permits video traffic on the link after the hour of 1600 each day. Policy 6 
makes no mention of video traffic in it's policy rule and therefore an implicit deny of video 
traffic is applied. Policy 6 in enforced after the hour of 1300 each day, leaving an overlap of 
hours between 1300 and 1600 each day. Without the use of the "-no_implicit_deny" option, this 
conflict can not be resolved by the policy's creator since the network manager was the creator in 
both policies. 
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Conflict 5: The last conflict that can not be resolved using the policy's creator, we..: 
between Policy 1 and Policy 7. Policy 1 applied to the path NPS-:>DARPA-:>NSF, and Policy·, 
applied to the NSF node itself. When policies are applied to a node, this indicates that the nod-.c 
represents a subnet itself. The overlap between these two paths is obviously the NSF node. 
Policy 1 permits research, NPS and NSF traffic during certain times of the day. Policy 7 denies 
university traffic and with no mention of research, NPS, or NSF traffic, these are implicitly 
denied as well. The denial of research, NPS, and NSF traffic of Policy 7 is applied to any 
network address beginning with 131. The support of addresses beginning with 131 is implied in 
Policy 1, therefore a contradiction occurs with regards to the common traffic classes. Again, both 
policies were created by the same user, causing no automatic resolution to be possible. 
Conflict 6: This conflict is between Policy 8 and Policy 10. Policy 8 applies to a path 
that utilizes the wild card character'*' in its definition. The path is defined as CERT -:>'* '-:>NPS 
and includes all possible paths between the nodes CERT and NPS, which do not include loops. 
This wild card matching provided in this definition provides eight unique paths which are listed 
below. 
UN~NATO~NSF~DARPA~NPS 
UN~NATO~SPA W AR~DARP A~NPS 
UN~NATO~NSF~SPAWAR~DARPA~NPS 





The first four paths include an overlapping link, DARPA-:>NPS, with Policy 10. The last 
four paths of Policy 8 do not overlap with Policy 10, and therefore can not cause a conflict. The 
results of the conflict detection phase identified four conflicts between these policies as a result 
of the four unique paths which overlapped with Policy 10. Solid links in Figure 16 show the links 
that are covered by the eight expanded possible paths of Policy 8. The links not effected by 
Policy 8 are indicated with dashed lines. As a result of this coverage, Policy 8 has a great change 














Figure 16. Link Coverage from Policy 8 
Policy 8 permits all traffic classes that have a source or destination address beginning 
with 153.20.8 or 131.40 to flow over that path. Policy 10 denies video traffic on the 
DARPA-+NPS link between the hours of 0800 and 1600 regardless of the address. These two 
policies create a conflict were video traffic is denied, by Policy 10, and permitted by Policy 8. 
There is a time overlap of the hours 0800 through 1600, and as a result of not specifying 
addresses in the conditional element of Policy 10, all addresses are permitted, causing a conflict 
between the policies. 
Policy 8 was created by the user Xie and has precedence of 3. Policy 10 was created by 
the network manager and has a precedence level of 1. As a result of these differing precedence, 
the conflict can be resolved by nullifying the policy enforcement of the 4 overlapping paths 
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specified by Policy 8. The four remaining paths that did not include the DARPA-+NPS link will 
be able to support Policy 8. 
Conflict 7: This conflict is between Policy 3 and Policy I 0. Policy 3 also utilizes a path 
that was defined with the wild card character'*', namely NPS-+*-+CERT. When expanded, this 
path produces two unique paths through the network that are loop free. These paths are 
NPS-+DARPA-+CERT and NPS-+NASA-+IETF-+DARPA-+CERT. The first path overlaps with 
link that Policy 10 applies to, NPS-+DARPA. 
Policy 3 permits all traffic to flow with no conditions. Policy 10 denies video traffic 
during certain times of the day. The deny creates a conflict with the open policy of 3. This 
conflict is resolved by the fact that policy was created by the user Lundy and has a precedence of 
3, where Policy 10 was created by the network manager and has a precedence of 1. This results 
in the fact that Policy 3 is applied to only one of the paths generated from the expanded target 
element, namely NPS-+NASA-+IETF-+DARPA-+CERT. The overlapping path of Policy 3 which 
is in conflict with Policy 3, is not allowed to carry all traffic. 
Conflict 8: The paths specified in Policy 2 and Policy 4 have an overlapping link of 
NASA -+lETF which produces a conflict. The common link is permitted to carry all traffic classes 
of data with no restrictions from Policy4, at the same time not permitted to carry NSF traffic. 
This produces a conflict that can not be resolved with the conditions element of the policy rules. 
The creator of Policy 2 is the user Stone and has a precedence of 4, Policy 4 is created by the 
network manager and has the highest precedence, 1. This resolution of the conflict will nullify 
the Policy 2 in favor of Policy 4. 
Conflict 9: As explained with conflict 6, Policy 8 applies to 8 different paths through the 
network. This policy conflicts with that of Policy 5, which shares a common link of 
NPS-+DARPA. Policy 8 permits all traffic from two address groupings. Policy 5 denies 
university traffic, no matter what the address, after the hour of 1100. This produces a conflict by 
permitting and denying university traffic after the hour of 1100, for the address groupings 
153.20.8. *and 131.40. *. *. 
The conflict is resolved by disallowing Policy 8 to be enforced on 4 of the paths that it 
applies to. Policy 5 was given precedence over Policy 8 as a result of the different users creating 
the policies. 
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Conflict 10: One of the paths applying Policy 3 is in conflict with the link 
NPS~DARPA ofPolicy 5. The overlappingpaths provide a conflict because Policy 3 permits all 
traffic unconditionally, and Policy 5 restricts traffic by not allowing university traffic after 1300. 
The creator of Policy 3 has a lower precedence than the network manager who created Policy 5. 
The conflict resolution disallows Policy 3 to be enforced on the path NPS~DARPA--X;ERT, but 
will be allowed on the path NPS~NASA~IETF~DARPA--X;ERT, which was also specified in 
Policy 3. 
Conflict 11: Policy 8 produces 8 paths, 4 of which overlap and produce a policy conflict 
with the link NPS~DARPA, specified in Policy 6. Policy 8 permits all traffic classes of data as 
long as they are from a selected list of host addresses. Policy 6 in tum denies university traffic 
for all host addresses after the hour of 1300. This produces a policy conflict that results in the 4 
overlapping paths specified in Policy 8 from being enforced. The remaining 4 paths of Policy 8 
produce no conflict with Policy 6 and therefore are allowed to co-exist in the network. The 
resolution of this policy conflict was a result that Policy 3 was created by a user with a lower 
precedence. The first 4 paths listed below will not enforce Policy 3. The remaining 4 paths do not 








UN~NATO~SPA W AR~NSF~DARPA~IETF~NASA~NPS 
Conflict 12: Policy 3 and Policy 6 produce a conflict as a result of a overlapping link 
which both permits and denies the same traffic. This overlapping link is NPS~DARPA, and is 
specified in Policy 6. One of the two paths specified in Policy 3, namely NPS~DARPA~ CERT 
utilizes the same NPS~DARPA link. Policy 3 allows unconditional passage of all traffic, where 
Policy 6 denies university traffic after the hour of 1300. This produces a conflict that is resolved 
by not permitting Policy 3 to be enforced on the overlapping path segment listed above, but will 
allow Policy 3 to be enforced on the path NPS~NASA~IETF~DARPA--X;ERT. The automatic 
resolution is a result of the fact that a lower precedence user created Policy 3. 
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Conflict 13: The last policy conflict detected was between Policy 7 and Policy 8. As 
explained earlier, particularly with conflict 6, the expansion of the path specified in Policy 8 
covers a majority of the links in the network by producing 8 unique paths through the network. 
Policy 7 is specified on a single node (NSF) in the network, and as can be seen in paths listed 









The two policies conflict because of the fact that Policy 8 permits all traffic when from a 
particular address grouping of hosts. The addresses permitted can begin with either 153.20.8, or 
131.40. Policy 7 in tum denies all traffic from a host that has an address beginning with 131. 
This address selection specified in the conditional element of the policy rule causes an overlap 
whenever the address belongs to 131, since any address starting with 131.40 also starts with 131. 
This is direct conflict and forces the 6 paths that include the node NSF to not enforce Policy 8. 
This results with only 2 of the 8 paths specified in Policy 8 to actually support the policy of 
permitting traffic. The creator of Policy 8 has a precedence lower than that of the network 
manager, who created Policy 7, resulting in the automatic resolution ofthis conflict. 
E. CHAPTERSU~Y 
In this chapter, a case study is presented as a proof of concept that network policies can 
be represented in PPL, and with the aid of formal logic, conflicts between network policies can 
be identified. Eleven policies are applied to the ten node network with varying degrees of overlap 
between those policies. Twenty-nine conflicts where identified between the policies and each 
conflict is examined in detail. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
A. CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
The case study demonstrated that an unambiguous language which supports both path 
and non-path network policies could indeed represent the structure of a network, as well as the 
policies to control the operations of that network. It was demonstrated that this can be used to 
specify static as well as dynamic policies, both of which are needed to support the changing 
policies of today's networks. Network policies frequently change in response to new 
requirements, and therefore require continuously re-testing. This need to specify new policies 
and test their consistency is the reason PPL and the policy tester were developed. 
In addition, when multiple network policies were composed together, the result of the 
compilation was output indicating policies that if implemented would produce conflicting results. 
The ability to provide a network administrator with information about conflicting policies as 
early as possible is a major goal of the research in this thesis, and influenced the design ofPPL. 
Policies were applied to simulated networks varying from 10 to 40 nodes providing 
feedback to the feasibility of using PPL to support the representation and conflict detection of 
network policies. The use of a wildcard character in the representation of policy paths had a 
tremendous impact on the performance of the simulations. When wildcards are present, all 
possible paths in the network are generated to support the expansion of wildcard paths. The time 
to process policies for a 10 node network averaged 15 seconds, and for a 40 node network, 27 
minutes and 24 seconds. To make the conflict detection process more efficient when wildcard 
characters are not used, a compilation flag was implemented, "-nowild", that would only include 
paths explicitly represented by the user. This dropped the compilation time for a 40 node network 
from over 27 minutes to 7 seconds. 
B. CONTRIBUTIONS 
While languages have been developed to support specific aspects of network policy, such 
as Integrated Service, Differentiated Service, and Policy Routing, PPL includes much if not all of 
the functionality of these specialized languages. PPL represents network policies in an abstract 
and unambiguous manor. The abstract nature of PPL transcends the issues associated with 
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platform-dependent network technology, allowing us to specify functionality rather than 
implementation detail. The benefit of a unambiguous language is that there is no question as to 
the meaning of the policy's goal. 
PPL also provides for the support of static as well as dynamic policies. This enables 
traffic belonging to certain classes to flow through a network segment, or to provide higher 
priority to certain types of traffic, such as voice or video. The dynamic aspect of PPL will 
support the fluctuation oftoday's network traffic measured by such functions as data loss, jitter, 
and delay. PPL provides for specifying network policies based on the feedback of such 
measurements, and controls the tuning of a network as it progresses from state to state. PPL also 
provides for the user to specify other measurement functions as needed, to enhance the PPL 
language's power. 
It is critical that a network perform in a predictable manor. The ability to detect specific 
network policies that are in conflict with each other greatly aids in this goal. Although conflict 
testing is not part of a formal language specification, PPL was designed with conflict detection in 
mind. A supporting compiler was developed which provides policy testing by utilizing a program 
written in the Prolog programming language. After parsing the network policies for correctness, 
the compiler translates the network policies into formal logic, and utilizing the Pro log interpreter, 
detects conflicts between policies. This feedback can then be utilized by a network administrator 
to modify the conflicting policies before they are implemented in the network. 
The PPL compiler also utilizes the creator of the policy to try and resolve any policy 
conflicts that have been detected. The allows conflicting policies to co-exist in the specification, 
but only the higher priority policy will be implemented in the network. The policies that are 
automatically resolved will also be presented to the user at the end of the compilation process. 
This feedback provides a sanity check by a human before the policies are implemented 
throughout the network. 
C. LIMITATIONS 
Although the PPL language provides the ability to support user-defined types, classes, 
and messages, there are limitations to predefined attributes. In particular the host/P attribute used 
in the conditions element of a policy rule. Host/P is intended to represent an IP address used in 
the Internet today. Although the dot quad notation used for the hostiP attribute is of similar 
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representation to real IP addressing scheme, it is not complete. The wild carding is limited, and 
there is no support for subnetting or netmasks. The larger issue is that only the IP version for 
address schema is supported. There is a need for user defined addresses schemes as well. 
The support of dynamic policies is realized with PPL by allowing for user-defmed 
measurement functions for each link, as well as the message that will provide the information. 
Currently a message is defined by providing a name that it can be identified with. There is no 
sense of contents of the message, and no way to represent the possible formats. 
Another limitation is with the conflict detection process. In its current state, only the 
static aspects of network policies are used. This shows that the concept of network policy 
conflict detection is possible, but is limited until the support of the dynamic aspects of the PPL 
language are enhanced, specifically messages. To support conflict detection with messages, a 
define statement will need to be implemented in the PPL language that allows for the declaration 
of the return value type and units associated with the message. For example, delay()<= 20% or 
available_bandwidth() = 24Mbps. Once the value type and unit of measurements are known, a 
decision table can be implemented and associated with the decision process. 
D. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The PPL language and compiler provides for the representation, verification and conflict 
detection of network policies. To actually implement the network policies, the various network 
devices must be instructed on what aspects of the policies they are to support. Future work could 
provide tasking files which contain the setup information necessary to program the device. The 
idea ofPPL was to develop an abstract language to support multiple vendors. This trend could be 
continued with the setup files. Only high-level details of the device setup could be provided. 
These high level setup instructions might be created using the category of device as a guide. For 
example, the setup files could be created based on the functions of the device, router, filter, 
firewall, etc. The setup files for routers would contains the information necessary to create 
routing tables, but not the manufacturers exact commands. 
The approach used to design PPL was that all the network policies are known ahead of 
time, and that a network administrator would be able to compile and test for consistency before 
the policies were implemented. A slight modification could be made to accept new network 
policies and determine if they should be implemented dynamically. For example, in today's 
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network, resource reservation messages such as RSVP, are used to request resources dynamicaL. 
as needed. To create a policy engine that is always available to request the implementation of 
new policy rules is another possible consideration. The policy engine would provide feedback to 
the requestor if the policy creates a conflicting situation in the network, is denied because of 
limited resources, and could generate the setup files needed to dynamically reprogram network 
devices to support the request. 
The next logical step would be to specify and enforce network policies represented in 
PPL using a testbed network. A network such as SAAM[38], being developed at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, would be ideal. The SAAM effort is being developed to support QoS in the 
Next Generation Internet (NGI). A path-based approach is being explored to support the end-to-
end QoS needs of today's networks, and would provide an ideal match for PPL. A policy 
server/engine could be designed based on the research of this dissertation to accept path-based 
requests, and provide feedback based on the policies applying to the network. 
A more user friendly means of creating network policies may also be developed. 
Currently PPL policy rules are typed into a data file and compiled with a command line interface. 
The PPL grammar is provided in appendix A, and would provide an excellent starting point for a 
Graphical User Interface (GUI) tool kit. The tool kit might have a natural field-by-field interface 
that would provide a syntax-free policy rule. Using input from previous fields of a policy rule, 
only valid choices would be presented to the user for completion of the policy rule. 
A user interface would also provide a security mechanism that would disallow direct 
manipulation of the PPL configuration file. If the interface was password protected, policies 
could only be associated with the user currently logged o~. This would prevent an ordinary user 
from assigning the "network managers" identifier to a policy in hopes of guaranteeing its 
implementation. 
Providing a means for the user to order and view existing policies would also be useful. 
The ordering may provide a view based on the policy creator, or perhaps all the policies that 
effect a particular network segment. When a policy is applied to several network paths, there is 
always a chance that a sub-set of paths conflict with other policies, while the remaining paths are 
conflict free. Providing a means to visualize this information would also be useful feature. 
Network managers and planners utilize network simulation tools to predict network 
performance. If a policy module were developed that could be incorporated in to such tools, 
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network policies could be applied to network simulations in an attempt to verify network security 
and performance. 
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APPENDIX A. PATH-BASED POLICY LANGUAGE (PPL) 
1. Keywords 

































These keywords are represented in upper case, but are not case sensitive. 
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2. Define Statements 
To make the language as dynamic as possible, the ability has been provided to the user to 
expand the functionality of the language with the use of define statements. Define statements 
such as node and link are also used as basic building blocks of language. As graph theory uses 
vertices and edges to define a graph, PPL used node and link to define the network that policies 




define policy _maker 
define class 
define type 
define node _param 
define link _param 
define path _param 
3. Policy ID 
Policy identifiers are legal variables that identify polices. They are required to be unique 
and are used to identify policies that are in conflict. 
4. User ID 
User identifiers are used to identify the creators of policies. They must be unique and be 
legal variables. These identifiers can be used to prioritize policies that are in conflict. Enabling 
prioritization is one way to resolve conflicts in network policy. 
5. Paths 
Paths are the component of policies in PPL that conditions, restrictions, and actions are 
based on. Paths are composed of at least two nodes in a network that are connected by one or 
more links. A path can be represented by a list of nodes, a link, a list of links, or a composition of 
nodes and links. For example, below are valid representations of paths. Assume that nodel, 






Nodes may also include wildcard characters. This allows for the representation of 
multiple paths with a single path statement. For example, the path {*, nodel, *} represents all 
possible paths in the network that traverse the node labeled node]. 
6. Target 
The target field of a policy is used to identify a class of traffic. This allows a flow of 
packets to be identified by a label and is critical for the implementation of differentiated services. 
Below are examples of how the target component can be used: 
{traffic_class ={video, voice}} 
{traffic_type ={research}} 
7. Conditions 
The conditions field is to represent how global conditions can be used to effect a policy. 
The conditions can either be language defined or user defined. For example time is a language 
defined condition that can be used to restrict a policy to hours between 8:00 am and 4:00pm: 
{time>= 0800, time<= 1600} 
Conditions can also be user defined, for example let us suppose the user defines a class 
called day, which consists of the names of the days of the week. Then a condition that restricts a 
policy to weekdays can be represented by: 
{day>= Monday, day<= Friday} 
8. Action Items 
The action item field is used to represent actions that should be taken if the target and 
condition fields are satisfied. Action items might be used to set or reset a priority on a traffic 
class, declaring compromises, and explicit deny actions. 
9. Legal Variables 
In PPL legal variables are made up of letters, digits and the underscore character. All 
variables must start with a letter. 
10. Dot Quad notation 
Dot quad notation is used to represent IP addresses or IP networks that a policy effects. 






11. Reserved Symbols 








Comments are used to make the program more understandable by allowing the writer to 
explain briefly what the program does. Comments are any characters between character 
sequences/* and */, and are ignored by the compiler. For example: 
I* This is a comment*/ 
/* 
* This is also a comment 
*I 




:= <define _list> I <policy _list> I <define _list> <policy _list> 
:= <define_ type> I <define _list> <policy _list> 
:= DEFINE <class_ define _list> I 
DEFINE <type_define_list> I 
DEFINE <path_define_list> I 
DEFINE <node_ define _list> I 
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<class_ define _list> 
DEFINE <link_define_list> I 
DEFINE <user_ define _list> 
DEFINE <param _define _list> 
:= <class_ define _section> 
I <class_ define _list> <class_ define _section> 
<class_define_section> :=CLASS <legal_var> { <class_element_list>}; 
<class_element_list> := <class_element> l<class_element_list>, <class_element> 
<class element> := <legal_var> 
<function_ define _list> := <function_ define_ section> 
I <function_ define _list> <function_ define _section> 
<type _define _list> := <type_ define _section> 
I <type_ define _list> <class_ define _section> 
<type_define_section> :=TYPE <legal_var> { <type_element_list>}; 
<type_ element _list> := <type_ element> 
<type_ element> 
<path_ define _list> 
I <type_element_list>, <type_element> 
:= <legal_ var> 
:= <path_ define _section> 
I <;path_ define _list> <path_ define _section> 
<path_define_section> :=PATH <legal_var> { <define_yath_list>}; 
<define _path _list> := <define _path> 
<define _path> 
I <define _path _list>, <define _path> 
:=<*>I* I< <define_yath_element_list> > 
<define _path_ element _list> := <define _path_ element> , <define _path_ element> 
<define_yath_element_list>, <define_yath_element> 
<define _path_ element> := <define _path_ element> , <define _path_ element> 
I <define _path_ element _list> , <define _path_ element> 




<link_ define _list> 
:= NODE <node _list> ; 




<link list> :=<link> I <link_list>, <link> 
<link> := <legal_var> < <legal_var>, <legal_var> > 
<user_ define _list> :=POLICY_ MAKER <user _list> ; 
<user list> := <define_ user> I <user _list> , <define _user> 
<define_user> := <legal_var> (<integer>) 
<param_define_list> := NODE_PARAM <legal_var> {<param_list>}; 
LIST_PARAM <legal_var> {<param_list>}; 
















:= BW := <integer> <bw _unit> 
I <legal_ var> ( ) 
:= <param_element> 
I <param _list> , <param _element> 
:= <policy> I <policy _list> <policy> 
:= <policy!D> <user!D> 
{ <path _list> } 
{ <target _list> } 
{ <condition _list> } 
{ <action _list> } ; 
:= <legal_ var> 
:= <legal_ var> 
:= <defined_yath> I <path_list>, <defined_yath> 
:= < legal_ var > 
:= <target> I <target _list> , <target> I * 
:= <legal_var> <target_symbol> { <target_element_list>} 
:= <target_ element> !<target_ element _list> , <target_ element> 
:= <legal_ var> 
:==i!= 
:= * I <condition> I <condition _list> , <condition> 
:= PRIORITY <= <integer> 
I PRIORITY>= <integer> 
I HOPCOUNT >= <integer> 
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I HOPCOUNT <= <integer> 
I TIME •<= <time> 
I TIME >= <time> 
I HOSTIP =<quad _dot> 
I HOSTIP != <quad_dot> 
I <bandwidth _symbol> >= <number_ bw _units> 
I <bandwidth_symbol> <=<number _bw _units> 
I <legal_ var> <conditional_ defined_ operations> 
<conditional_defined _operations> := <conditional_ operations> 
I ( ) <conditional_symbol> <number _units> 
<conditional_ symbol> := GTEQ I LSEQ I NTEQ I EQUAL I< I> 
<bandwidth_symbol> := BW 
<conditional_ operations> := <conditional_ symbol> <legal_ var> 
<action _list> :=DENY 
I <action> I <action _list> , <action> 
. <action> := <action _Jeserved _word> 
I <action _Jeserved _word> := <number_ units> 
<action_Jeserved_ word> :=PRIORITY I PERMIT I HOPCOUNT 








:=<integer> I <integer>: <integer> 
:= <number> I <number> <unit> 
:= <integer> I <float> 
:= <output_ number> <bw _unit> 
:= <integer> I <float> 
:= <quad_ dot _1> I 
<quad_ dot _1> I 
<quad_dot_3> I 
<quad_ dot_ 4> 
:= MBYTES I BYTES I BITES I SEC I 
MSECIUSECIPACKETS 
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APPENDIX B. POLICY RULE INPUT FILE OF CASE STUDY 
I* 
* Defme the nodes of the network 
*I 
defme node NPS, DARPA, SPA WAR, NSF, IETF, Internet_linkl, Internet_link2; 
I* 
* Define the links of the network 
*I 
define link NPS_DARPA <NPS, DARPA>, NPS_NASA <NPS, NASA>; 
define link DARPA_IETF <DARPA, IETF>, DARPA_NSF <DARPA, NSF>; 
define link DARPA_SPAWAR <DARPA, SPA WAR>, DARPA_CERT <DARPA, CERT>; 
define link NASA_ IETF <NASA, IETF>; 
define link IETF _FDA <IETF, FDA>; 
define link SPAWAR_NSF <SPA WAR, NSF>, SPAWAR_NATO<SPAWAR, NATO>; 
define link NSF _NATO <NSF, NATO>; 
define link UN_NATO <UN, NATO>; 
I* 
* Defme the paths used in the network policies 
*I 
define path NPS _ CERT { <NPS, *, CERT>}; 
defme path NPS_NSF {<NPS, DARPA, NSF>}; 
defme path NASA_ SPA WAR { <NASA,IETF ,DARPA, SPA WAR>}; 
define path UN_NPS {<UN,*,NPS>}; 
define path ALL{*}; 
I* 
* Define the users who can create policies 
*I 
define policy_ maker Net_ Manager( 1 ), Xie(3 ), Lundy(3 ), Stone( 5); 
I* 
*User defined classes of traffic which can be used 
* in the target element of policy rules 
*I 
defme class traffic_ type {research, university}; 
defme class traffic_ class {data, video, voice}; 
defme class traffic_ security {Private, Public}; 
defme class traffic _priority {High, Med, Low}; 
define class user {faculty, student, staff, accounting} ; 
define class node_traffic {NPS, DARPA, SPAW AR, NSF, IETF, Internet_linkl, Internet_link2}; 
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/* 
*User defined type that can be used in the conditional element 
* of a policy rule. 
*I 
define type day {Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Saturday, Sunday}; 
/* 
* Paramaters associated with links and paths 
*I 
define link_param NPS_DARPA {BW := 100MBPS, delay(), loss_rate()}; 
define path_param NPS_CERT {BW := 100 MBPS,jitter()}; 
define path_param NPS_NSF {BW := 100 MBPS,jitter()}; 
/* 
*Format of Policy Term: 
* PolicyiD UseriD {paths} {target} {conditions} {action_items}; 
*I 
/* 
* Permit research, NPS and NSF traffic Monday - Friday 
*between the hours of0800 and 1200 
*I 
Policy1 Net_Manager {NPS_NSF} 
/* 
{traffic_type ={research}, node_traffic = {NPS, NSF}} 
{day!= Saturday, day!= Sunday, time>= 0800, time<= 1200} 
{permit}; 
* Deny all traffic from NSF on the link between NASA and SPA WAR 
*I 
Policy2 Stone {NASA_SPAWAR} {node_traffic= {NSF}}{*} {deny}; 
/* 
* Permit all traffic unconditionally on the two paths 
*specified with the NPS_CERT path definition 
*I 
Policy3 Lundy {NPS_CERT} {*} {*} {permit}; 
/* 
* Permit all traffic unconditionally on the NASA->IETF link 
*I 
Policy4 Net_Manager {NASA_IETF} {*} {*} {permit}; 
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I* 
* Deny all university traffic after 1100 on the 
* NPS->DARPA link 
*I 
Policy5 Net_ Manager {NPS_DARPA} 




* Deny university traffic after 1300 on the 
* NPS->DARP A link 
*I 
Policy6 Net_ Manager {NPS_DARPA} 




* Deny all traffic from hosts with and address beginning 
*with 131. 
*I 
Policy7Net_Manager {NSF}{*} {hostiP= 131.*.*.*} {deny}; 
I* 
* Permit all traffic from hosts whos addresses begin with 
*either 153.20.8 or 131.40. 
*I 
Policy8 Xie {UN_NPS} {*} {hostiP = 153.20.8.*, hostiP = 131.40.*.*} {permit}; 
I* 
* Permit and assign a priority of 3 to video traffic before the hour 
* of0800, on the NPS->DARPA link 
*I 
Policy9 Net_Manager {NPS_DARPA} {traffic_class ={video}} 
{time <=0759} {priority:= 3}; 
I* 
*Deny video traffic on the NPS->DARPA link between the hours of0800 and 1600 
*I 
Policy10 Net_Manager {NPS_DARPA} {traffic_class ={video}} 
{time >=0800, time <=1600} {deny}; 
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/* 
* Permit and assign a priority of 5 to video traffic after the hour 
*of 1600 on the NPS->DARPA link 
*I 
Policy11 Net_ Manager {NPS_DARPA} {traffic_class ={video}} 
{time >=1601} {priority:= 5}; 
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APPENDIX C. POLICY RULE OUTPUT FILE FOR CASE STUDY 
Print Unresolved conflicts 
Conflict PolicylO < > Policyl 
PolicylO Path= [NPS,DARPA] 
PolicylO Targets: deny traffic_class=[video] 
Policyl Path= [NPS,DARPA,NSF] 
Policyl Targets: permit traffic_type=[research], permit node_traffic=[NPS], permit 
node_ traffic=[NSF] 
Target Conflicts: node_traffic = [NPS], node_traffic =[NSF], traffic_type =[research] 
Conflict Policy5 < > Policyll 
Policy5 Path = [DARP A,NPS] 
Policy5 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policyll Path= [DARPA,NPS] 
Policyll Targets: permit traffic_class=[video] 
Target Conflicts: traffic_class =[video] 
Conflict Policy5 < >Policy! 
Policy5 Path= [NPS,DARPA] 
Policy5 Targets: deny traffic_ type=[ university] 
Policyl Path= [NPS,DARPA,NSF] 
Policy I Targets: permit traffic_type=[research], permit node_traffic=[NPS], permit 
node_ traffic= [NSF] 
Target Conflicts: node_traffic = [NPS], node_traffic =[NSF], traffic_type =[research] 
Conflict Policy5 < > Policyll 
Policy5 Path= [NPS,DARPA] 
Policy5 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policyll Path= [NPS,DARPA] 
Policyll Targets: permit traffic_class=[video] 
Target Conflicts: traffic_class =[video] 
Conflict Policy6 < > Policyll 
Policy6 Path = [DARP A,NPS] 
Policy6 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policyll Path= [DARPA,NPS] 
Policyll Targets: permit traffic_class=[video] 
Target Conflicts: traffic_class =[video] 
Conflict Policy6 < > Policyll 
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Policy6 Path= [NPS,DARPA] 
Policy6 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policy II Path= [NPS,DARPA] 
Policy II Targets: permit traffic_class=[video] 
Target Conflicts: traffic_class =[video] 
Conflict Policy?< >Policy I 
Policy? Path = [NSF] 
Policy? Targets: [] 
Policy! Path= [NPS,DARPA,NSF] 
Policy I Targets: permit traffic_type=[research], permit node_traffic=[NPS], permit 
node_ traffic= [NSF] 
Target Conflicts: node_traffic = [NPS], node_traffic =[NSF], traffic_type =[research] 
Print Resolved conflicts 
Conflict PolicylO < > Policy8 
PolicylO Path= [DARPA,NPS] 
Policy I 0 Targets: deny traffic_ class=[ video] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,NSF,DARPA,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy8 =[permit_ all] 
Resolved: PolicylO(Priority =I) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict PolicylO < > Policy8 
PolicylO Path= [DARPA,NPS] 
PolicylO Targets: deny traffic_class=[video] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,NSF,SPA W AR,DARP A,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy8 = [permit_all] 
Resolved: Policy I O(Priority = I) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict PolicylO < > Policy8 
PolicylO Path= [DARPA,NPS] 
PolicylO Targets: deny traffic_class=[video] 
Policy8 Path = [UN,NATO,SPA W AR,DARP A,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy8 =[permit_ all] 
Resolved: PolicylO(Priority = I) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy I 0 <=> Policy8 
PolicylO Path= [DARPA,NPS] 
PolicylO Targets: deny traffic_class=[video] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,SPAW AR,NSF,DARPA,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
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Target Conflicts: Policy8 =[permit_ all] 
Resolved: Policy10(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy10 < > Policy3 
Policy10 Path= [NPS,DARPA] 
Policy10 Targets: deny traffic_class=[video] 
Policy3 Path= [NPS,DARPA,CERT] 
Policy3 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy3 = [permit_ all] 
Resolved: Policy10(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy3(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy4 < > Policy2 
Policy4 Path = [NASA,IETF] 
Policy4 Targets: [] 
Policy2 Path= [NASA,IETF,DARPA,SPAW AR] 
Policy2 Targets: deny node_traffic=[NSF] 
Target Conflicts: Policy4 =[permit_ all] 
Resolved: Policy4(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy2(Priority = 4) 
Conflict Policy5 < > Policy8 
Policy5 Path = [DARP A,NPS] 
Policy5 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,NSF,DARPA,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy8 =[permit_ all] 
Resolved: Policy5(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy5 < > Policy8 
Policy5 Path = [DARP A,NPS] 
Policy5 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,NSF,SPAWAR,DARPA,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy8 =[permit_ all] 
Resolved: Policy5(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy5 < > Policy8 
Policy5 Path = [DARP A,NPS] 
Policy5 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policy8 Path = [UN,NATO,SPA W AR,DARP A,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy8 =[permit_ all] 
Resolved: Policy5(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy5 < > Policy8 
Policy5 Path= [DARPA,NPS] 
Policy5 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,SPAWAR,NSF,DARPA,NPS] 
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Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy8 = [permit_ all] 
Resolved: Policy5(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy5 < > Policy3 
Policy5 Path= [NPS,DARPA] 
Policy5 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policy3 Path= [NPS,DARPA,CERT] 
Policy3 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy3 = [permit_all] 
Resolved: Policy5(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy3(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy6 < > Policy8 
Policy6 Path = [DARP A,NPS] 
Policy6 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,NSF,DARPA,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy8 =[permit_ all] 
Resolved: Policy6(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy6 <-> Policy8 
Policy6 Path = [DARP A,NPS] 
Policy6 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policy8 Path = [UN,NA TO,NSF ,SPA W AR,DARP A,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy8 = [permit_ all] 
Resolved: Policy6(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy6 < > Policy8 
Policy6 Path = [DARP A,NPS] 
Policy6 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,SPA W AR,DARP A,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy8 = [permit_ all] 
Resolved: Policy6(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy6 < > Policy8 
Policy6 Path = [DARP A,NPS] 
Policy6 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,SPAW AR,NSF,DARPA,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy8 =[permit_ all] 
Resolved: Policy6(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy6 < > Policy3 
Policy6 Path= [NPS,DARPA] 
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Policy6 Targets: deny traffic_type=[university] 
Policy3 Path= [NPS,DARPA,CERT] 
Policy3 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy3 =[permit_ all] 
Resolved: Policy6(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy3(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy? < > Policy8 
Policy? Path = [NSF] 
Policy? Targets: [] 
Policy8 Path = [UN,NA TO,NSF ,DARP A,IETF ,NASA,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy? = [deny _all] 
Resolved: Policy7(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy? < > Policy8 
Policy? Path = [NSF] 
Policy? Targets: [] 
Policy8 Path = [UN,NATO,NSF ,DARP A,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy?= [deny_all] 
Resolved: Policy7(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy? < > Policy8 
Policy? Path = [NSF] 
Policy? Targets: [] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,NSF,SPA WAR,DARP A,IETF,NASA,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy?= [deny_all] 
Resolved: Policy7(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy? < > Policy8 
Policy? Path = [NSF] 
Policy? Targets: [] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,NSF,SPAWAR,DARPA,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy?= [deny_all] 
Resolved: Policy7(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
Conflict Policy? < > Policy8 
Policy? Path= [NSF] 
Policy? Targets: [] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,SPAW AR,NSF,DARPA,IETF,NASA,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy?= [deny_all] 
Resolved: Policy7(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
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Conflict Policy? < > Policy8 
Policy? Path = [NSF] 
Policy? Targets: [] 
Policy8 Path= [UN,NATO,SPAWAR,NSF,DARPA,NPS] 
Policy8 Targets: [] 
Target Conflicts: Policy? = [deny_ all] 
Resolved: Policy7(Priority = 1) overrides=> Policy8(Priority = 3) 
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I* Function prototype to print out the 
* compiler user options 
*I 
void print_ usage(); 
/* 
*Text string passed in by flex 
*I 
extern char *yytext; 
/* 
* Pointer to output file created to contain 




* Variables used record the compiler options 
* entered by the user 
*I 
int no_ wild = 0; 
int no_implicit_deny = 0; 
extern int verbose; 
/* 
* Temporary Pointers to entries in Symbol Table 
*I 
struct symtab *class_ id = 0; 
struct symtab *function_id = 0; 
struct symtab *type_id = 0; 
struct symtab *path_id = 0; 
struct symtab *param _id = 0; 
struct symtab *policy_id = 0; 
struct symtab *link_name = 0; 
struct symtab *link_nodel = 0; 
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struct symtab *link_node2 = 0; 
I* Return value from symbol lookup function *I 
int class _found; 
I* Flag to indicate the first time in the loop *I 
int first_ time; 
I* 
* Flag to indicate if defined type is to be 
* represented in formal logic, and output to file. 
*I 
int output_ flag= 0; 
I* Number of policies processed *I 
int policy_ count= 0; 
I* 
* Flag to indicate messages supported on network links 
* are to output to the file. 
*I 
int message_ flag = 0; 
I* Count to uniquely identified defined types internally *I 
int type_ count = 0; 
I* 
* Variables to hold clock times convertd from strings to 
*integers 
*I 
int clock_time, clock_timel, clock_time2; 
%} 
I* DEFINITION SECTION *I 
I* 




struct symtab *symp; 
char *string; 
I* Define the following Variables as type string *I 
%token <string> LEGAL V AR 
%token <string> INTEGER 
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%token <string> FLOAT 
%token <string> QUAD_DOT_l 
%token <string> QUAD_DOT_2 
%token <string> QUAD_DOT_3 
%token <string> QUAD_DOT_4 
I* 
* Reserved Symbols 
*I 
%token GTEQ LSEQ NTEQ ASSIGN EQUAL CR WILDCARD 
I* 
* Reserved Words 
*I 
%token DENY PRIORITY ALLOW PERMIT HOPCOUNT HOSTIP USERID 
%token TIME DAY DEFINE CLASS MESSAGE TYPE PATH NODE LINK 
POLICY _MAKER 
%token NP ARAM LP ARAM PPARAM 
%tokenBW 
I* 
* Measurement Units 
*I 
%token MBYTES BYTES GBPS MBPS KBPS BITES BPS SEC MSEC USEC PACKETS 
I* RULES SECTION *I 
%% 
system _policy: define _list 
I policy _list 
I define_list policy_list 
I* 
* Rules to allow user defined classes, messages, types, paths, 
* nodes, links, and users 
*I 
define _list: define_ type 
I define _list define_ type 
defme _type: DEFINE class_ define _list 
I DEFINE type_define_list 
I DEFINE path_define_list 
I DEFINE node_define_list 
I DEFINE link_defme_list 
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I DEFINE user_define_list 
I DEFINE param_define_list 
I* 
* Rules for defining parameters associated with nodes, links, and paths 
*I 




NPARAM LEGAL V AR 
{if(sym_look ($2,DEFINED_NODE) != FOUND_ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Unknown NODE");} 
else {param_id = sym_tab_ref($2, DEFINED_NODE); 
message_flag = 0;};} 
'{' param_Iist'}' ';' 
LPARAM LEGALVAR 
{if (sym_look ($2,DEFINED _LINK) !=FOUND _ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Unknown LINK ");} 
else {param_id = sym_tab_ref($2, DEFINED_LINK); 
message_flag = 1;};} 
'{' param_list '}' ';' 
PPARAM LEGAL V AR 
{if(sym_look ($2,DEFINED_PATH) != FOUND_ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Unknown PATH");} 
else {param_id = sym_tab_ref($2, DEFINED_PATH); 
message_flag = 0;};} 
'{' param_list '}' ';' 
param _element 
param_Iist ',' param_element 
BW ASSIGN INTEGER 





{if(sym_look ($1,DEFINED_MESSAGE) != FOUND_ENTRY){ 
sym_add($1 ,DEFINED _MESSAGE);} 
if(sym_tab_entry_lookup(param_id, $1) = NO_ENTRY){ 
sym_tab_entry_add (param_id, $1);}; 
if (message_ flag) 
'(' ')' 




* Rules for defining users who can make policies 
*I 





POLICY_MAKER user_list ';' 
define_ user 
user_list ',' define_user 
LEGALVAR 
{if(sym_look ($1,DEFINED_USER) = FOUND_ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Re-definition of USER");} 
else {class_id = sym_add($1, DEFINED_USER);};} 
'('INTEGER 
{ sym_ tab_ entry _add( class _id, $4);} 
')' 
* Rules for defining links in the network 
*I 
link_ define _list: 
link_list: 
link: 
LINK link list '·' 
- ' 
link 
link _list ',' link 
LEGALVAR 
{if(sym_look ($1,DEFINED_LINK) = FOUND_ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Re-definition of Link");} 
else {link_name = sym_add($1, DEFINED_LINK);};} 
'<LEGALVAR 
{if ((sym_look ($4,DEFINED _NODE)) !=FOUND _ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Unknown Node in Link");}; 
link_node1 = sym_tab_ref($4, DEFINED_NODE);} 
','LEGALVAR 
{if((sym_look ($7,DEFINED_NODE)) != FOUND_ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Unknown Node in Link");}; 
link_node2 = sym_tab_ref($7, DEFINED_NODE);} 
'>' 
{fprintf(logic_out,"link(\'%s\',\'%s\',\'%s\').\n", 
(link_ name )->name,(link _node 1 )->name, (link_ node2)->name ); 
fprintf(logic_out,"link(\'%s\',\'%s\',\'%s\').\n", 




* Rules for defining nodes in the network 
*I 
node_ define _list: NODE node_list';' 
node list: node 
node_list ','node 
node: LEGAL V AR 
{if((class_found = sym_look ($1,DEFINED_NODE)) = FOUND_ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Re-definition ofNode ");} 
else {class_id = sym_add($1, DEFINED_NODE);};} 
I* 
* Rules for defining paths in the network 
*I 
path_ define _list: 
I 
path_ define_ section: 
define _path _list: 
I 
define _path: 
path_ define_ section 
path_ define _list path_ define_ section 
PATHLEGALVAR 
{if ((sym _look ($2,DEFINED _PATH))= FOUND _ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Re-definition of Path");} 
else {class_id = sym_add($2, DEFINED_PATH); 
fprintf (logic_ out, "path _links(\'%s\',[" ,$2);};} 
'{' define_path_list '}' ';' {fprintf(logic_out,"]).\n");} 
define _path 
define_path_list ',' {fprintf(logic_out,11 , 11 );} define _path 
'<'WILDCARD'>' {fprintf(logic_out,"'*"');} 
WILDCARD { fprintf (logic_ out,"'*"');} 
'<' define_path_element_list '>' 
define _path_ element_ list: 
define _path_ element 
define _path_ element ',' { fprintf(logic _out, 11 , 11 );} 
I define _path_ element_ list ',' { fprintf(logic _out, 11 , ");} 
define _path_ element 
define _path_ element: LEGALVAR 
{if(sym_look ($1, DEFINED_NODE) != FOUND_ENTRY) 
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/* 
{yyerror ("Invalid Path (Node not defined)");} 
else { fprintf (logic_ out, "'%s"' ,$1 ); } ; } 
WILDCARD { fprintf (logic_ out,"'*"');} 
* Rules for defining traffic classes to be used in the network 
*I 
class_ define _list: class_ define_ section 
class_ define _list class_ define_ section 
class_ define_ section: CLASS LEGAL V AR 
{if((sym_look ($2,DEFINED_CLASS)) = FOUND_ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Re-definition of Class ");} 
else {class_id = sym_add($2, DEFINED_CLASS);};} 
'{' class_element_list '}' ';'; 
class_ element_ list: class_ element 
I class_element_list ',' class_element 
class element: LEGALV AR {sym_tab_entry_add(class_id, $1);}; 
/* 
* Rules for defming types to be used in the network 
*I 
type_ define _list: 
I 
type_ define_ section: 
type_element_list: 
I 
type_ define_ section 
type_ define _list class_ define_ section 
TYPE LEGAL V AR 
{type_count = 0; 
if((sym_look ($2, DEFINED_TYPE)) = FOUND_ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Re-defmition of Class ");} 
else {class_id = sym_add($2, DEFINED_TYPE);};} 
'{' type_element_list '}' ';'; 
type_ element 
type_element_list ',' type_element 
type_ element: LEGAL V AR 
{ sym _tab_ entry_ type _add( class _id, $1, type_ count);type _count++;}; 
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/* 
*Syntax for Policy Term 
* policyiD <useriD> {paths} {target} {conditions} {action_items} 
* - policyiD - unique policy identification token 
* - useriD - user ID of policy creator 
* - paths - network paths the policy effects 
* - target - target class of network traffic 
* - conditions - any global conditions (items are AND'ed) 
* - action_items- for setting parameters (e.g. policy priority), 
* declaring compromises and explicit deny, etc. 
*I 
/* 
* Rules for defining policies 
*I 
policy_list: policy 
I policy _list policy 
policy: policyiD useriD '{' path_list '}' '{' 
{ fprintf (logic_ out, "policy _targets(\'%s\',[" ,(policy _id)->name ); } 
target_list 
{ fprintf (logic_ out, "]).\n ");} 
'}' '{' condition_list '}' '{' action_list '}' ';' 
policyiD: LEGALVAR 
{if(sym_look ($1, POLICYID) = FOUND_ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Re-definition of Policy ID ");} 
else {policy_id = sym_add($1, POLICYID);};policy_count++;} 
useriD: LEGAL V AR 
{if(sym_look($1, DEFINED_USER) != FOUND_ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("UNKNOWN user");} 
else 
{ fprintf (logic_ out, "policy_ owner(\'%s\', \'%s\').\n" ,(policy_ id)->name, $1 ); } ; } 
/* 
* Syntax for Path Component 
*I 
path_list: defined _path 
I path _list ',' defmed _path 
defined _path: LEGAL V AR 
110 
/* 
{if((sym_look ($1,DEFINED_PATH) != FOUND_ENTRY) && 
(sym_look ($1,DEFINED_LINK) != FOUND_ENTRY) && 
(sym_look ($1,DEFINED_NODE) != FOUND_ENTRY)){ 
yyerror ("Unknown DEFINED element ");} 
else{ fprintf(logic _out, "policy _path(\'%s\',\'%s\').\n" ,(policy_ id)->name,$1 );} ;} 






target_list ',' {fprintf(logic_out,",");} target 
WILDCARD 
{ fprintf(logic _out,"'*','*',[]"); 
sym _ add((policy _id)->name, TARGET _ALL);} 
target: LEGAL V AR 
{if(sym_look($1, DEFINED_CLASS) = FOUND_ENTRY) 
{class_id = sym_tab_ref($1, DEFINED_CLASS); 
fprintf(logic _out, "'%s"' ,$1 ); } 
else yyerror ("Invalid Class");} 
target_symbol '{' 
{ fprintf(logic _out,"[");} 
target_ element_ list 
{ fprintf(logic _out,"]");} 
'}' 
target_ element_list: target_ element {} 
I 
, 
target_element_list ',' {fprintf(logic_out,",");} 
target_ element 
target_ element: LEGAL V AR 
' 
{if ( sym _tab_ entry _look( (class _id)->name,$1, 
DEFINED_ CLASS)= NO _ENTRY) 
{yyerror ("Invalid Class Entry");} 
fprintf(logic _out, "'%s"' ,$1 ); } 
target_symbol: EQUAL {fprintf(logic_out,",'=',");} 
I NTEQ {fprintf(logic_out,",'!=',");} 
/* 
* Syntax for Conditions Component 
*I 
condition _list: WILDCARD { fprintf(logic _out, "no_ conditions(\'%s\').\n" ,(policy _id)->name );} 
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condition: 
{class_id = function_id = type_id = (struct symtab *) -1;} 
condition {} 
condition_list ',' {class_id = function_id = type_id = (struct symtab *) -1;} 
condition {} 
PRIORITY LSEQ INTEGER 
{ fprintf(logic _out, "condition _path(\'%s\',priority, <=, %s ).\n ", 
(policy _id)->name,$3 ); } 
PRIORITY GTEQ INTEGER 
{ fprintf(logic _out, "condition _path(\'%s\',priority,>=, %s ).\n", 
(policy_ id)->name,$3 ); } 
HOPCOUNT GTEQ INTEGER 
{ fprintf(logic _out, "condition _path(\'%s\',hopcount,>=, %s ).\n", 
(policy_ id)->name,$3 ); } 
HOPCOUNT LSEQ INTEGER 
{ fprintf(logic _out, "condition _path(\'%s\' ,hopcount,>=, %s ). \n", 
(policy_ id)->name,$3 ); } 
TIME LSEQ { fprintf(logic _out, "condition _path(\'%s\',time, <=, ", 
(policy_ id)->name ); } time 
TIME GTEQ {fprintf(logic_out,"condition_path(\'%s\',time,>=,", 
(policy_ id)->name ); } time 
HOSTIP EQUAL 
{ fprintf(logic _out," condition _path(\'%s\', \'host_ id\', \' \', ", 










number_ bw _units 
{fprintf(logic_out,"]).\n");} 
bandwidth_symbol LSEQ 
{ fprintf(logic _out, "condition _path(\'%s\',\'BW\', <=,[",(policy_ id)->name ); } 
number bw units 
{fprintf(logic_out,"]).\n");} 
USERID EQUAL LEGALVAR 
{ fprintf(logic _out, "condition _path(\'%s\',\'user _id\',\' \',\'%s\').\n", 
(policy_id)->name,$3);} 
USERID NTEQ LEGALV AR 
{fprintf(logic_out,"condition_path(\'%s\',\'user_id\',\'!=\',\'%s\').\n", 
(policy_ id)->name,$3 ); } 
LEGALVAR 
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{ if(sym_look ($1, DEFINED_MESSAGE) = FOUND_ENTRY){ 
function_id = sym_tab_ref($1, DEFINED_MESSAGE); 
fprintf(logic_out,"policy_message(\'%s\',\'%s\').\n", 
(policy _id)->name,$1 ); 
}; 
if(sym_look ($1, DEFINED_TYPE) = FOUND_ENTRY){ 
type_id = sym_tab_ref($1, DEFINED_TYPE); 
output_flag = 1; 
}; 
if(class_id = (struct symtab *) -1 && 
function_id ==(struct symtab *) -1 && 
type_ id = ( struct symtab *) -1 ){ 
yyerror ("Unknown DEFINED element "); 
};} 
conditional_ defined_ operations {} 
time: INTEGER 
{clock_time = atoi($1); 
if(clock_time >= 0 && clock_time < 2400){ 
} 
if (clock_ time < 1 0){ fprintf(logic _out, "000%d00).\n ",clock_ time);} 
else if(clock_time < 100){fprintf(logic_out,"OO%d00).\n",clock_time);} 
else if(clock_time < 1000){fprintf(logic_out,"O%d00).\n",clock_time);} 
else {fprintf(logic_out,"%d00).\n",clock_time);} 
else {yyerror ("Invalid Time: range 0000-2359 ");}} 
I INTEGER':' INTEGER 
{clock_timel = atoi($1); 
clock_time2 = atoi($3); 
if(clock_timel >= 0 && clock_time1 < 2400 ){ 
} 
if(clock_time1 < 10){fprintf(logic_out,"OOO%d",clock_time1);} 
else if(clock_time1 < 100){fprintf(logic_out,"OO%d",clock_time1);} 
else if (clock _time 1 < 1 000){ fprintf(logic _out, "O%d" ,clock_ time 1 ); } 
else { fprintf(logic _out, "%d" ,clock_ time 1 ); } 
else {yyerror ("Invalid Time: range 0000:00-2359:59 ");} 
if(clock_time2 >= 0 && clock_time2 <=59){ 
if(clock_time2 < 10){fprintf(logic_out,"O%d).\n",clock_time2);} 
else {fprintf(logic_out,"%d).\n",clock_time2);} 
} 
else {yyerror ("Invalid Time X:Y :X range 0000-2359, Y range 00-59");}} 
conditional_ defined_ operations: conditional_ operations 
I '(' ')' 
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{if(function_id = (struct symtab *) -1) { 
yyerror ("Unknown Message");};} 
conditional_symbol number_units 
conditional_ operations: {if (output_ flag) { 
fprintf(logic _out, "condition _path(\'%s\', \ '%s\', ", 
(policy_ id)->name,(type _ id)->name ); 
};} 
conditional_ symbol LEGAL V AR 
{if(class_id = (struct symtab *) -1 && 
} 
type_id = (struct symtab *) -1){ 
yyerror ("Invalid CLASS/TYPE"); 
if(class_id != (struct symtab *)-I) 
} 
{if( sym _tab_ entry _look( (class_ id)->name,$3, 
DEFINED_CLASS) = NO_ENTRY){ 
yyerror ("Invalid CLASS Member"); 
} 
if(type_id != (struct symtab *) -1) { 
if(sym_tab_entry_look((type_id)->name,$3, 
DEFINED _TYPE)= NO _ENTRY){ 





fprintf(logic _out, ",\'%s\').\n",$3); 






GBPS { fprintf(logic _out,", \'GBPS\"');} 
MBPS { fprintf(logic _out, 11, \'MBPS\"');} 
KBPS { fprintf(logic _out, 11 ,\'KBPS\"');} 
BPS {fprintf(logic_out, 11,\'BPS\"');} 
number 
number unit 
conditional_ symbol: GTEQ {if(output_flag) {fprintf(logic_out,"\'>=\"'); output_ flag= 0;};} 
LSEQ {if(output_flag) {fprintf(Iogic_out,"\'<=\"');output_flag = 0;};} 





{if(output_flag) {fprintf(logic_out,"\' \"');output_flag = 0;};} 
'>' 
{if(type_id != (struct symtab *) -l){yyerror ("Invalid Type Operator");} 
if (output_ flag){ fprintf(logic _out, "\'>\"');output_ flag = 0;};} 
'< 
{if(type_id != (struct symtab *) -1){yyerror ("Invalid Type Operator");} 
if (output_ flag) { fprintf(logic _out,"\'<\"'); output_ flag = 0;};} 
bandwidth_symbol: BW {} 
number: INTEGER{} 
FLOAT{} 
output_ number: INTEGER { fprintf(logic _out, "%s" ,$1 ); } 
I FLOAT {fprintf(logic_out,"%s",$1);} 
quad_dot: QUAD_DOT_l {replace_dots($1); fprintf(logic_out,"[%s]",$1);} 
QUAD_DOT_2 {replace_dots($1); fprintf(logic_out,"[%s]",$1);} 
QUAD_DOT_3 {replace_dots($1); fprintf(logic_out,"[%s]",$1);} 


















{ fprintf(logic _out, "policy_ action('%s',deny).\n",(policy _id)->name ); 




action _reserved_ word 
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action _reserved_ word ASSIGN number_ units 
action _reserved_ word: PRIORITY 
{fprintf(logic_out,"policy_action('%s',permit).\n",(policy_id)->name); 
if (sym _look ((policy _id)->name, 
%% 
TARGET _ALL)= FOUND _ENTRY) 
{ fprintf(logic _out, "target('%s' ,permit_ all). \n" ,(policy_ id)->name ); } ; } 
PERMIT 
{ fprintf(logic _out, "policy_ action('%s',permit).\n",(policy _id)->name ); 
if(sym_look ((policy_id)->name, 
TARGET_ALL) = FOUND_ENTRY) 
{ fprintf(logic _out, "target('%s',permit_ all).\n ", 
(policy _id)->name ); } ; } 
HOPCOUNT 
{ fprintf(logic _out, "policy_ action('%s' ,permit).\n" ,(policy_ id)->name ); 
if(sym_Iook ((policy_id)->name, 
TARGET_ALL) = FOUND_ENTRY) 
{ fprintf(logic _out, "target('%s',permit_all).\n",(policy _id)->name ); } ; } 
extern FILE *yyin; 
extern FILE *logic_out; 
main(int ac, char **av) 
{ 
FILE *prologrules; /* Input files ofProLog policy rules */ 
int ij,count,c,first_time; /*Loop counters and flags*/ 
/* 
* File to contain Prolog Facts from PPL Configuration File 




* Scan the arguments passed in with the compile statement. 
* Set the appropriate flags according to the user's request 
*I 
while ( -ac > 0){ 
/*User wanted the Symbol Tables Dumped after parse*/ 
if(strcmp (av[ac],"-v") = 0){ 
verbose= 1; 
} 
/*User requests no wild card expansion*/ 




no wild= 1· 
- ' } 
I* 
* Do not implicit denies in the conflict detection 
*phase if the policy's creater are the same. 
*I 
else if(strcmp (av[ac],"-no_implicit_deny") = 0){ 
no_implicit_deny = 1; 
} 
I* Test the input configuration file *I 
else { 
} 




logic_file_name =(char *)malloc ((size_t)15); 
sprintf (logic _file_ name, "ppll.txt"); 




* If the input file was not specified or invalid, 
* print compiler usage to the user 
*I 








printf ("\nParse worked\n"); 
if (policy_ count = 0){ 
} 
else 
printf(''No policies specified\n\n"); 
exit(O); 
printf("%d policies scanned\n\n",policy_count); 
printf ("\nParse failed\n\n"); 
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/* 
* Loop thru the symbol table to create ProLog facts about 
* the nodes used to construct the network. 
*I 
count= 0; 





switch (symtable[i].type) { 
} 
case DEFINED _NODE: 
fprintf (logic_ out, "node _label('%s', %i). \n ", 
symtable[i] .name,count++ ); 
break; 
* Loop thru the symbol table to create ProLog facts about 
* user defined classes of traffic. 
*I 
count= 0; 





switch (symtable[i].type) { 
} 
case DEFINED_ CLASS: 
first_time = 1; 
fprintf (logic_ out, "class('%s',[", symtable[i].name ); 
for G = 0; j < MAXCLASSENTRIES; j++){ 
} 
if (class_ entries[j] .name = NULL) 
break; 
if (class_entries[j].class_reference = &(symtable[i])){ 




fprintf (logic_ out, "'%s"', class_ entries[j] .name); 
first_time = 0; 
fprintf (logic_ out,", '%s"', class_ entries[j] .name); 
fprintf (logic_out, "]).\n"); 
break; 
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* Loop thru the symbol table to create ProLog facts about 
* user defined types to be used in conditional statements, 
* and users defined who can create network policies. 
*I 
count= 0; 
for (i = 0; i < MAXSYMBOLS; i++){ 
} 
I* 
if ( symtable[i] .name = NULL) 
break; 
switch (symtable[i].type) { 
case DEFINED_ TYPE: 
} 
for G = 0; j < MAXCLASSENTRIES; j++ ){ 
if (class_entries[j].name =NULL) 
break; 
if (class_ entries [j] .class _reference = &( symtable[i])) { 
fprintf(logic_out,"type(\'%s\',\'%s\',%d).\n", 




case DEFINED_ USER: 
for G = 0; j < MAXCLASSENTRIES; j++ ){ 




if (class_entries[j].class_reference = &(symtable[i])){ 
fprintf (logic_ out, "user(\'%s\' ,\'%s\').\n", 
symtable[i].name,class_entries[j].name); 
} 
* Output dummy facts to keep ProLog interpreter from choking when 
* referencing facts that do not exist. 
*I 
fprintf (logic_ out,"no _ conditions(\'_null_ \').\n"); 
fprintf (logic_ out, "target(\'_ null_\',\'_ null_ \').\n"); 
fprintf (logic_out, "path_message(\'_null_ \',\'_null_ \').\n"); 
fprintf (logic_ out, "policy_ message(\'_ null_\',\'_ null_ \').\n"); 
fprintf (logic_ out," condition _path(\'_ null_\',\'_ null_\',\'_ null_\',\'_ null_ \').\n "); 
I* 
* Set flag in Pro log to allow wild card characters to be expanded 
* or not, depending on the user's direction 
*I 
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if (no_ wild) 
fprintf (logic_ out, "wild(\'no\').\n"); 
else 
fprintf (logic_ out, "wild(\'yes\').\n"); 
/* 
* Set flag in Pro log to allow implicit denies between 
* policies created by the same user to be ignored. 
*I 
if (no _implicit_ deny) 
fprintf (logic_ out, "user _implicit_ deny(\'no\').\n "); 
else 
fprintf (logic_ out, "user _implicit_ deny(\'yes\').\n "); 
/* 
* Create and run the first stage of the conflict detection 
* process. This involves sorting the facts just created by 
* the parsing process. The sorting is needed only to stop 
* Pro log from issuing warnings about facts not being contiguous 
* in the file. Add to the end of the file, the Prolog rules that 
* are to be applied to the facts entired from the prologrulesl.txt file. 
*Then execute the Prolog program by calling the Prolog command 
* line interface with input file. 
*I 
fclose(logic _out); 
system("sort ppll.txt > ppll.pl "); 




if((prologrules = fopen("prologrulesl.txt", "r")) =NULL) { 
perror ( av[ 1 ]); 
exit( I); 
} 
while ((c = getc(prologrules)) != EOF) 
putc( c,logic _out); 
fclose(prologrules ); 
fclose(logic _out); 





system("pl/bin/plcon.exe -fppll.pl -t stagel"); 
/* 
* Stage two of the conflict detection takes the modified facts 
*generated by stagel, and adding the rules to be applied together 
* in a file named ppl2.pl. 
* The Pro log interpreter then executes this next stage. Stage two like 
* stage one manipulates the facts from stage to stage in a progressive 
* fashion. One stage could have been used, but would be complicated to 
* follow and debug. 
* For efficiency, the combining of stages should be considered. 
*I 
system(" sort ppl2.txt > ppl2.pl"); 








while ((c = getc(prologrules)) != EOF) 
putc( c,logic _out); 
fclose(prologrules ); 
fclose(logic _out); 
system("pl/bin/plcon.exe -f ppl2.pl -t stage2"); 
I* 
*Stage three is the final stage of the conflict detection and 
*resolution phase of the compiler. The modified facts from 
* stage two are used and applied with the Prolog rules from 
*the file "prologrules3.txt". 
*Final output is created in "scan_out.txt". 
*I 
system("sort ppl3.txt > ppl3.pl"); 




if ((prologrules = fopen("prologrules3.txt", "r")) =NULL) { 






while ((c = getc(prologrules)) != EOF) 
putc( c,logic _out); 
fclose(prologrules ); 
fclose(logic _out); 
system("pllbin/plcon.exe -f ppl3 .pl -t stage3 "); 
printf("\n\n Policy Conflict results written to \"scan_out.txt\"\n\n"); 
* Print_ usage outputs the options available to the user trying to compile 
* PPL configuration file. 
*I 
void print_ usage() 
{ 
printf("\n\n Usage: Scan [-v -wild -no_implicit_deny] <filename>\n"); 
printf("\t -v :Verbose mode, dump symbol tables\n"); 
printf("\t -no_ wild : Do not support wild cards in paths\n "); 
printf("\t -no_implicit_deny: If policy creators are the same betweeen\n"); 
printf("\t a conflict, do not enforce implicit deny\n"); 




APPENDIX E. PROLOG CONFLICT DETECTION CODE 
% Stage 1 is the first step in determining policy conflicts. 
% Steps: * Open "ppl2.txt" file for policy conflict information 
% * Print all the possible paths thru the network, 
% This is needed for matching paths represented with 
% wild cards. 
% * Print the association between policy labels and 
% policy targets. 
% * Print the association between policy labels and 
% policy conditions. 
% * Copy all other neccesary facts from stage one to 
% the file that will be used in stage two. 




% Open the file ppl2.txt to place the modified ProLog facts 
%to be used in stage two. 
% 
open('ppl2.txt', write, output), 
set_ output( output), 
% 
% Output paths & all the posible nodes that can be used 
% to create the path. 
% 
setof(Policy_Path,paths_in_nodes(Policy_Path),Policy_Paths), 
not(print _policy _list(Policy _Paths)), 
% 
% Create an association between a policy and the targets 
% it supports. 
% 
not( create _paths),!, 
setof(Target_ List,policy _ target_Iist(Target_ List), Target_ Lists), 
not(print _ target_list(T arget_ Lists)), 
% 
% Create a list of conditions and associate them with policies 
% 
not(print_ condition _list), 
% 
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%Forward the facts of users, bandwidth, no_conditions, actions and types 
% to the file for stage two. 
% 
not( explicit_ nodes), 
not(print_ no_ conditions), 
print_implicit_ deny, 











% Close the output file 
% 
set_ output( user_ output), 
close( output), 
write('Stage 1 complete'),nl,nl. 
%========================================== 
% Generate the paths required to detect policy conflicts 
% If no wild card characters were used: 
% then print just the paths explicitly listed 
% and all the links that create the network 
% else print out all possible paths through the 








findall(Node,node _label(Node,_),Nodes ), ! , 
create _paths(N odes),! ,fail. 
%.========================================== 
% Return all possible paths incrementally by 
% taking each node pair in the network and 





create _paths(LI []]):-fail,! . 
create _paths([Node1 ,Node2 1Tail]):-
not(create_paths_helper([Node1,Node21Tail])),!, 
not( create _paths([Node21Tail]) ),! . 
%======================================= 
%Find all possible paths between two nodes 
% in the network 
% 
create _paths_ helper([]):-fail,!. 
create_paths_helper(LIO]):-fail,!. 
create _paths_ helper([N ode 1 ,Node2 !Tail]):-
not( all_paths(Node 1 ,Node2) ), !, 
not( all _paths(Node2,Node 1) ), !, 
not( create _paths_ helper([N ode 11Tail]) ),fail,!. 
%======================================= 
% Print all paths explicitly listed by the user 
% 
explicit_paths:- setof(Path, path_links(_, Path), Paths), 
print _path _list(Paths ),fail. 
%,======================================= 
% Print all possible links in the network 
% 
explicit_links:- findall(Link, link(Link,_,_), Links),!, 
remove_ dups(Links, Links _nod up),!, 
print_link_list(Links_nodup),!,fail. 
%,======================================= 
% Print all the nodes in the network 
% 
explicit_nodes:- setof(Node, node_label(Node,_), Nodes), 
print_ node _list(N odes ),fail. 
%======================================= 
% Print out nicely all the possible paths of a network 
% of length 2 or more. The atom's are quoted. 
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all_paths(A, Z) :- setof(Path, pathl(A, [Z], Path), Paths), 
print _path _list(Paths ),fail. 
%======================================= 
% Helper function to "all _paths". Determines 
% if two nodes in the network are directly connected. 
% 
pathl(A, [A I Pathl], [A I Pathl]). 
pathl(A, [YIPathl], Path):- adjacent(X, Y), 
not(member(X, Pathl)), 
pathl(A, [X, Y I Pathl], Path). 
%======================================== 
% Print out the paths associated with each policy 
% 




% Print out a node list nicely formatted 
% 
write _path([]):- write(']'). 
write _path([XI[]]):- term_ to_ atom(X,X _atom), 
write(X_atom), 
. (']') I write ,.,true. 











term_ to_ atom(Link,Link _atom), 
write(Link _atom), 
write(']). '),nl, 
print_ node _list(Tail),fail. 
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%,===================================== 
% Print out all the links in the network 





term_ to _atom(Src,Src _atom), 














% Output a list of lists, where each 
% list is on a line by itself and 
% all the atoms are quoted. 
print __path _list([]):- fail. 
print_path_list([Path I Tail]) :-
not( eq 1 (Path)), 
write('path(['), 
write __path(Path ), 
write(').'), nl, print__path_list(Tail). 
print__path_list([[XIY] I Tail]):-
eq1([XIY]}, 
print __path _list(Tail). 
print__path_list([[XIY] I Tail]):-









% print_policy _list: 
% Output nicely for each policy the paths 
% associated with the that policy 
print _policy _list([]):- fail. 






write(').'), nl, print_policy _list(Tail). 
%=========================================== 
%Print out a list of targets associated with a policy 
% 
write_ target_path([XI []]):- term_ to_ atom(X,X _atom), 
write(X_atom),!,true. 





% Print out the association between a policy 




term_ to_ atom(Label,Label_ atom), 
write(Label_ atom), 
write(','), 




%Given a Policy _Label a list will be returned 
% with the first element being the Label, and 
% the second element being the path associated 
%with that label 




path _links(Path,Path _List), 
policy _path(Policy _Label,Path), 
path_ in_ nodes(Path _ List,Expanded _Path). 
paths_in_nodes([Policy_Labeli[Expanded_Path]]):-
link(Path,_,_), 
policy _path(Policy _Label,Path), 
path _in_ nodes([Path ],Expanded _Path). 
paths_in_nodes([Policy_Labeli[Expanded_Path]]):-
node _label(Path,_), 
policy _path(Policy _Label, Path), 
path _in_ nodes([Path ],Expanded _Path). 
%===================================== 
% Take a path with link elements, and return a path 
% with those links expanded into its node 




%Returns: ['NPS', 'DARPA', 'SPA WAR'] 
path_in_nodes([X],[Nl,N2]):-link(X,Nl,N2). 




path_ in_ nodes(Tail,Path). 




%Print a list. 
% 
print_list([]):- fail. 
print_list([X I Tail]) :- write(X), nl, print_list(Tail). 
%,===================================== 
%Use quicksort to sort a list of lists by the 
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% number of elements in each list 
qsort( [], []). 
qsort([X I Tail], Sorted) :-
split( X, Tail, Small, Big), 
qsort( Small, SortedSmall), 
qsort( Big, SortedBig), 
cone( SortedSmall, [X I SortedBig], Sorted). 
%,======================================= 
% Helper function to qsort, splits one list 
% into two parts 
% 
split(_, [], [], []). 
split( X, [Y I Tail], [Y I Small], Big) :-
gt( X, Y),!, 
split(X, Tail, Small, Big). 
split(X, [Y I Tail], Small, [Y I Big]) :-
split(X, Tail, Small, Big). 
%======================================= 
% Is X is greater than Y 
% 
gt(X, Y) :-length(X, Xlen), length(Y, Ylen), Xlen > Ylen. 
%,======================================= 
% Return the first element of a list 
% 
first([],[]). 
first( X, [X I_]). 
%======================================= 
% Given list of traffic classes, expand list 
% by assigning action and operation, to 
% each class in the list. 
% 
expand_ value _list(_,Action,Class,Op,List,[Expanded _List]):-
expand _list(Action,Class, Op,List,Expanded _List). 
%,======================================= 
%Helper to "expand_value_list" 
% Assign action, and opertion to each value 




expand _list(Action,Ciass,Op,[XITail], [ Action,Class,Op,XIResults ]):-
expand _list(Action,Class,Op, Tail,Results ). 
%======================================== 










% Create a list of targets assocatied with a policy 
% 
policy_ target_list([Labell [Results]]):-
policy_ targets(Label, Targets), 
create_ target _list(Label, Targets, Target _list), 
remove_dups(Target_list,Unique_Target_List), 
flatten(Unique _Target_ List, Results). 
%======================================== 
% Given a label to identify a policy, create 
% a list of target traffic classes that the 




policy _ action(Label, 'deny'), 
create_ target_list(Label, Tail,Results _of_ Tail). 
create_target_list(Label,L'*',JTail],Results_of_Tail):-
policy _ action(Label,_), 
create_ target_list(Label, Tail,Results _of_ Tail). 
create_target_list(Label,[Class,'=',Target_ListiTail],[[Results_of_expand]IResults_of_Tail]):-
policy _ action(Label,Action), 
remove_ dups(T arget_ List, Unique_ Target_ List), 
expand_ value _list(Labei,Action,Class, '=',Unique_ Target_ List,Results _of_ expand), 
create_ target_list(Label, Tail,Results _of_ Tail). 
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%========================================== 
% Create a list of conditions that must be met 
% in order for the policy to be executed. 
% 
list_of_conditions(Policy,_,[Policy,permit,Attribute,Op,Value]):-
condition _path(Policy,Attribute,Op,Value ), 
not(Op = '!='), 
not( type( Attribute,_,_)). 
list_of_conditions(Policy,_,[Policy,permit,Attribute,'!=',Value]):-
condition_path(Policy,Attribute,'!=',Value), 
not( type( Attribute,_,_)). 
%,=========================================== 
% Create a list conditions that are composed 





condition _path(Policy, Type,'!=',_), 








list_ of_ type_ conditions(Policy,_, [Policy ,permit, Type,'=' ,Element2]):-
condition _path(Policy, Type,'>=' ,Element), 
type(Type,Element, Value), 
type(Type,Element2, Value2), 
V alue2 >= Value. 
%==================================== 
% Print the conditions that must be meet to 











term_ to_ atom(Attribute,A _Attribute), write( A_ Attribute), 
write(','), 
term_ to_ atom(Operator,A _Operator), write( A_ Operator), 
write(','), 
term_to_atom(Value,A_ Value),write(A_ Value), 
write(').'),nl, 
output_ conditions(Tail). 
output_ conditions([[Policy,Action,Attribute, Operator, Value ]ITail]):-






term _to_ atom(Attribute,A _Attribute), write( A_ Attribute), 
write(','), 
term _to_ atom(Operator,A _Operator), write( A_ Operator), 
write(','), 










output_no _ conditions(Tail). 
%========================================== 
% When no conditions are associated with a 
% policy, make note of it. 
% 
print_ no_ conditions:-
setof(Policy,no _ conditions(Policy ),No_ Conditions), 




% Print out the fact if implicit denies are 
% to applied to conflict detection when both 




user _implicit_ deny( Option), 




% Print out a user defined type 





term_ to_ atom(Type,A _Type), write( A_ Type), 
write(','), 
term_ to_ atom(Element,A _Element), write( A_ Element), 
write(','), 








output_ types(Types ), 
true. 
%,======================================== 
%For each policy, print out the target classes 
% effected by it. 
% 
print_ target_ all:-
setof(Policy ,target(Policy ,_),Policies), 
output_ target_ all(Policies ), 
true. 
%======================================== 
%Print out the class of traffic effected by a policy 
% 
output_ target_ all([]):-fail. 
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%Print out facts about the creator/owner of 
% each policy to be applied to the network. 
% 
print _policy_ owner:-
setof(Policy,policy _ owner(Policy,_),Policies ), 
output _policy_ owner(Policies ), 
true. 
%======================================= 
% Output the owner for a policy 
% 






term_to_atom(Value,A_ Value),write(A_ Value), 
write(').'),nl, 
output_policy _ owner(Tail). 
%,======================================== 
% Print out all the nodes of the network. 
% 
print_nodes:-
setof(Label,node _label(Label,_),Labels ), 
output_ nodes(Labels ), 
true. 
%======================================== 
% Output a fact for each node in the network 
% These facts are used in the conflict 





node _label(Label, Value), 
write('node _label('), 
term_ to_ atom(Label,A _Label), write( A_ Label), 
write(','), 








setof(Link,path _ message(Link,_),Links ), 
output _path _messages(Links ), 
true. 
%========================================== 
% Print the messages associated with a policy 
% 
print_policy _messages:-
setof(Policy,policy _ message(Policy,_),Policies ), 
· output _policy_ messages(Policies ), 
true. 
%,========================================== 
% Output the "message" associated with a path 
% 
output _path_ messages([]):-fail. 
output _path_ messages([Link!Tail]):-
path _ message(Link,Message ), 
write(' path_ message('), 
term_to_atom(Link,A_Link),write(A_Link), 
write(','), 
term_ to_ atom(Message,A _Message), write( A_ Message), 
write('). '),nl, 
output _path_ messages(Tail). 
%========================================== 









term_ to _atom(Message,A _Message}, write( A _Message}, 
write(').'},nl, 
output _policy _messages(Tail). 
%,===================================== 
% Print out all the links of the network 
% 
print_links:-
findall(Link,link(Link,_,_),Links ), ! , 
remove_ dups(Links, Links_ nod up},!, 
output_links(Links _nod up),!, 
true. 
%·======================================= 






term_ to_ atom(Dst,Dst_ atom), 











































% Print all the users that are allowed to 








setof(Policy,policy _action(Policy,_), Action _list), 
output_ actions( Action _list), 
true. 
o/o======================================= 
% Output the parameters associated with a path 











term _to _atom(Op,A _ Op ),write( A_ Op ), 
write(','), 
convert_ unit(Value, Unit,New _Value), 














% Print out the conditions of all policies 
% 
print_ condition _list:-
setof(Condition _Set, list_ of_ conditions(_,_, Condition_ Set), Conditions), 
output_ conditions( Conditions), 
true. 
%·========================================== 
%Print out the user defined types involved in the 
% conditions of all policies 
% 
print_condition_list:-
setof(Condition _ Set,list_ of_ type_ conditions(_,_, Condition_ Set), Conditions), 
output_ conditions( Conditions), 
true. 
%.========================================== 
% Convert Bandwidth unit to a uniform Mbps for 
% comparison reasons 
% 
convert_bw([Value,Unit],New_ Value):-
convert _ unit(V alue, Unit,New _Value). 
%,========================================== 
convert_unit(Old_ Value,'MBPS',Old_ Value). 
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convert_unit(Old_ Value,'GBPS',New_ Value):-
New Value is Old Value * I 024. 
- -
convert_unit(Old_ Value,'KBPS',New_ Value):-
New Value is Old Value I 1024. 
- -
convert_unit(Old_ Value,'BPS',New_ Value):-
New_ Value is (Old_ Value I 1024)/1024. 
%========== :====================================== 
%True ifthere is an link from X->Y or Y->X (undirected link) 
% 
adjacent(X, Y) :-link(_,X,Y); link(_,Y,X). 
%======================================= 
% Concat two lists together 
% 
cone([] ,L,L ). 
cone( [X I L1], L2, [X I L3]) :- conc(Ll,L2,L3). 
%======================================= 




% Stage2 is the second step in determining policy conflicts. 
% Steps: * Open "ppl3.txt" file for policy conflict information 
% * Print all paths in the next that are associated with 
% policies being applied to the network. 
% * Copy all other neccesary facts from stage two to 
% the file that will be used in third and final stage three. 
% *Close the output file 
% 
stage2:- open('ppl3.txt',write,output), 
set_ output( output), 
% From all possible paths in the network, print 
% only those associated with policies after the 
% expansion of all wild card characters. 
not( all _policy _paths), 
% Print all necessary facts for use in stage three 
not(print_ no_ conditions), 
not(print_path _params ), 
not(print_ users), 









write(' condition(_ null,_ null,_null,_ null,_ null,_ null).'),nl, 
set_ output( user_ output), 
close( output), 
write('Stage 2 complete'),nl,nl. 
%============================================ 
% Print all paths associated with policies 
% 
all _policy _paths:-
policy _path(Pol_Label,Pol_ Path), 
path(Pos_Path), 
setof(Policy _Path, policy _paths(Pol_ Label,Pol_Path,Pos _Path,Policy _Path),Policy _Paths 
), 




% Match wild card paths, with their expanded paths 
% 
policy _paths(Policy _Label, Policy _Path, Possible _Path,[Policy _Label\Possible _Path]):-
match(Policy _Path,Possible _Path). 
%========================================== 
% Does a given list with or without wildcard 
% characters match another one? 
% 
match([X\Taill ],[X\Tail2]):- match(Taill ,Tail2). 
match(['*','*'\Tail],Path):- match(['*'\Tail],Path). 
match(['*' ,X\Taill ],[X\Tail2]):- match(Taill, Tail2). 







% Output a list of lists, where each 
% list is on a line by itself and 




policy_ target(Policy _ Label,Policy _Targets), 
not(eql([Policy_Label\Path])), 
write('path('), 





write _path(Policy _Targets), 
write(').'), nl, not(print_path_list(Tail)),fail. 
print_path_list([[Policy_Label\Path] I Tail]):-
not(policy _ target(Policy _Label,_)), 
not( eq 1 ([Policy_ Label!Path]) ), 
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write(' path('), 




write(',[]).'), nl,not(print_path _ Iist(Tail) ),fail. 
%,========================================== 
% Print the conditions associated with every policy 
% 
print_ conditions([]):- fail. 
print_ conditions([[Policy _LabeliPath] I Tail]) :-
policy_ condition(Policy _ Label,Action,Att,Op, Value), 
not( eq 1 ([Policy_ LabeliPath ])), 
write(' condition('), 











term_ to_ atom(Value, Value _atom),write(V alue _atom), 
write(').'), nl, print_path_list(Tail). 
print_conditions([[Policy_LabeliPath] I Tail]):-
not(policy _ condition(Policy _Label,_,_,_,_)), 
not( eq 1 ([Policy_ Labell Path])), 
print_path_list(Tail). 
%,========================================== 
%Helper function used by print_path_list to output 
% a list with all the atoms quoted. 
write _path([]):- write(']'). 
write_path([XI[]]):- term_to_atom(X,X_atom), 
write(X _atom), 
. (']') I write ,.,true. 






% Is the list of size 1? 
eql(LJ[]]). 
%,================================== 
% Print a user defined type 
% 
output_ types([]):-fail. 
output_ types([[Type,Element, Value] IT ail]):-
write('type('), 
term_ to_ atom(Type,A _Type), write( A_ Type), 
write(','), 
term_ to_ atom(Element,A _Element), write( A_ Element), 
write(','), 




% Print all the user defined types 
% 
print_ types:-
setof([Type,Element, Value ],type(Type,Element, Value), Types), 
output_ types(Types ), 
true. 
%,======================================== 
% Print a policy that has no conditions 
% associated with it. 
% 





output_ no_ conditions(Tail). 
%========================================= 
% Print all the policies that have no conditions 
% associated with them. 
% 
print_ no_ conditions:-
setof(Policy ,no_ conditions(Policy ),No_ Conditions), 
not(No _Conditions = []), 
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output_ no_ conditions(No _Conditions), 
true. 
%==================================== 
% Print the owners of all the policies 
% 
print _policy_ owner:-
setof(Policy,policy _ owner(Policy ,_),Policies), 
output _policy_ owner(Policies ), 
true. 
%,======================================== 








term_to_atom(Value,A_ Value),write(A_ Value), 
write('). '),nl, 
output_policy _ owner(Tail). 
%======================================== 
% Print the nodes of the network. 
% 
print_ nodes:-
setof(Label,node _label(Label,_),Labels ), 
output_ nodes(Labels ), 
true. 
%,======================================== 













% Print out all the links of the network 
% 
print_links:-
findall(Link,link(Link,_,_j,Links ), ! , 










term_ to_ atom(Dst,Dst_ atom), 

















% Print out messages associated with each path 
% 
print _path_ messages:-
setof(Link,path _ message(Link,_j,Links ), 
output _path_ messages(Links ),true,!. 
%================================================================= 
% Print the messages associted with each policy 
% 
print_policy_messages:-
setof(Policy,policy _ message(Policy ,_],Policies), 
output_policy _ messages(Policies ), true,!. 
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%====================================== 
% Print the messages associated with a path 
% 
output _path _messages([]):-fail. 
output _path_ messages([Link!Tail]):-
path _ message(Link,Message ), 
write('path _message('), 
term_ to_ atom(Link,A _ Link),write(A _Link), 
write(','), 
term_ to _atom(Message,A _Message), write( A_ Message), 
write(').'),nl, 
output _path_ messages(Tail),!. 
o/o========================================:; 
% Print the messages assocaited with a path 
% 
output _policy_ messages([]):-fail. 
output _policy_ messages([Policy!Tail]):-




term_ to _atom(Message,A _Message), write( A _Message), 
write(') .'),nl, 
output _policy _messages(Tail),!. 
%========================================:; 























output_ actions(T ail). 
%======================================== 





path _param(Path,Att,Op, Value, Unit), 
write(' path _param('), 
term_ to_ atom(Path,A _Path), write( A_ Path), 
write(','), 
term_ to_ atom(Att,A _ Att), write( A_ Att), 
write(','), 
term_ to_ atom(Op,A _ Op ), write( A_ Op ), 
write(','), 





% Print the parameters of each path 
% 
print _path _params:-




% Print the flag identifing whether implicit 
% denies are to be ignored between policies 
% created by the same user 
% 
print_ implicit_ deny:-
user _implicit_ deny( Option), 






% Print all the user who can create a policy 
% 
print_users:-
setof(U ser, user(U ser ,_), User _list), 
output_ users(U ser _list), 
true. 
%======================================= 




output_ actions(Action _list), 
true. 
%======================================== 




output_ target_ all(Policies ), 
true. 
%,======================================== 
% Print the target for a policy 
% 
output_target_all([]):-fail. 





term_to_atom(Value,A_ Value),write(A_ Value), 
write(').'),nl, 
output_ target_ all(Tail). 
%,====================================== 











% Stage3 is the fmal step in determining policy conflicts. 
%Steps: *Open "scan_out.txt" file for policy conflict information 
% * Find all policies with overlapping paths 
% * Determine policies in conflict 
% * Print the policy conflicts that could not be resolved 
% * Print the policy conflicts that COULD be resolved 
% * Print out the policies that contain "message" conflicts 
% * Close the output file 
% 
stage3:- open(' scan_ out. txt', write, output), 
set_ output( output), 
%Find all policies expressed over links and nodes 
% that are sub-paths of other policies. 
% 
find_ all_ subpaths(Subpaths ), 
% Take the list of policies that have overlapping 
% paths and check for permit conflicts 
% 
permit_ conflicts(Subpaths,Permit_ Conflicts), 
% Print out policy conflicts that can not be 
%resolved using the "Id" of the creator 
% 
write(' Print Unresolved Conflicts'),nl, 
write(' '),nl, 
print_ unresolved_ conflict_list(Permit_ Conflicts), 
% Print out the policy conflicts than CAN be resolved 
%using the "ld" of the policy creator 
% 
nl,nl,nl, write(' Print Resolved Conflicts'),nl, 
write(' ============'),nl, 
print_resolved _ conflict_list(Permit_ Conflicts), 
% Print out the policies that require "message" support on a 
%path, but all the links of the path do not support that "message" 
% 
nl,nl,nl,write(' Message Conflicts'),nl, 
write(' =========''),nl,nl, 
not(print_ message_ conflict_ list), 
% 
set_ output( user_ output), 
close( output), 
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write('Stage 3 complete'),nl,nl. 
%,================================================ 
% 
% Return set of all policies that contain overlapping 
%paths. 
% 
find_ all_ subpaths(Subpaths ):-
setof(Subpath, find_ subpaths(Subpath),Subpaths ). 
find_ all_ subpaths([]):-
not( setof(Subpath, find_ subpaths(Subpath),_) ). 
%================================================ 
% 
% Return all Policy/Path pairs were a policy specified 
% over on a link or node, is a sub list of policies 





[From, To]= Pathl, 
path(Policy2,Path2, Target2), 






sublist(Path 1 ,Path2). 
%,============================================== 
% Take a list of policy pairs that contain overlapping paths. 
% Check each policy pair for overlapping conditions. 
% If the conditions do overlap, then check the classes of 
% of traffic that are permitted on each to determine 
% if a conflict exists. 
% 
permit_ conflicts([[Policyl,Path 1, Targetl ,Policy2,Path2, Target2]1Tail], 
ts), 
[[Policy1,Path1,Targetl,Policy2,Path2,Target2,Conflicts]IPermit_Conflicts]):-
not(Policyl = Policy2), 
conditional_ overlap(Policyl ,Policy2,_,No _Overlap), 
No_ Overlap = [], 
setof(Conflict,conflict_permit_targets(Policyl,Policy2,Target2,Targetl,Conflict),Conflic 
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not(Conflicts = [[]]), 
permit_ conflicts(Tail,Permit_ Conflicts). 
permit_ conflicts([[Policy 1 ,Path 1, Target 1 ,Policy2,Path2, Target2]JTail], 
[[Policyl,Path1,Targetl,Policy2,Path2,Target2,[[Policyl,Value]]]JPermit_Conflicts]):-
not(Policyl = Policy2), 
conditional_ overlap(Policyl ,Policy2,_,No _Overlap), 
No_ Overlap= 0, 
( 





target(Policy 1, Value), 
permit_ conflicts(Tail,Permit_ Conflicts). 
permit_ conflicts([[Policy 1 ,Path I, Target 1 ,Po licy2,Path2, Target2] JTail], 
% 
[[Policy 1 ,Path 1, Target 1 ,Policy2,Path2, T arget2, [[Policy2, Value]]] !Permit_ Conflicts]):-
not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
conditional_ overlap(Policyl,Policy2,_,No _Overlap), 








permit_ conflicts(Tail,Permit_ Conflicts). 
% If there are no conflicts between two paths, then skip and continue to check 
% other over laping paths. 
% 
permit_ conflicts([[Policy 1 ,_,Target 1 ,Po licy2,_, T arget2] JTail] ,Permit_ Conflicts):-
not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
setof(Conflict,conflict_permit_ targets(Policy 1 ,Policy2, Target2, Target1 ,Conflict),Conflic 
ts), 
Conflicts = [[]], 
permit_ conflicts(Tail,Permit_ Conflicts). 
% 
% If the same policy is being checked, skip it and check the rest of the list 
% of over laping paths. 
% 
permit_ conflicts([L,_,_,_,_,_]JTail], Permit_ Conflicts):-
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permit_ conflicts(Tail,Pennit_ Conflicts). 
% 




% Compare a target class element for conflicts with all 
% the target elements of a second policy 
% 
conflict _permit_ targets(_,_,[],_,[]). 
conflict_permit_targets(Policyl,Policy2,[A1,C,_,VLJ,Targets,Results):-
conflict_permit_ target(Policy 1 ,Policy2,[ A 1 ,C, V], Targets,Results ), 
not( empty(Results) ). 
conflict _permit_ targets(Policy 1 ,Policy2,L,_,_,_ITail], Targets,Results ):-
conflict_permit_ targets(Policy 1 ,Policy2, Tail, Targets,Results ), 
not( empty(Results)). 
%,===================================================== 
% Compare the target class and action between two 




policy_ owner(Policy2, Creator2), 
Creator! = Creator2, 
user _implicit_ deny('no'), 
fail. 
conflict _permit_ target(_,_,['permit' ,C, V],[],[C,V]):-
user _implicit_ deny('yes'). 
conflict _permit_ target(_,_,[' deny',_,_],[],[]). 
conflict_permit_ target(_,_,[],_,[]). 
conflict_permit_target(_,_,[Al,C,Value],[A2,C,_, ValueLJ,[C,Value]):-
not(Al = A2),!. 





% Determine if a conditional overlap exists by testing each 
% type of condition. 
% 
conditional_ overlap(P 1 ,P2,['priority'j0ver ],No_ Over):-
priority _ overlap(P 1 ,P2), 
conditional_ overlap 1 (P 1 ,P2,0ver,No _Over),!. 
conditional_overlap(P1,P2,0ver,['priority'INo_Over]):-
not(priority _ overlap(P 1 ,P2) ), 
conditional_ overlap 1 (P 1 ,P2,0ver,No _Over),!. 
conditional_overlap1{P1,P2,['time'l0ver],No_Over):-
time _ overlap(P 1 ,P2), 
conditional_overlap2{P1,P2,0ver,No_Over),!. 
conditional_overlap1{P1,P2,0ver,['time'INo_Over]):-
not(time _ overlap(P 1 ,P2) ), 
conditional_ overlap2{P 1 ,P2,0ver,No _Over),!. 
conditional_ overlap2(P 1 ,P2,['hopcount'j0ver ],No_ Over):-
hopcount_overlap(P1,P2), 
conditional_ overlap3(P1 ,P2,0ver,No _Over),!. 
conditional_ overlap2(P1 ,P2,0ver,['hopcount'!No _Over]):-
not(hopcount_ overlap(P 1 ,P2) ), 
conditional_ overlap3(P1 ,P2,0ver,No _Over),!. 
conditional_ overlap3{P1 ,P2,['bandwidth'j0ver ],No_ Over):-
bw _ overlap{P1,P2), 
conditional_ overlap4{P 1 ,P2,0ver,No _Over),!. 
conditional_ overlap3{P1 ,P2,0ver,['bandwidth'INo _Over]):-
not(bw _ overlap(P1 ,P2) ), 
conditional_ overlap4{P 1 ,P2,0ver,No _Over),!. 
conditional_overlap4{P1,P2,['user'l0ver],No_Over):-
user _ overlap(P1 ,P2), 
conditional_overlap5{P1,P2,0ver,No_Over),!. 
conditional_ overlap4(P 1 ,P2,0ver,['user'INo _Over]):-
not( user_ overlap(P 1 ,P2) ), 
conditional_overlap5(P1,P2,0ver,No_Over),!. 
conditional_ overlap5{P1 ,P2,['host'j0ver],No _Over):-
host_ overlap(P1 ,P2), 
conditional_overlap6(P1,P2,0ver,No_Over),!. 
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conditional_ overlap5(P1 ,P2, Over,['host'jNo _Over]):-
not(host_overlap(P1,P2)), 
conditional_ overlap6(P 1 ,P2,0ver,N o _Over),!. 
conditional_ overlap6(P 1 ,P2,['type'j0ver ],No_ Over):-
not( overlap_ types(P 1 ,P2,_) ), 
conditional_overlap7(P1,P2,0ver,No_Over),!. 
conditional_ overlap6(P 1,P2,0ver,['type'INo _Over]):-
overlap_ types(P 1 ,P2,_), 
conditional_ overlap 7(P 1 ,P2,0ver,No _Over),!. 
conditional_ overlap 7 (_,_, [], []). 
%=========================================== 
% Determine if there is an overlap between 




setof(Element,condition(Policy 1 ,_,_, Type,_,Element ),Elements 1 ), 
setof(Element,condition(Policy2,_,_, Type,_,Element),Elements2), 
not(Elements 1 = []), 
not(Elements2 = []), 
intersection(Elements 1 ,Elements2,1), 
I=[]. . 
%=========================================== 
% Determine if a priority overlap exists 
% 
priority_ overlap(Policy 1 ,Policy1 ). 
priority_ overlap(Policy1,Policy2):-
not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
(not( setof([Op 1 ,Value 1 ],condition(Policy 1 ,_,_, 'priority',Op 1, Value 1 ),_) ); 
not(setof([Op2,Value2],condition(Po1icy2,_,_,'priority',Op2,Value2),_))). 
priority_ overlap(Policy1 ,Po1icy2):-
not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
setof([Op 1, Value 1 ],condition(Policy 1 ,_,_,'priority' ,Op 1 ,Value 1 ),Values 1 ), 
setof([Op2, V alue2],condition(Po1icy2,_,_, 'priority',Op2, V alue2), V alues2), 
overlap(Values 1, Values2). 
%,=========================================== 
% Determine if a hopcount overlap exists 
% 
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hopcount_ overlap(Policy 1 ,Policy 1 ). 
hopcount_ overlap(Policy 1 ,Policy2):-
not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
(not(setof([Op 1 ,Value1 ],condition(Policy1,_,_, 'hopcount',Op 1 ,Value 1 ),_)); 
not(setof([Op2,Value2],condition(Policy2,_,_,'hopcount',Op2,Value2),_))). 
hop count_ overlap(Policy 1 ,Policy2):-
not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
setof([Op 1, Value 1 ],condition(Policy 1 ,_,_,'hopcount' ,Op 1 ,Value 1 ), Values 1 ), 
setof([Op2, V alue2],condition(Policy2,_,_,'hopcount',Op2,V alue2),Values2), 
overlap(V alues 1, Values2). 
%,========================================== 
% Determine if a bandwidth overlap exists 
% 
bw_overlap(Policy1,Policy1). 
bw _ overlap(Policy1 ,Policy2):-
not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
(not(setof([Op1,Value1],condition(Policy1,_,_,'BW',Op1,Value1),_)); 
not( setof([Op2,Value2],condition(Policy2,_,_, 'BW' ,Op2,V alue2),_)) ). 
bw _ overlap(Policy1 ,Policy2):-
not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
setof([Op1,Value1],condition(Policy1,_,_,'BW',Op1,Value1),Values1), 
setof([Op2, Value2],condition(Policy2,_,_, 'BW' ,Op2, Value2), Values2), 
overlap(V alues 1, Values2). 
%,========================================== 
% Determine if a time overlap exists 
% 
time_ overlap(Policy 1 ,Policy 1 ). 
time_ overlap(Policy 1 ,Policy2):-
not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
(not(setof([Op1,Time1],condition(Policy1,_,_,'time',Op1,Time1),_)); 
not( setof([Op2, Time2],condition(Policy2,_,_, 'time' ,Op2, Time2),_)) ). 
time_ overlap(Policy 1 ,Policy2):-
not(Policyl = Policy2), 
setof([Op1,Time1],condition(Policy1,_,_,'time',Op1,Time1),Timesl), 
setof([Op2, Time2],condition(Policy2,_,_,'time' ,Op2, Time2), Times2), 
overlap(Times 1, Times2). 
%========================================== 
% An overlap exists if ALL elements of a condition 
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% overlap. The overlap rule uses the operator and value 





overlap([[Op 1, Value 1 ]1Tail1 ],[[Op2,Value2]1Tail2]):-
not([[Op2,Value2]1Tail2] = []), 
not([[Op1,Value1]1Taill] = []), 
overlap 1 (Value I, Op 1, V alue2,0p2 ), 
overlap(Tail1 ,[[Op2,Value2]1Tail2]), 
overlap([[Op 1 ,Value I ]1Tail1 ], Tail2). 
%=========================================== 
%Helper rule to "overlap" above. 
% Detemines if an overlap exists between 
% two conditional elements. 
% 
overlap 1 (Value 1 ,_,Value 1 ,_). 
overlap I(_,'>=',_,'>='). 
overlap I (Value 1 ,'>=', V alue2,'<='):-
Value1 < Value2. 
overlap I(_,'<=',_, '<='):-true. 
overlap I (Value 1 ,'<=', V alue2, '>='='):-
Value1 > Value2. 
%============================================ 
% Determines if there is an overlap between 
%users. Each user in the conditional element 
% list is checked, and if any user 




user_ overlap(Policy 1 ,Policy2):-
not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
(not(setof([Op 1 ,User 1 ],condition(Policyl ,_,_,'user _id',Op 1 ,User1 ),_) ); 
not( setof([Op2, U ser2],condition(Policy2,_,_,'user _id' ,Op2, U ser2),_)) ). 
user_ overlap(Policy 1 ,Policy2):-
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not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
setof([Op 1 ,User 1 ],condition(Policy1 ,_,_,'user_id',Op 1 ,User 1 ),Users 1 ), 
setof([Op2,User2],condition(Policy2,_,_,'user_id',Op2,User2),Users2), 






not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
setof([Op 1 ,User! ],condition(Policy1 ,_,_,'user _id',Op 1 ,User! ),Users 1 ), 
setof([Op2, U ser2],condition(Policy2,_,_, 'user _id', Op2, U ser2), U sers2), 





%Helper rule to "user_overlap" above. 
% Determines if user element lists overlap 
% with at least one common user 
% 
user_ overlap 1 ([],LLJ,[]). 
user_overlap1(U_],[],[]). 
user_overlap1([[0p1,Value1]JTai11],[[0p2,Value2]JTail2],[Result1,Result2,Result3]):-
not([[Op2,Value2]JTail2] = []), 
not([[Op1,Value1]JTaill] = []), 




not([[Op2,Value2]JTail2] = []), 
not([[Opi,Valuel]JTaill] = []), 
not( user_ overlap2(V alue I ,Op 1, Value2,0p2,_) ), 
user_overlapi(Taili,[[Op2,Value2]JTail2],Result2), 
user_ overlap 1 ([[Op l,Value 1 ]JTaill ], Tail2,Result3). 
%~========================================== 
% Helper rule to "user_ overlap I" above 
% Determines if two user values overlap 
%Can return "No overlap", "Overlap", or "Conflict" 
% 
user_ overlap2(V alue,Op,Value,Op,'overlap'). 
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user_ overlap2(Value 1 ,'=', Value2,'=','nooverlap'):-
not(Value1 = Value2). 
user_overlap2(Value1,'=',Value2,'!=','overlap'):-
not(Value1 = Value2). 
user_overlap2(Value1,'=',Value1,'!=','conflict'). 
% This makes an assumption that there are many/infinite users 
%If there were limited user, then maybe they should be a "type" instead. 
% 
user_ overlap2L,'!=' ,_,'!=','overlap'). 
%·============================================= 
% Determines if there is an overlap in host identifiers 
% 
host_ overlap(Policy1 ,Policy I). 
host_ overlap(Policy 1 ,Policy2):-




not(Policyl = Policy2), 
setof([Op 1 ,Add 1 ],condition(Policy 1 ,_,_,'host_id',Op 1 ,Add 1 ),Addresses 1 ), 
setof([Op2,Add2],condition(Policy2,_,_,'host_ id' ,Op2,Add2),Addresses2 ), 
host_ overlap 1 (Addresses 1 ,Addresses2,Results ), 
flatten(Results,Flat_ Results), 
not(member('conflict' ,Flat_ Results)), 
member(' overlap' ,Flat_ Results), 
true. 
host_ overlap(Policy 1 ,Policy2):-
not(Policy1 = Policy2), 
setof([Op1,Add1],condition(Policy1,_,_,'host_id',Op1,Addl),Addresses1), 
setof([Op2,Add2],condition(Policy2,_,_,'host_id',Op2,Add2),Addresses2), 





%Helper rule to "host_ overlap" above 
% Progresses through the list of host addresses from 
% two policies looking for an overlap 
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% 
host_ overlap 1 ([],U_],[]). 
host_overlap1(U_],[],[]). 
host_ overlap 1 ([[Op 1 ,Value 1 ]!Tail1 ],[[Op2,Value2]1Tail2],[Result1 ,Result2,Result3]):-
not([[Op2,Value2]1Tail2] = []), 
not([[Op1,Value1]1Taill] = []), 
not( address_ overlap(V alue 1, Value2) }, 




not([[Op2,Value2]1Tail2] = []), 
not([[Opl,Value1]1Taill] = []), 
address_ overlap(V alue 1, Value2), 
host_ overlap2(0p 1 ,'X' ,Op2,'X',Resultl ), 
host_overlapl(Tail1,[[0p2,Value2]1Tail2],Result2), 
host_ overlap 1 ([[Op 1 ,Value1 ]!Taill ], Tail2,Result3). 
host_ overlap 1 ([[Op 1, Value 1 ]!Tail1 ],[[Op2,Value2]1Tail2],[Result2,Result3]):-
not([[Op2,Value2]1Tail2] = []), 
not([[Op1,Value1]1Taill] = []), 
address_ overlap(V alue 1, Value2), 
not(host_ overlap2(0p 1 ,'X' ,Op2,'X',_) ), 
host_ overlap 1 (Tail1 ,[[Op2,Value2]1Tail2],Result2), 
host_ overlap l([[Op 1 ,Value1 ]1Tail1 ], Tail2,Result3). 
host_overlap1([[0p1,Value1]1Tail1],[[0p2,Value2]1Tail2],[Result2,Result3]):-
not([[Op2,Value2]1Tail2] = []), 
not([[Op1,Value1]1Taill] = []), 
not( address_ overlap(V alue 1, Value2) ), 
not(host_ overlap2(0p 1 ,'X' ,Op2, 'Y' ,_)), 
host_overlap1(Tail1,[[0p2,Value2]1Tail2],Result2), 
host_ overlap 1([[0p 1 ,Value 1 ]IT ail I ],Tail2,Result3). 
%======================================== 
%Helper rule to "host_overlap1" above 
% Determines if two host values overlap using 
% the specified comparison operator 
% 
host_ overlap2('=' ,X,'=',X, 'overlap'). 
host_overlap2('=',X,'=',Y,'nooverlap'):- not(X = Y). 
host_overlap2('=',X,'!=',X,'conflict'). 
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host_overlap2('=',X,'!=',Y,'overlap'):- not(X = Y). 
host_ overlap2('!=',X, '=',X, 'conflict'). 
host_overlap2('!=',X,'=',Y,'overlap'):- not(X = Y). 
host_ overlap2('!=' ,X,'!=' ,X, 'overlap'). 
host_overlap2('!=',X,'!=',Y,'overlap'):- not(X = Y). 
%============================================= 
% Determines if IP protocol addresses overlap 
% 
address_overlap([DotliTaill],[Dot21Tail2]):-
Dotl = Dot2, 
address_overlap(Taill,Tail2). 
address_ overlap([Dotl LJ,[Dot2LJ):-
Dotl = '*'; 
Dot2 = '*'. 
address_overlap([],[]). 
%============================================ 
% Determines if message specified for a policy path 




setof(Link, message_conflict_helper(Policy,L,Link]), Links), 
flatten(Links,Flattened _Links), 
generate _list_pairs(Flattened _Links, List_ of_ Pairs), 
remove_ dups(List_ of _Pairs,Results ). 
message_ conflict(Policy ,[]):-
path(Policy,_,_), 
not( setof(Link, message_ conflict_ helper(Policy ,L,Link ]), _) ). 
%============================================= 
% Given a policy, return a list of links that do 




policy_ message(Policy ,Message), 
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message_ supported(Path,Message,Results ), 
not(Results = []). 
%=========================================== 
% Create a list of link, message pairs such that 





not(path _ message(Link,Message )). 
message_ supported([Src,Dst],Message, []):-
link(Link,Src,Dst), 
path _message(Link,Message ). 
message _supported([Src,DstJTail], Message, Results):-
link(Link,Src,Dst ), 
path_ message(Link,Message ), 
message_ supported([DstJTail], Message,Results ). 
message_ supported([Src,DstJTail], Message, [Link,MessageJResults ]):-
link(Link,Src,Dst ), 
not(path _ message(Link,Message )), 
message_ supported([DstJTail], Message,Results ). 
%=========================================== 
% Modify a given list of items into a list of 




generate _list_pairs([Node,MessageJTail],[[Node,Message ]!Tail_ Results]):-
generate _list_pairs(Tail, Tail_ Results). 
%,=============================================== 









remove_ dups(Tail,List ). 
%========================================== 
% Concat two lists together 
% 
conc([],L,L ). 
cone( [X ILl], L2, [X I L3]) :- conc(Ll,L2,L3). 
%,================================================ 











% print_ conflict_list: 
% Output nicely each policy conflict that could not 
% be resolved using the ID of policy's creator 
print_ unresolved_ conflict_ list([]). 
print_ unresolved_ conflict_list([L_,_,_,_,_,[]]ITail]):-







Value 1 = V alue2, 
nl,nl,write('Conflict '), 
write(Policy 1 ), 
write(' < > '), 
write(Po licy2 ),nl, 
write(' '), 
write(Policy 1 ), 
write(' Path = ['), 





write_ targets(T arget 1 ),nl, 
write(' '), 
write(Policy2), 








print_list(Pennit_ results ),nl, 
print_unresolved_conflict_list(Tail). 





not(Value1 = Value2), 
print_ unresolved_ conflict_list(Tail). 
%======================================================= 
% print_conflict_list: 
% Output nicely policy conflicts that could be 
%resolved using the ID of the policy's creator 
% 
print _resolved_ conflict_list([]). 
print_reso lved _ conflict_list([L_,_,_,_,_,[]] IT ail]):-
print_resolved _ conflict_list(Tail). 
print_resolved_conflict_list([[Policy1,Path1,Target1,Policy2,Path2,Target2,Pennit_results]ITail] 
) :-
policy_ owner(Policy 1 ,Owner 1 ), 
policy_ owner(Policy2,0wner2), 
user( Owner 1 ,Value 1 ), 
user(Owner2, Value2), 
not(V alue 1 = Value2), 
nl,nl, write('Conflict '), 
write(Policy 1 ), 
write(' < > '), 
write(Policy2),nl, 
write(' '), 
write(Policy 1 ), 
write(' Path = ['), 
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write _path(Path 1 ),nl, 
write(' '), 
write(Policy 1 ), 
write(' Targets: '), 
write_ targets(Target1 ),nl, 
write(' '), 
write(Policy2 ), 







write('Target Conflicts: '), 
print _list(Pennit _results ),nl, 
print_how_resolved(Policyl,Valuel,Policy2,Value2), 
print _resolved_ conflict_list(Tail). 





Value1 = Value2, 
print_resolved _ conflict_list(Tail). 
%======================================================= 
% Print nicely the how the a policy conflict was resolved 
% 
print_how_resolved(Policyl,Value1,Policy2,Value2):-
Value1 < Value2, 
write(' '), 
write('Resolved: '), 
write(Policy 1 ), 
write('(Priority = '), 
write(V alue 1 ), 
write(')'), 
write(' overrides=> '), 
write(Policy2), 
write('(Priority = '), 
write(Value2), 
write(') '),nl. 
print_how _resolved(Policy1, Value I ,Policy2,Value2):-





write('(Priority = '), 
write(V alue2), 
write(')'), 
write(' overrides=> '), 
write(Policy 1 ), 
write('(Priority = '), 
write(V alue 1 ), 
write(') '),nl. 
%================================================== 




not( empty(Tail) ), 
write( C), 
write(' = '), 
write(V), 
write(', '), 








% is a helper function used to output 
% a list with all the atoms quoted. 










% write nicely the target list of a policy 
% 

















% Print out any message conflicts beween a path 
% and the links used to compose it. 
% First step is to generate the list of conflicts 
% step 2 is to output a list if not empty 
% 
print_ message_ conflict_list:-
not( setof(Link _Message, print_ message_ conflict_ list_ helper(Link _Message),_) ),fail. 
print_message _ conflict_list:-
setof(Link _Message, 
print_ message_ conflict_ list_ helper(Link _Message ),Message_ Conflicts), 
write_ message_ conflicts(Message _Conflicts ),fail. 
%=================================================================== 
% Return a list of links and nodes that do not support 
%the "messages" require by a policy path 
% 
print_ message_ conflict_ list_ helper(Message _Conflicts):-
path(Policy,_,_), 
setof(Link _Message, message_ conflict(Policy ,Link_ Message ),Message_ Conflicts). 
%,===================================================================== 
% Print nicely all the policies that contain message conflicts 
% 
write_ message_ conflicts([]). 
168 
write_ message_ conflicts([Message _ ConflictjTail]):-
write _message_ conflict(Message _ Conflict),nl, 
write_ message_ conflicts(Tail). 
%======================================================= 
% Write out a individual message conflict for a policy 
% 
write_ message_ conflict([]). 
write_message_conflict([[Policy, Message_list] I Policy_Message_Tail]) :-
write(Policy),write(' requires message support on the following links'),nl, 
write_ message_ conflict_ helper 1 (Message _list), 
write_ message_ conflict(Policy _Message_ Tail). 
%,======================================================= 
% Print each link that does not support the "message" on the path 
% 
write_ message_ conflict_ helper 1 ([]). 
write_message_conflict_helper1([[Link,Message] jTail]):-
write(' '), 
write('link "'),write(Link),write("' requires support for message 
"'), write(Message ), write(""),nl, 
write_ message_ conflict_ helper 1 (Tail). 
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